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Abstract 
The effect of government intervention on business is a longstanding topic in political 
economy. One of the interesting cases is in recent China, where ―socialism with Chinese 
characteristics‖ is associated with three decades of rapid economic growth. However, many 
doubt the sustainability of the ―dual-track‖ approach applied in China, which tries to combine 
―market track‖ and ―planned track‖ and achieve national goals without sacrificing firm-
specific efficiency.  
This thesis investigates how the ―market economy model dominated by political 
capital‖ works in Chinese OMAs. We look at Chinese overseas M&As in the period of 1994-
2009. It is a good example because 80% of Chinese overseas M&A took place after China’s 
―Go Global‖ policy, and approximately half of the executors are state-owned enterprises. We 
test whether China’s Go Global policy affected shareholders’ wealth while pursuing 
government’s long-term goals of strategic resource-seeking and industry restructuring. 
The results show that Chinese OMAs achieved significantly positive performance in 
the short-run. However, performance decreased and became statistically insignificant over a 
longer three-year horizon. We find no evidence in the short-run responses of markets that the 
Go Global policy sacrificed shareholder wealth. However, we find OMAs by state-owned 
enterprises significantly underperformed private enterprises in the three years following 
completion of the deal. And there is evidence OMA performance varied across different 
sectors in the before and after policy periods. 
We also develop a generalized event study approach that pools multi-listings in event 
samples and ―weights‖ individual listings by the new information they provide. We think this 
approach can be applied to other empirical studies in international/emerging markets settings.  
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Chapter One Introduction 
1.1. Why China, Why OMA? 
China’s modernization and prosperity over the last three decades has been described 
as the ―China Miracle‖. Since economic reform and open policy in China, the Chinese gross 
domestic product (GDP) has grown at an average annual rate of 9.8 percent according to 
official statistics (Chang, 2008). What is more, the rate of growth seems to be accelerating 
with an increasing trade surplus and foreign exchange reserves.  
Yet by each of the criteria that westerners considers crucial to economic success, 
China scores poorly or worse. Outsiders criticize Chinese growth pattern for grafting a free-
market mechanism onto a Marxist structure. They argue that a true market economy requires 
the rule of law, which in turn requires institutional restraints on government. However, the 
communist party in China insists on remaining above the law, and ―attempt to reform a 
system that is essentially unreformable‖; as they are unlikely to tolerate more development of 
the various private sectors (Chang, 2008). 
In fact, the Chinese government attributes the success of the country’s three-decade 
rapid economic development to ―socialism with Chinese characteristics‖. This approach can 
be described as a ―market economy model dominated by political capital‖. It is characterized 
by a strategy of utilizing government’s coercive power to cultivate national brands and global 
players. It places a premium on quick-witted decision-making in investment, especially 
construction in transportation and infrastructure. 
With common wealth in control (so-called government capitalization), the Chinese 
government supports domestic companies in ―pillar industries‖ to Go Global to keep more of 
the rewards in China. At the firm-specific level, this is a different approach than that of 
efficiency-seeking businesses. The latter rationalise the structure of established resources in 
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such a way that the investing companies can gain from the common governance of 
geographically dispersed activities. 
In this thesis, we analyze Chinese overseas mergers and acquisitions (OMAs) with a view 
to evaluating the effect of government’s political policy on Chinese OMA activities. 
1.1.1 “Three Carriages” in Chinese Economic Development 
The so-called ―Three Carriages‖ in Chinese economic development are investment, 
export, and consumption. Initially, investment has been the focus of government attention. 
Apart from overseas investment, much investment on public facilities has been aimed at 
supporting the domestic economic environment, with the intent of creating a multiplier effect 
on gross domestic product (GDP).  
The second carriage is export. It is believed that a large trade surplus contributes to 
economic prosperity, and accelerates the growth of manufacturing industries. However, as an 
emerging economy, ordinary Chinese people do not enjoy strong support from a social 
insurance system. As a result, citizens need to worry about expenditure on education, 
healthcare and housing, which limits their consumption power.   
Chinese labour-intensive products are well known in world markets. However, the 
unwanted by-products of this kind of export-oriented economy are pollution and energy 
consumption. Trade conflict is another consideration. Economists argue China’s current 
economic development pattern is not sustainable. And that overseas M&A is a possible 
solution for industry restructuring and trade substitution. 
1.1.2. Motives of Chinese OMAs 
OMAs provide a means whereby the Chinese economy can acquire strategic resources for 
sustainable growth. Examples of strategic resources are energy, land or human resources. It is 
also regarded as a learning process for technology improvement and industry upgrading 
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(Cantwell, 1989). Intangible assets such as patents, property rights and brands are also critical 
resources in competitive markets. OMAs can speed up the growth of Chinese multi-national 
enterprises (MNEs) by gaining control of these.  
OMAs are also a path to create and expand markets. Traditional Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) theories suggest that overseas M&As perform as trade substitution 
(Buckley & Casson, 1976; Hymer, 1960; Vernon, 1966). Firms achieve foreign market share 
by operating subsidiaries in the host countries instead of exporting. Meantime, some Chinese 
enterprises serve as parts and auxiliary-equipment manufacturers for developed multinational 
giants. To provide more convenient service and gain market share in the foreign markets, 
they are tempted to move to the developed countries (Lall, 1983; Lecraw, 1993; Wells, 
1983b).   
Chinese OMAs are easily funded by excessive liquidity. Mergers and acquisitions occur 
when the economy is booming, and free cash flow encourages managers of firms to expand 
their market power and managerial scale (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). With the accumulated 
wealth of 3 decades of economic growth - and the associated savings of households, 
enterprises and governments - Chinese MNEs are easily financed in OMA activities.  
Finally, Chinese Overseas M&As can be one of the solutions to mitigate pressure on 
RMB appreciation, which derives from the huge foreign exchange reserves of China. U.S. 
dollar assets constitute the bulk of Chinese foreign exchange reserves. As the U.S. dollar has 
depreciated over time, Chinese MNEs find it cheaper to purchase foreign assets and are more 
likely to invest abroad. 
1.1.3. Motives of This Research  
In contrast with the large scale of overseas M&A studies in developed countries, little 
research has been conducted on overseas M&As from emerging economies. Some 
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researchers have noticed considerable overseas investment from emerging economies over 
the last few decades. However, their focus has been the motivations of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and theories on location and industry distribution. Few of them employ 
empirical analysis to investigate Chinese overseas M&A performance and determinants.  
However, it is a critical research topic to examine Chinese OMA performance and their 
determinants. From the perspective of economic development, it is a good example to see to 
what extent government intervention can influence business activities. At the firm-specific 
level, it provides an opportunity to study how government policy affects shareholder wealth. 
This research enriches knowledge of OMAs in emerging market settings. Top managers and 
policy makers in similar economic setting can also get useful information from an analysis of 
the determinants of OMA performance.  
In all, China’s open and reform policy in the past decades has created a better economic 
environment for domestic firms to expand overseas, which is consistent with John Dunning’s 
dynamic FDI development theory (Dunning, Kim, & Lin, 2001). The Chinese economy is 
now integrating with the world. The growth pattern of China and Chinese overseas M&A 
activities needs to be better understood by the rest of the world, which is the reason we 
choose it as the thesis topic.   
1.2. Introduction of Chinese OMAs1 
Chinese firms started overseas M&A activity in the mid 1980s. There are four major 
waves of Overseas M&As. The first wave (1994-1998) was triggered by the return of Hong 
Kong to China, as money from the mainland flowed into Hong Kong to take control of 
strategically important assets in the city. The second wave (1999-2002) is characterized by 
                                                 
 
1
 The main data sources for Chinese OMAs are Thomson’s SDC Platinum M&A Database. We also take 
reference from World Investment Report (2010, 2009), Morck, Yeung & Minyuan (2008) and Hemerling, 
Michael D. & Michaelis (2006). 
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Chinese companies buying out their foreign partners. The third wave (2002 and after) 
emerged after the Go Global policy was adopted as part of the 10
th
 Five Year Plan, along 
with government announcements of loosening controls on outward investment by Chinese 
firms. In this period, Overseas M&A activities have covered a far broader range of industries 
and target countries with larger deal size (please see Figure 2 in Chapter Three for details). A 
fourth wave of Chinese OMAs occurred after the global financial crisis (2007 and after). 
44.6% of the OMA deals, and 29.8% of total deal value happened during the fourth wave.
2
 
World Investment Reports lists the Chinese mainland as ranked 6
th 
of the top 20 home 
economies in global FDI outflows in the year 2009, compared to 13
th
 in 2007 (World 
Investment Report, 2009; 2010). 
Natural Resources and High-Technology industries lead the recent Chinese OMA wave 
with 66% of total deals.
3
 The rapid increase in natural resource OMAs (3% during the pre-
policy period to 33% of total deals in the post-policy period) is driven by China’s quest for 
sufficient supplies of energy and other natural resources to fuel its rapid development. As an 
integral part of a modern industrial infrastructure, advanced technologies are regarded as 
strategic resources for sustainable growth. High-Technology industries are high-value added, 
less energy-consuming and low pollution. They are pillar industries for government’s goal of 
industry modernization.  
Developed targets account for approximately 68.8% of deal numbers and 64.9% of the 
total deal value of Chinese OMAs.
4
 The extraordinarily large share of 74.2% Hong Kong 
targets in the pre-policy period declined to 27.8% after the Go Global policy.
5
 Of the Natural 
resources industries, the primary industry targets are located mostly in South-east Asia, 
                                                 
 
2
 Please see Table 1 in Chapter Three for details. 
3
 Please see Table 13 in Chapter Three for details.  
4
 Please see Table 2 in Chapter Three for details. 
5
 Please see Table 13 in Chapter Three for details. 
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Russia and in Africa; whereas the mineral targets are located in South America and Australia. 
The targets in manufacturing industries tend to be in nations with high trade barriers, while 
service industry targets tend to be in developed and emerging economies. 
1.3. Research Design 
This thesis is arranged according to four main research tasks: (i) To evaluate short-and 
long-run performance of Chinese OMAs in stock markets. (ii) To test the effects of the Go 
Global policy on OMA performance. (iii) To investigate the determinants of OMA 
performance. (iv) To develop an econometric approach to include multi-listings in event 
studies of OMA performance. 
Firstly, we are interested in whether Chinese OMAs create value for shareholders in the 
short- and long-run. We employ standard event study methodologies to test stock market 
performance of Chinese acquirers.  
Secondly, we exam how the Go Global policy affects Chinese OMA performance. We 
break the whole sample into pre- and post-policy period and employ (i) multi-variate 
regression and (ii) a Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition procedure to accomplish this goal. 
Thirdly, we test the relationship between OMA performance and determinants. We group 
performance determinants into three categories: bidder’s endowment, transaction details, and 
target location variables. Univariate and multivariate regression are used to investigate the 
respective relationships. 
Lastly, we develop a procedure to include multi-listings in event studies. Cross-listings 
provide additional information. And in emerging market setting, these listings usually mean 
more transparent firms’ financial statements and a better investor’s protection environment. 
Moreover, the inclusion of more observations is especially valuable for emerging markets, 
where sample size and time series data are limited for standard empirical study. If we can 
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correct the heteroscadesticity and cross-sectional correlation in multi-listings, it is possible to 
put multi-listings in the sample pool and obtain better estimates. 
1.4. Findings 
We report our finding in three research chapters. Chapter Three employs daily data to 
investigate the Go Global policy and its impact to Chinese short-run OMA performance. We 
find that over the 1994-2009 period, abnormal returns are positive and significant on the (-1,1) 
interval. However, markets responded less favourably to Chinese OMAs after the Go Global 
policy. We investigate three hypotheses: (i) the Demand and Supply Hypothesis, (ii) the 
Government Capitalization Hypothesis, and (iii) the Hubris and Herding hypothesis. We find 
no evidence in favor of the ―government capitalization‖ or ―hubris and herding‖ hypothesis. 
We conclude that the deregulation of overseas investment after ―Go Global‖ era increased the 
number of deals, which had the effect of decreasing inframarginal rents associated with those 
deals.  
Chapter Four looks at long-term OMA performance and their determinants. Monthly data 
are employed to examine one-, two- and three-year calendar-time abnormal returns (CTARs) 
after Chinese OMAs. The Fama-French Three Factor Model is generally supported on asset 
pricing in our dataset. We find some evidence of positive one- and two-year CTARs, though 
the results are not significant. However, by the third year after an OMA event, these returns 
become very small, and remain insignificant. We note OMA performance varies across 
different sectors. The Chinese trade sector suffered a significant drop in OMA performance in 
the post-policy period. Further, short-and long-run performance determinants differ. We also 
find that government ownership is negatively and significantly related to long-run 
performance as measured by yearly CTAR. 
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 Chapter Five develops a new methodology for event studies that allows multi-listings. 
This approach suits empirical studies in emerging economies where markets are partially 
segmented, and relatively few observations can be collected in a short period of time. We use 
GLS to ―weight‖ multi-listings according to the new information they provide, such that 
consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates of abnormal returns are produced. We apply 
the new approach on Chinese OMA daily data. The results show significant, positive 
abnormal returns on the (-1,1) window, but the estimate of CARs falls from over 1 percent to 
approximately 0.2%. We suggest that this new approach may be useful in other emerging 
market research situations.  
1.5. Contribution 
This thesis focuses on stock market performance of Chinese acquirers on overseas 
M&A events (OMAs) from 1994 through 2009. Our research contributes to the literature in 
the following ways: 
(i) We investigate how the ―market economy model dominated by political capital‖ 
works in Chinese OMAs. We find that the Go Global policy speeds up Chinese OMAs by 
number and scale. Half of all OMAs are initiated by political capital. We find no evidence 
that this government policy destroys OMA value in the short-run. Nor is there evidence that 
top-manager’s irrational expansion adversely affects short-run OMA performance. However, 
in the long-run, political capital (government ownership) is found to be significantly and 
negatively related to performance. This suggests that greater reliance on private capital 
involvement would be good for OMA performance and sustainable growth. 
(ii) Our study uses the largest sample size to date to study Chinese short- and long-run 
OMA performance. 
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(iii) Our study expands the analysis of OMAs beyond domestic listings to include 
listings on foreign markets (Hong Kong and the U.S.). Our results evidence that Chinese 
multi-listings supply useful additional information about market evaluations of Chinese 
OMAs. 
(iv) We develop a new procedure for conducting event studies using multi-listing 
information. We believe this approach can be applied to other empirical studies in 
segmented/emerging market settings. 
1.6. Thesis Framework 
This thesis is arranged by six chapters. Chapter Two is an introduction to the literature related 
to my thesis. Chapter Three employs daily data to investigate the effect of the Go Global 
policy on the short-run performance of Chinese overseas M&As. Chapter Four looks at long-
term OMA performance and their determinants with monthly data. Chapter Five introduces a 
new methodology in event study analysis to include multiple listings and applies it to a 
Chinese OMA sample. Chapter Six concludes. 
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Chapter Two Literature Review 
 
This chapter reviews the extensive literature on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) as it relates 
to our topic of Chinese overseas M&As (OMAs). Our review consists of four sections: (i) 
Motives, (ii) Methodology, (iii) Performance and (iv) Determinants. 
Motives of Chinese Overseas M&As (OMA). OMAs are strategic investment decisions 
of multinational enterprises (MNEs). These decisions are driven by many motivations. A 
major difference between Chinese OMAs and those of developed countries is the substantial 
role that government plays. Government policies heavily influence Chinese OMA decision-
making. The motivation of Chinese firms to engage in OMAs needs to be understood within 
this context. 
Event study and assets pricing models. Our analysis employs event study methodology 
and asset pricing models to evaluate short- and long-run performance of Chinese OMAs. In 
this section, we highlight the theory we employed. We also discuss alternative methodologies 
that have been employed in the literature.  
OMA performance. An extensive literature reports on the performance of OMAs. These 
studies obtain different results depending on whether (i) the acquirer or (ii) the target is from 
a developed country. Emerging OMA acquirers are less likely to achieve positive abnormal 
returns. Most studies find negative or zero long-run OMA performance for acquirers. There is 
some evidence that targets fare better.  
OMA Determinants. A large literature investigates the determinants of OMA 
performance. These determinants can be grouped into three categories. Bidder’s endowment 
variables measure characteristics of the bidder, such as firm size, whether the firm is a ―value 
firm‖, and its ownership structure. Transaction detail variables include things such as how the 
bidder financed the OMA deal, and whether professional advisors were employed. Finally, 
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target location variables measure characteristics of the target firm and its resident country, 
such as inward/outward investment policies in host/home countries (country risk), culture 
differences and exchange rate factors.  
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2.1. Motives of Chinese OMAs 
From corporate finance point of view, the motivation of OMAs is to make the investing 
enterprise more profitable and competitive in the markets it serves. Hopkins (1999) sorts the 
motives of domestic M&As into four categories, strategic motives, market motives, economic 
motives and personal motives. For cross-border M&As, he argues that firms’ sources of 
competitive advantage in the global market come from national differences, scale economies 
and scope economies.
6
 Moreover, the motives for cross-border M&A (global strategy) lay in 
achieving efficiency in current operations, managing risks and in innovation and adaptation. 
Behrman (1972) concludes four basic motives of Overseas M&As. They are natural 
resource-seeking, market-seeking, efficiency-seeking and strategic asset or capability-
seeking.
7
 Natural resource-seeking means MNEs are prompted to invest abroad to acquire 
particular and specific resources of a higher quality at a lower real cost than could be 
obtained in their home countries. Market-seeking OMAs aim to sustain or protect existing 
markets or to exploit or promote new markets. The efficiency-seeking OMAs’ goal is to 
rationalise the structure of established investment to achieve economies of scale and scope, 
and risk diversification. The strategic asset or capability-seeking is to promote MNE’s long-
term strategic objectives by acquiring the assets of foreign corporations.  
    Studies that focus on Chinese OMAs emphasize the resource and strategic asset seeking 
motivations of Chinese MNEs. Deng (2009) argues that more Chinese companies are using 
cross-border merger and acquisition to access resource and strategic assets so as to address 
                                                 
 
6
 ―Economies of scale‖ refers to reductions in unit cost of a single product as the size of a facility and the usage 
levels of other inputs increase. ―Economies of scope‖ refers to lowering average cost for a firm in producing two 
or more products. It makes product diversification efficient if they are based on the common and recurrent use 
of proprietary knowhow or on an indivisible physical asset. 
7
 Apart from the above four motivations of OMAs, Dunning (2008) rises the concept of ―escape investment‖. 
He argues that the ―round-tripping‖ of investment between China and Hong Kong to exploit incentives granted 
only to foreign investors. OMAs may be an escape strategy to tax or other government regulations. 
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their competitive disadvantages. Rui & Yip (2008) suggest that Chinese firms strategically 
use OMAs to acquire strategic capabilities, make use of institutional incentives and minimize 
institutional constraints.
8
  
    Antkiewicz and Whalley (2007) argue that the main motives for Chinese OMAs are related 
to recent changes in official Chinese policy that encourage domestic companies to invest 
abroad for the purpose of securing domestic energy demand as well as acquiring advanced 
technology.  
    Much OMA activities have been undertaken either directly by nation states, or with their 
support and encouragement.  
―Governments of the investing countries are also interested in the outcome of the 
activities of MNEs, then, by influencing the conduct of such firms or their affiliates, they 
may affect the amount and pattern of FDI.‖ (Dunning, 2008) 
    Svedberg (1982) reveals that most early British investments in North America and 19
th
 
century investments by European colonial powers in the developing countries were 
government orientated. Sauvant (2005) shows some evidence that SOEs from Brazil & 
Russia are becoming more active as foreign investors.  
Dunning (2008) argues that governments may affect the capacity and willingness of 
domestic firms to extend themselves to overseas markets by creating new incentives or 
structures; and influencing market conditions. In China, the Chinese government’s decision 
to ―go global‖ is targeted towards industry restructuring and increasing national competitive 
power by appealing to national interest. Based on this principal strategy, a series of 
                                                 
 
8
For example, lack of developed intellectual property rights frequently discourages firms to maximize their 
effort in R&D, despite government’s efforts of encouraging and supporting numerous R&D projects at different 
times. This led to low R&D investment and technology level, and eventually the motive of Chinese firms to 
access the need from foreign companies. 
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promotional measures were announced in the several years following 2000.
9
 Firstly, foreign 
exchange controls were relaxed. After the regulations ―Notice on Simplifying Foreign 
Exchange Administration relating to OFDI 2003‖, ―Further Measures on Foreign Exchange 
Administration Stimulating OFDI 2005‖, and ―Supplement Measures of Foreign Exchange 
Usage for OFDI 2006‖, the quota for purchasing foreign exchange for overseas investments 
was revoked and the necessary foreign exchange for domestic investors to invest abroad was 
extended to self-owned foreign exchange, the foreign exchange purchased by RMB, and 
domestic and overseas foreign exchange loans.  
The second promotional measure was tax relief, and credit/loans support. A guidance 
catalogue was issued by the Ministry of Commerce (MOC). Firms complying with these 
requirements receive preferential treatment in situations concerning funding, tax collection, 
foreign exchange, customs, etc.  
Thirdly, the Chinese government transformed its role from being a regulator of OMAs to 
being a supporter of OMAs. Approval processes were simplified, the threshold sums of OMA 
projects degraded, and an information bank set up to provide guidance and coordination of 
firms’ OMAs.  
        Luo, Xue and Han (2010) develop the logic that Chinese OMA policies are 
economically imperative and needed to offset the competitive disadvantage of Chinese MNEs 
in global competition. In terms of the eclectic paradigm, OMA promotion policies strengthen 
O-specific advantage of MNEs in the world market.
10
 Further, the institutional environment 
in China magnifies the effects of the ―Go global‖ policy because many Chinese MNEs are 
state-owned enterprises or have considerable government ownership.  
                                                 
 
9
 Details of comprehensive extant OFDI Policy Regime in China please see Table 1 in Y. Luo et al. How 
emerging market governments promote outward FDI: Experience from China, Journal of world business 45 
(2010), page 73-74. 
10
 O-specific advantage comes from Dunning’s Ownership advantage in his eclectic paradigm. Please see 
Dunning and Lundan (2008), page 95-109 for details. 
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       We conclude from our reading of the literature on Chinese OMAs that the motives of 
Chinese OMAs are primarily based on seeking resources and strategic assets. The long-term 
economic and political goals of the Chinese government are the main purpose of OMAs, not 
the short-term profitability interests of shareholders. However, as individual firms are critical 
components of a market economy in the long run, government strategic goals must be 
consistent with firms’ performances. Positive short- and long-run shareholders’ abnormal 
returns are the prime detector of appropriate OMA decision-making. 
2.2. Event Study and Asset Pricing Models 
     Under the weak form of the efficient markets hypothesis, M&A announcements are 
information shocks that affect stock market prices. Econometricians have developed ―event 
study‖ methodologies to capture investors’ responses to M&A events, and evaluate M&A 
performance accordingly. They believe the magnitude of abnormal performance at the time 
the event actually occurs is a measure of the impact of the respective event on the wealth of 
firms’ claimholders. 
2.2.1. Event-time Approach 
Most event studies have focused on the behaviour of share prices in order to test whether 
their stochastic behaviour is affected by the disclosure of firm-specific events.
11
  Time series 
returns are split into an estimation period and a test period. daily abnormal returns are 
calculated by subtracting expected returns from actual returns during the test period (Norman, 
1992). 
(1)    ( )it it itAR R E R   
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 See Norman Strong, Modeling abnormal returns: a review article, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 
June 1992, page 533-553. 
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Researchers use different benchmarks to calculate expected abnormal returns. Examples 
are mean adjusted returns, market adjusted returns, returns produced from the capital asset 
pricing model, returns from a control portfolio, and predicted returns from the market model. 
Of these, the market model is the most popular. 
Under the market model, researchers estimate the following specification, 
(2)   it i i mtR R   ; 
where i indicates a specific share, t is a day during the estimation window and Rmt is the 
observed return of an appropriate market portfolio at time t.  
 The coefficients estimated from this regression, ˆi  and 
ˆ
i  are then used to calculate 
expected or predicted, returns during the test window. 
(3)      ˆˆ ˆit it i i mtE R R R     
    Interval abnormal returns aggregate daily abnormal returns for specified intervals around 
the announcement date.  
2.2.1.1. Abnormal Return Measurement 
    Brown and Warner (1980; 1985) analyse monthly/daily returns and use simulation 
procedures to examine various methodologies which are used in event-time approach. They 
compare the performance of the market model with methodologies using Fama-MacBeth 
residuals and control portfolios.
12 13
 They find the market model outperforms the more 
complicated Fama-MacBeth and control portfolio methods.  
                                                 
 
12
 There are different versions of CAPM in empirical studies. Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) prefer a constant 
beta approach, which implies the betas for portfolios are constant over the full period. However, Fama and 
MacBeth argue that betas are non-stationary. The t-statistics are biased upward under constant bata assumption. 
In their approach, the portfolio betas differ by estimating according to different time periods (generally 60 past 
daily/monthly data points). Therefore their estimation automatically corrects for cross-sectional correlations in 
the return errors by calculating realized parameter variance. Please see Fama and MacBeth (1973) for details. 
However, academic papers have tended to use the simpler approach of employing the full sample to estimate 
one constant beta for each portfolio. 
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    As the timing of an event is not known precisely in some cases, event dates are not 
identified with certainty. using interval abnormal returns is a way to avoid the risk of missing 
an the event. Researchers employ two ways to calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). 
Some researchers (Brown & Warner, 1980; Keown & Pinkerton, 1981) sum up cumulative 
daily abnormal returns in the test period, say from day (-30) till day (30) as follows:
14
 
(4)  1t t tCAR CAR AR     
The associated cumulative abnormal returns should be a random walk before the 
announcement date. It jumps dramatically on day 0, with no further drift thereafter.  
Other researchers (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; J. Doukas & Travlos, 1988; Mikkelson & 
Partch, 1986) investigate different interval cumulative abnormal returns for each security i. 
Example intervals are days (-60,-2), or days (1, 20). In general, the interval begins with day 
T1 and ends with T2, where T1 and T2 are specific to event announcements.
15
 The formula is 
as follow: 
(5)  
2
1
T
it it
t T
CAR AR

    
      A finding of significant cumulative abnormal returns over the interval (-1,1) indicates the 
event has increased or decreased wealth. If significant cumulative abnormal returns are 
observed before the announcement date, for example days (-20,-2), or days (-10,-5), it implies 
information leakage before the announcement. A finding of significant CARs after the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
13
 Control portfolios approach is to form the sample securities into a portfolio with an estimated   of 1. 
Regardless of the risk level of each sample security, the portfolio thus formed should have the same risk as the 
market portfolio. Those securities comprising the market portfolio become a ―control portfolio‖ in the sense that 
the market portfolio has the same risk level as the sample securities, but is not experiencing the ―event‖ under 
study. The performance measure for day/month 0 is the difference between the average return on the market 
portfolio on the day/month in which the sample securities experience events. 
14
 Please also see Pettway, Sicherman, & Spiess (1993). 
15
 For details, please see Fama, Fisher, Jensen, & Roll (1969; 1997) and Firth (1997). 
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announcement date, say days (1, 5) or days (5,10) suggests that the release of information 
may have been delayed. 
2.2.1.2. Hypothesis Testing 
       The purpose of hypothesis testing in event study is to determine whether abnormal 
returns on the announcement day, or during intervals around the announcement day, are 
significantly different from zero. Brown and Warner (1980; 1985) find that parametric t-tests 
achieve higher rejection rates than non-parametric tests (e.g. the sign test and the Wilcoxon 
signed rank test). Standard parametric tests are perform well under (i) non-normality of daily 
returns, (ii) bias in OLS estimates of market model parameters in the presence of non-
synchronous trading, (iii) autocorrelation in daily excess return and variance increases on 
days around an event. 
       Patell (1976) argues that when parameters of the market model are estimated from 
observations outside the test period, abnormal returns are prediction errors rather than true 
residuals. As a result, they should be standardised. Summing the standardised abnormal 
returns across securities, a normalised sum can be formed which is distributed unit normal for 
large N.
16
 The PSR (Patell Standardised Residual) test explicitly recognises the possibility of 
different residual variances across securities, and weights the abnormal returns accordingly. It 
is based on the market model (because the estimated residuals come from OLS estimation of 
the market model). It is widely used for hypotheses testing in event-time approach. (Doukas 
& Travlos, 1988; MacKinlay, 1997).  
2.2.2. Calendar-time Portfolio Approach 
       The calendar-time portfolio approach differs from conventional, market model event-
time approach by estimating a multifactor (e.g. the Fama-French three factor) time-series 
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 Please see Appendix I in Chapter Three for details. 
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regression model for use in computing average abnormal returns. Some of the research takes 
Jensen’s alpha as a measure of abnormal returns of portfolios (Eberhart, Maxwell, & 
Siddique, 2004; Ivkovich, Sialm, & Weisbenner, 2006).
17
 Others apply calendar-time 
abnormal return (CTAR, differences between actual returns and the expected returns) as a 
proxy for abnormal returns (Byun & Rozeff, 2003; Mitchell & Stafford, 2000; Savor & Lu, 
2009).
18
 
       We do not have an estimation period when evaluating performance using the calendar-
time approach. For individual firms/stocks, the investigation period starts from the 
announcement/effective dates and ends three-five years afterwards. The calendar-time 
portfolio approach was first used by Jaffe (1974) to investigate the profitability of insider 
trading. It is currently popular in research on long-run performance (Byun & Rozeff, 2003; 
Mitchell & Stafford, 2000; Savor & Lu, 2009).  
2.2.2.1. Benchmark Model 
     The Sharpe-Lintner CAPM (Lintner & John, 1965; Sharpe, 1964) suggests that the 
expected return on any asset i equals the risk-free interest rate,
fR , plus a risk premium. The 
risk premium is defined as the asset’s market beta, iM , times the premium per unit of beta 
risk, ( )m fR R . This yield the time series regression: 
(6)  ( )it ft i iM Mt ft itR R R R       , 
where an intercept i  is added, but whose expected value is zero for each asset.  
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 Jensen’s alpha: A well-specified asset-pricing model assumes intercept is indistinguishable from zero in the 
time-series regressions (Dunne & Ndubizu, 1995; Harris & Ravenscraft, 1991; Lowinski, Schiereck, & Thomas, 
2004; Mikkelson & Partch, 1986; Pettway et al., 1993). However, Jensen (Merton, 1973) argues that actually 
portfolio  managers in mutual funds can increase returns on the portfolio through successful prediction of future 
security prices. In another word, the intercept (alpha) in assets pricing model can be different from zero. 
18
 Please see Section 4.4.2. in Chapter Four for detailed description of CTAR. 
20 
 
      Fama and French (1992; 1993) highlight the importance of two risk factors in asset 
pricing. They are the size factor (small minus big) and the book-to-market equity factor (high 
minus low). They build a three factor model (FF3FM) and argue that the model captures 
much of the variation in average return for portfolios formed on size, book-to-market equity 
and other price ratios that otherwise cause problems for the CAPM.  
(7)   ( )it ft i iM mt ft is t ih tR R R R SMB HML               
      They also predict that the intercept ― i ‖ will be zero and this is supported by their 
empirical time-series regressions
19
. In other words, they find that overall abnormal returns are 
close to zero after we take market, firm size and book-to-market equity as risk adjustment 
factors. 
2.2.2.2. Market Proxy Returns  
Roll (1977) addresses that the market portfolio at the heart of CAPM is theoretically and 
empirically elusive. All the empirical tests use proxies, not the true market portfolio, and this 
is true for the FF3FM, too.  
Moreover, market proxy becomes a far more serious problem in the global context. Most 
researchers apply world or regional indices contributed by Morgan Stanley. In theory, 
arbitrage activities should eliminate return differences, so that market returns will be identical 
across countries/areas. But in practice, this kind of trading is restricted because of regulations 
or information asymmetry, especially in emerging markets.  
Cho, Eun, & Senbet (1986) provide an empirical investigation of the arbitrage pricing 
theory in an international setting. The results reject the hypothesis that international capital 
markets are integrated.  Fama and French (1998) estimate an international version of FF3FM. 
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 Please see Page 36-27, Table 9a in Fama & French (1993) for evidence.  
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They find the FF3FM is much less reliable when applied to emerging markets compared to 
developed markets. 
       In conclusion, it is tricky to select the right market proxy in empirical tests when we 
apply the calendar-time portfolio approach to evaluate abnormal returns. Further, things get 
worse when emerging markets’ share returns are included in the portfolio.  
2.2.2.3. Clustering 
     The t-test statistic framework in calendar-time approach works properly in a random 
sample. However, if there are extreme firm, industry or calendar clustering in the M&A 
sample, cross-sectional dependence may cause misspecified inference (Lyon, Barber, & Tsai, 
1999). Usually when overlapping returns are included in the sample, researchers adjust the 
variance-covariance matrix to incorporate clustering.    
2.3. Empirical Literature on M&A Performance 
       A large literature examines M&A performance from a varity of perspectives. These 
include the performance of domestic or cross-border M&As, performance of M&As targets 
are in different nations, or in the U.S., or in other developed countries, or in emerging 
countries; short-term versus long-term performance of M&A; performance of bidders versus 
targets; performance measured by accounting method or stock market abnormal returns; 
M&A performance according to various transaction details, such as, different payment 
methods, different transaction forms, etc. 
2.3.1. Domestic M&A Performance 
2.3.1.1. M&A Performance in The U.S.  
      Most papers focus on US M&As. Berkovitch & Narayanan (1993) employ completed 
tender offers data (330 observations in total) from 1963 through 1988 in the U.S. to test 
motives for takeovers. They use the market model and 11-day cumulative abnormal returns 
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(CAR [-5,5] ) to investigate announcement effects for both acquirers and targets. They find 
that, on average, takeovers yield positive CARs for both parties. When takeovers achieve 
positive gains, the total gain increases with competition for the target. 
      Heron & Lie (2002) investigate operating performance associated with U.S. takeovers 
during the period 1985-1997 (859 acquisitions in total). They use the market model and 
three-day CARs (CAR [-1,1] ) to measure abnormal returns. They find no differences after 
takeovers. Neither do they find evidence that the method of payment conveys information 
about an acquirer’s future operating performance. 
      Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz (2005) compare acquiring firms’ returns in three time 
periods, 1980-1990, 1991-2001, 1998-2001 in the U.S. market. They use three-day CARs 
(CAR [-1,1]) to measure M&A announcement effects. They find that the acquiring firm loses 
value in the announcement period, and that the losses of bidders exceed the gains of targets. 
Further, firms announcing acquisitions with large dollar losses perform poorly afterwards. 
    Masulis, Wang, & Xie (2007) use a sample of 3,333 completed acquisitions during the 
period between 1990 and 2003 in U.S.. They examine five-day CARs (CAR [-2,2]) generated 
from the market model and find that acquirers with more anti-takeover provisions experience 
significantly lower announcement-period abnormal returns. Acquirers operating in more 
competitive industries experience higher announcement abnormal returns. Higher CARs are 
generated when the positions of CEO and the chairman of the board are separate. 
         Loughran & Vijh (1997) use acquisitions during 1970-1989 in the U.S. to investigate 
long-term M&A performance (405 observations in total). Fama & French’s size and book to 
market effects are included in their five year-long window for buy-and-hold abnormal return 
measurement. They find significant negative excess returns of -25% in the five-year period 
following the acquisition, whereas cash tender offers earn significantly positive excess 
returns of 61.7%. 
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         Rau & Vermaelen (1998) test acquiring firms’ long-term performance (3 years 
following the completion date) from January 1980 to December 1991 in the U.S. (3169 
mergers and 348 tender offers in total). Monthly ARs and CARs are measured relative to a 
size and book-to-market based benchmark. Bidders in mergers underperform, while bidders 
in tender offers outperform in the three years after the acquisition. However, the long-term 
underperformance of acquiring firms is predominantly caused by the poor post-acquisition 
performance of low book-to-market firms. 
2.3.1.2. M&A in Other Developed Countries 
       Firth (1997) uses New Zealand M&A data (162 observations in total) during the period 
1970-1987. The market model is employed and monthly CAR40s are measured. The results 
indicate that target firm shareholders gain from the takeover process, but that the acquiring 
companies suffer losses. The losses to acquirers are lower when payment is in cash. 
Acquirers who make uncontested bids tend to experience more negative returns. 
        Sudarsanam & Mahate (2003) study completed U.K. M&As with transaction value 
above £10 million over the time period 1983-1995 (519 observations). Four benchmark 
models are employed: mean-adjusted model, market-adjusted model, size-adjusted model and 
market model. Daily buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs), covering the day-spans (-1,1), 
(2,40), (41,750) are measured. They find that acquirers experience BHARs in the region of -
1.4% at the time of the announcement and an average of -15% over the three-year, post-
acquisition period. 
       Andre et al. (2004) focus on long-term M&A performance for Canadian firms with 
transaction values greater than US$10 million over the period 1980-2000 (267 observations). 
They employ the Fama & French Three-factor model and mean calendar-time abnormal 
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return methodology to investigate 12, 24, and 36-monthly returns. They conclude that 
Canadian acquirers significantly underperformed over the three-year, post-event period. 
2.3.1.3. M&A Performance in Emerging Economies 
Li & Chen (2002) use event study methodology to test 349 M&A events in China during 
1999 to 2000. The authors find that M&As generate significant wealth effects for acquirers 
instead of targets. Zhang (2003) investigates 1216 Chinese M&As from 1993 to 2002. On the 
contrary, he finds improved performance for the targets, not the acquirers. Insignificant 
performance is found when the performance of targets and acquirers are combined. 
2.3.1.4. Other M&A Performance Literature  
      Jensen & Ruback (1983) review much of the scientific literature before 1983 and 
conclude that the targets of successful tender offers and mergers earn significantly positive 
abnormal returns on the announcement of offers, and through the completion of offers. 
Targets of unsuccessful tender offers earn significantly positive abnormal returns on the offer 
announcement and through the realization of the failure. Targets of unsuccessful mergers lose 
all positive returns earned in the offer announcement period by the time failure of the offer 
becomes known. However, with respect to acquirers, both successful and unsuccessful 
bidders achieve nonnegative abnormal returns. Takeover gains do not come from the 
acquisition of market power, but from some source of efficiency that also appears to be 
available to rival firms in the industry.  
       Jensen (1986) develops the ―free cash flow‖ theory. He argues that mergers and 
takeovers are more likely to destroy, rather than to create value, especially for bidders. 
Takeovers financed with cash and debts generate larger benefits than those accomplished 
through the exchange of stock. 
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      Healy (1992) uses accounting data from the 50 largest mergers in the U.S. in the period 
1979 to 1983 to evaluate M&A performance. He finds a significant increase in post-merger 
cash flow. Merged firms have significant improvements in operating cash flow return at the 
time of merger announcements. 
       In summary, empirical studies on domestic M&A performance show conflicting results. 
However, most of the papers in this subsection support the idea that acquiring firms suffer 
losses in domestic M&A events. M&As achieve nonnegative abnormal returns when returns 
from acquirers and targets are combined, usually the shareholders of the target firms gain 
more than those of the acquiring firms.  
2.3.2. Cross-border M&A Performance 
Studies on cross-border M&A, however, have quite different results. 
2.3.2.1. Cross-border M&A Performance in The US  
       Doukas & Travlos (1988) study international acquisitions from 1975 to 1983 where 
American firms are either the acquirers or the targets. The market model is employed to 
generate daily ARs over days (-5,5); and the daily mean difference of abnormal returns is 
measured. The authors divide their original sample into three homogeneous subsamples 
according to the degree of international exposure (already operating in the target firm’s 
country, not operating in the target firm’s country, and going abroad for the first time). The 
result shows that shareholders of MNEs not already operating in the target firm’s country 
reap the greatest benefits from international acquisitions when their firms expand into a new 
industry and geographic market. Shareholders of MNEs operating in the target firm’s country 
experience insignificantly negative abnormal returns. Domestic firms expanding 
internationally for the first time experience insignificantly positive valuation effects. 
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   Harris & Ravenscraft (1991) examine 1273 U.S. firms acquired by foreigners during the 
period 1970-1987. The market model is employed to generate daily ARs, CAR (-3,1), and 
CAR (-20,4). Most of the takeovers achieve positive abnormal returns. Harris and 
Ravenscraft argue that the targets of foreign buyers have significantly higher wealth gains 
than the targets of U.S. firms. Also, cross-border takeovers are more frequent in research and 
development-intensive industries. In addition, the M&A effect is positively related to the 
weakness of the U.S. dollar.  
Morck & Yeung (1992) examine 322 foreign acquisitions by U.S. corporations between 
1978-1988. They find that the mean abnormal return is 0.29%, significantly above zero. 
Firms with information-based assets experience a significantly positive stock price reaction 
upon announcing a foreign acquisition, while firms apparently lacking such assets experience, 
at best, zero abnormal returns. The authors attribute their findings to internalization theory, 
specifically, that firms with technology-related intangible assets experience high abnormal 
returns.
20
 
   Pettway, Sicherman, & Spiess (1993) investigate Japanese acquirers having U.S. 
targets from October 1981 to September 1991. Their data consist of fifty-three Japanese 
acquirers and forty U.S. asset sales. The authors employ the market model and use daily 
cumulative prediction errors (CPEs) to measure announcement wealth impacts. They find 
both Japanese buyers and U.S. sellers achieve significant wealth effects at the time of the 
announcement relative to domestic Japanese M&As. In the case of U.S. assets purchases, 
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 Internalization theory was first developed by Buckley & Casson (1976). It centers on the fact that a MNE 
carries out many activities that are interdependent and related through flows of intermediate products. (These 
include materials, components and semi-finished goods, which are sometimes in tangible forms. More often 
they are in intangible forms and knowledge-based, such as patents, engineering expertise, management and 
marketing skills, and quality control). Since markets for intermediate products are difficult to organize, these 
transactions can be handled more efficiently within the firm by an internal hierarchy rather than by an external 
market. The creation of internal markets brings these activities under the direct ownership and control of the 
firm. 
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Japanese acquirers also gain significantly positive CPEs at the time of the announcement. The 
authors’ results are consistent with the existence of imperfections in globally integrated 
capital markets. 
   Dunne & Ndubizu (1995) employ the market model on daily data to investigate ninety-
five acquisitions of U.S. target firms by foreign bidders in the period 1983-1988. Average 
standardized cumulative abnormal returns (ASCAR) are positive for different subgroups 
during the event window days (-20,20). The results show that acquirers who write off 
goodwill against a reserve account provide significantly greater abnormal returns to target 
shareholders on the acquisition announcement date than those acquirers who amortize 
goodwill against income. Foreign acquirers already operating in the U.S. transfer more 
wealth to the target than those who are expanding into the U.S. market for the first time. 
   Doukas & Lang (2003) use 156 greenfield investments (having $3 million of 
investment project value or more) of U.S. firms during 1980-1992 and supervise FDI 
performance with respect to geographic diversification. The authors estimate CARs and by-
and hold returns (BHARs). They get significantly negative CAR (-1,0). When the sample is 
broken down into core-related and non-core related investments, core-related investment 
achieves positive 0.24% CAR(-1,0) while non-core related investments suffer -0.38% CAR(-
1,0). The same story happens when 2-year and 3-year BHARs are employed in the study. It is 
obvious that unrelated FDI results in a negative effect and deteriorating performance. 
2.3.2.2. Cross-border M&A Performance in Other Developed Economies 
      Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, & Zulehner (2002) focus on the effects of mergers around the 
world (69,605 observations in total) during the period 1981 to 1998. They use profitability 
and sales to measure the effects of mergers and find that 57% achieve positive profits and 
51.5% generate positive sales one year after the merger. When they extend their horizon to 
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five years after the merger, they find that 54.8% have positive profit and 44.6%, positive 
sales. The authors also employ control-firm analysis to compare the performance of the 
merging firms with nonmerging firms. The results show significant increases in profit, but 
reduction in the sales of the merging firms on average. The authors’ results reveal no major 
differences between domestic and cross-border mergers.  
Andre et al. (2004) focus on Canadian long-term M&A performance with a sample of 
267 events above USD 10 million during 1980-2000. They employ the Fama and French 
Three-factor model, and alpha and mean calendar-time abnormal return (MCTAR) methods 
to investigate 12, 24, and 36-monthly returns. They conclude that Canadian acquirers 
significantly underperform over the three-year post-event period. They argue that cross-
border deals involving Canadian acquirers perform poorly in the long run. 
      Francoeur & Montreal (2005) also employ the Fama and French three-factor model in 
their research. A control-firm event approach and calendar-time approach are used to 
investigate long-term performance of Canadian acquirers in cross-border M&As. They use 
847 cross-border M&A events in the year 1990-2000 and find that firms subsequently 
outperform the level of return generated by their peers within their main industrial sector. 
They find that firms possessing high levels of R&D and a strong combination of R&D and 
intangibles are necessary conditions for achieving better long-term performance. 
      Lowinski, Schiereck, & Thomas (2004) analyze wealth effects of 114 domestic and 
international acquisitions announced by Swiss corporations between 1990 and 2001. They 
apply the market model and find significant positive daily CARs for cross-border acquisitions 
but no difference between national and cross-border M&A announcement effects. The 
authors also find that the expenses of investment bank advice might outweigh the potential 
benefits.  
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2.3.2.3. Cross-border M&A Performance in Emerging Economies  
     Aybar and Ficici (2009) examine 433 merger and acquisitions associated with 58 
Emerging Market Multinational enterprises (EMMs) during the sample period 1991-2004. On 
average, cross-border expansions do not create value. They find that more than half of the 
transactions diminished firm value. The cross sectional regression results show that target 
size, ownership structure of the target, structure of the bidder (diversified vs non-diversified) 
positively affect the bidder value. High-tech nature of the bidder and related OMAs 
negatively affect the bidder value.    
Pradhan and Abraham (2005) examine the patterns and motivations behind overseas 
M&As by Indian enterprises. They find that a large majority of overseas M&As originate 
within the services sector, led by the software industry. The overwhelming number of cases 
are directed towards developed countries. The main motivations of Indian firms’ overseas 
acquisitions are to access international markets, acquire firm-specific assets like technology 
and human skills, exploit operational synergies, overcome constraints from a limited home 
market, and gain sufficient size strength to survive in an increasingly competitive business 
environment. In the manufacturing sector, overseas acquirers tend to be large-sized and 
research-intensive; while they are older, large-sized and export-oriented in the case of the 
software sector. 
      Kim (2003) studied 256 Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) cases of South 
Korean firms during the period January 1992 to June 1997 where the investment exceeds 
$500,000. Using daily AARs and CARs, they conclude that OFDI announcements by 
acquirers increase shareholder value. In contract, cross-border investments do not increase 
shareholder wealth for the 30 largest chaebol-affiliates.  Shareholder wealth losses are greater 
when corporate ownership is concentrated. 
30 
 
     Wang & Wang (2006) employ accounting data (ROA, ROE and sales growth) to 
investigate 27 Chinese firms’ performance after they completed outbound M&As in 
developed countries such as the U.S. and countries in the E.U. They find a decrease in the 
three accounting measures in the following two years. 
2.3.2.4. Cross-border M&A Performance in Specific Industries 
   Amihud, Delong, & Saunders (2002) examined 214 cross-border banking mergers 
announced between 1985 and 1998 throughout the world. With daily data and a (-10,1) event 
window, the authors find that CARs for acquirers are negative (approximately 1%) and 
significant. They find a positive, albeit weak, increase in the total risk. They conclude that the 
growth of cross-border banking appears to pose limited systemic risk to the stability and 
solvency of the international banking system. 
   Boubakri et al. (2008) examine the long run performance of M&A transactions in the 
U.S. property-liability insurance industry. With a sample of 177 transactions, of which 30 are 
cross-border, the authors find that M&As in this industry create value in the long-run 
(positive BHARs after 3 years). In addition, tender offers appear to be more profitable than 
mergers. Further, positive returns are significantly higher for frequent acquirers and in 
countries where investor protection is weaker. The study also reports that internal corporate 
governance mechanisms such as board independence and CEO share ownership are 
contributors to the long run positive performance of bidders. 
   A paper titled The Wealth Effect of Cross-border Merger and Acquisitions in The 
Chinese Financial Sector (2008) investigates 37 cross-border M&A transactions in the 
Chinese financial sector (foreign acquirers and Chinese targets) during the period 1990-
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2005.
21
 Employing the market model, the paper shows that both experienced foreign bidders 
and Chinese targets obtain significant positive wealth gains during the event, while 
inexperienced foreign bidders suffer losses. Foreign bidders with Chinese banking targets 
experience positive wealth gains, while they suffer losses with Chinese non-banking targets. 
Moreover, the wealth gains to foreign bidders are positively related to exchange rate volatility 
and to the size, business scope and geographic location of the foreign bidders. Bidders listed 
in Hong Kong experienced better wealth gains than those listed in mainland China.  
2.3.3. Discussion 
Differences in factor endowments between acquirers and targets and uncertain economic 
environments make it difficult for acquirers to integrate international resources, contributing 
to higher investment risks. It is argued that firms should invest abroad only after they have 
attained a sufficient level of development, and achieved a competitive (absolute or 
comparative) advantage in their domestic markets. Due to international market imperfections, 
it is possible for firms involved in cross-border M&As to achieve larger abnormal returns 
than domestic ones. In contrast to the results from the domestic M&A performance research, 
cross-border M&A performance studies tend to find positive gains, or at least zero abnormal 
returns, for acquiring firms. They also find that acquiring firms gain more than targets unless 
a host country’s environment forces them to transfer more wealth to their targets.  
Because of imperfect information and separate international stock markets (different 
benchmarks), it is difficult to collect the completed data required to estimate the performance 
of both acquirers and targets. Therefore, a number of the papers focus on cross-border M&A 
performance in one market, for example, in the US market from both an acquirer and a target 
perspective. More papers focus on acquirers only or targets only. The financial sector is 
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 Author unknown, but the paper is available at www.ccfr.org.cn/cicf2007/download.php?paper
 
. 
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considered as an industry with a special characteristic, thus it is usually investigated 
separately (Altunbarş, Molyneux, & Thornton, 1997; Amihud et al., 2002; Boubakri et al., 
2008; Catarina, Joseph, & Richard, 2007; Marc, Dirk, & Markus, 2006; The Wealth Effect of 
Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions in the Chinese Financial Sector ", 2008).  
Researchers employ different methodologies to evaluate M&A performance (event 
study, accounting method or survey). Event studies are the most common. However, some 
authors use surveys to collect data for long-term cross-border M&As or greenfield investment 
performance. Most papers focus on M&A performance in developed countries, for example, 
the U.S., the U.K., and Canada. Studies focusing on overseas M&As (a subset of OFDI) in 
emerging economies or developing countries are rare. China has attracted attention primarily 
as an important M&A host country, rather than as the home country of acquirers. In the case 
of Chinese cross-border M&As, papers tend to be more about M&A motives, M&A 
strategies, fit and the relationship between M&A and technology development. There have 
been very few empirical papers on Chinese outbound M&A performance. Qualitative rather 
than quantitative studies have been employed in investigating determinants of Chinese 
outbound M&A performance.  
2.4. Performance Determinants 
Generally speaking, the performance of OMAs is jointly decided by M&A transaction 
details, acquirers’ endowments and location of the targets. In emerging markets, the 
government’s promotion policies in OMAs play an important role in their performance.22 
   Firstly, transaction details are regarded one of the key factors of M&A performance. Top 
managers suffer from information asymmetry in M&A transactions. M&As end up with 
unexpected outcomes because of improper asset pricing, miscalculation of overall transaction 
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 Please see Chapter Three for details.  
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value, and employing incorrect forms of acquisition or payment method. Occasionally, 
weaker corporate governance structure leads to top managers’ irrational decision-making, 
causing acquirers to pay too much for the deals (Hymer, 1960; Vernon, 1966). 
Secondly, bidder’s endowment is another consideration in OMA performance. Small 
firms or value firms have consistently superior M&A performance. Acquirer’s ownership 
structure is another factor related to OMA performance. In the emerging markets literature, 
acquirers that cross-listed signal informational transparency and experienced international 
operations. Thus, they are expected to perform better in OMAs.  
Thirdly, target location is one of the critical elements of OMA performance. When 
MNEs invest overseas, the host country’s institutional environment contributes to OMA 
performance. Investor protections vary across different host countries. Favourable foreign 
direct investment (FDI) policies and regulations, financial transparency, the level of 
economic development and political stability are supportive factors for OMA performance. 
Foreign exchange rate volatility and culture differences also affect OMA performance.  
2.4.1. Transaction Details and M&A Performance 
M&A performance varies with different M&A transaction characteristics. In this 
subsection we will cover findings that relate transaction characteristics to M&A performance. 
Key transaction characteristics are methods of payment (cash or stock payment), form of 
acquisition (tender offer or merger), whether the acquirer and target industries are related, the 
role of professional advisors, and the number of bidders. 
2.4.1.1. Method of Payment 
 The method of payment hypothesis (first mentioned in Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
implies that top managers employ cash as their M&A payment only if they have enough cash 
flow and foresee bright prospects for post-merger performance. As an alternative to cash 
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payment, acquirers can exchange stocks with targets to share risk, making the target 
shareholders equity-holders in the acquirer. In other words, if acquirers are sure that an M&A 
will be profitable and do not want to share the extra gain with others, they will choose cash 
payment. Thus the method of payment turns out to be a signal to outside investors as to 
whether a given M&A will be profitable. Many empirical results support the method of 
payment hypothesis (Harford, Mansi, & Maxwell, 2008). 
2.4.1.2. Forms of Acquisition 
The distinction between friendly and hostile takeovers is examined by many researchers 
(Firth, 1997; Jensen, 1986; Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Sudarsanam & Mahate, 2003). Hostile 
takeovers are more costly and often result in failure because the managers of targets find 
ways to defence themselves, for example, a poison pill, or white knight manoeuvres.
2324
 On 
the other hand, a friendly takeover implies that managers of targets are willing to cooperate 
with the bidders during the negotiation and post-merger integration. However, it also may 
indicate weakness. Targets may lack competitive power in the market and need a helping 
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 Poison pills (Or called a shareholder rights plan) is a kind of defensive tactic used by a corporation’s board of 
directors against a takeover. It involves a scheme whereby shareholders will have the right to buy more shares at 
a discount, if one shareholder buys a certain percentage of the company's shares. The plan could be triggered, 
for instance, when any one shareholder buys up 20% of the company's capital, at which point every other 
shareholder (except the one who already possesses 20%) will have the right to buy a new issue of shares at a 
discount. The plan is issued by the board as an ―option‖ or a ―warrant‖ attached to existing shares, and can only 
be revoked at the discretion of the board of directors. The point is that the shareholder who could potentially 
reach the 20% threshold will be a takeover bidder. If every other shareholder will be able to buy more shares at 
a discount, that will mean the bidder's interest will be diluted, and the cost of the bid will rise substantially. If 
the bidder knows that this will happen, the bidder will not attempt to take the corporation over without the 
board's approval. They will negotiate with the board so that the plan is revoked. 
24
 There are two types of white knight. The first type, the white knight, refers to the friendly acquirer of a target 
firm in a hostile takeover attempt by another firm. The intention of the acquisition is to circumvent the takeover 
of the object of interest by a third, unfriendly entity, which is perceived to be less favorable. The knight might 
defeat the undesirable entity by offering a higher and more enticing bid, or strike a favorable deal with the 
management of the object of acquisition. The second type refers to the acquirer of a struggling firm that may not 
necessarily be under threat by a hostile firm. The financial standing of the struggling firm could prevent any 
other entity being interested in an acquisition. The firm may already have huge debts to pay to its creditors, or 
worse, may already be bankrupt. In such a case, the knight, under huge risk, acquires the firm that is in crisis. 
After acquisition, the knight then rebuilds the firm, or integrates it into itself. 
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hand to survive. Given this background, a successful tender offer usually indicates a more 
profitable future than a friendly merger. 
2.4.1.3. Industry Relatedness 
  Firms in related industries usually possess similar technologies and managerial 
structures, which lead to better communication and successful post-merger integration. Firms 
in related industries can also potentially share firm-specific resources, such as distribution 
networks and human resources. Further, top managers often have little knowledge about 
operating firms in unrelated industries. This leads to faulty decision-making and 
misunderstandings between acquirers and targets. These are obstacles to post-merger synergy. 
Therefore, rational investors will make their investment decisions according to the outcome 
of M&A relatedness, which in turn, will set the stock price (Boubakri et al., 2008; Eckbo, 
Giammarino, & Heinke, 1990; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Rau & Vermaelen, 1998). 
2.4.1.4. Professional Advisers  
Bidders employ professional advisors in M&A transactions to gain a better knowledge 
of the targets and thereby make more informed M&A decisions (Doukas & Lang, 2003; 
Dunne & Ndubizu, 1995; Harris & Ravenscraft, 1991; Hopkins, 1999). Professional advisors 
also play an important role in facilitating the transaction and with post-merger integration. 
They are supposed to be better informed and equipped with M&A knowledge, which are 
crucial for a M&A to be successful. These services don’t come cheap. Bidders pay large 
sums of money as fees for their direction. Even with professional advisors, there are no 
guarantees that a deal will be successful. 
The number of bidders is an indicator of the potential value of a target. If it is believed 
in the market that an acquirer might achieve a positive abnormal return from an M&A, which 
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means there are opportunities for excess profits, more bidders will join in the competition 
(Lowinski et al., 2004). 
2.4.2. Acquirers’ Endowment and M&A Performance 
Bidders’ endowment relates to ownership advantage and their capability of exploiting 
benefits after the OMA. Associated variables include firm size, book-to-market equity, 
ownership structure, R&D intensity and OFDI experience of the acquirers.  
2.4.2.1. Firm Size and Leverage Level 
 Banz (1981) finds that, on average, smaller firms have higher risk adjusted returns than 
larger firms. The estimated effect is nonlinear. The main effect occurs for very small firms, 
while there is little difference in returns between average-sized and large firms. Fama and 
French (1992) also find a size effect in their time series regression of CAPM. Asset pricing 
models perform much better when size and leverage factors (SMB and HML respectively) 
are included. Gugler et al. (2002) argue that M&As between small firms increase efficiency 
by creating economies of scale and scope while mergers between large firms increase market 
power. 
Many papers support the view that value firms tend to outperform glamour firms (Rau & 
Vermaelen, 1998; Sudarsanam & Mahate, 2003).
25
 Chan, Hamao, & Lakonishok (1991) find 
a significant positive relationship between book-to-market ratio and expected returns in the 
Japanese share market. Using U.S. data, Fama and French (1992; 1993) find a positive 
relationship between book-to-market equity and expected returns.  
                                                 
 
25
 ―Value firms‖ are high book-to-market ratio firms and ―glamour firms‖ are low book-to-market ratio firms in 
this study. 
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2.4.2.2. Ownership Structure 
Evidence from developed markets indicates that family or CEO share ownership is 
positively related to firm performance (Ben-Amar & Andre, 2006; Boubakri et al., 2008; 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999).  
 Morck et al. (2008) study Chinese OMAs and find that China’s outward foreign direct 
investment was mostly conducted by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Wei, Xie, & Zhang 
(2005) and Hess, Gunasekarage, & Hovey (2008) both apply Tobin’s Q as firm’s 
performance and exam its relationship with Chinese government ownership. Wei, Xie, & 
Zhang (2005) find that Chinese state and institutional shares are significantly, negatively 
related to firm performance. In contrast, Hess, Gunasekarage, & Hovey (2008) find that firms 
with combined state ownership at levels above approximately 35% are superior performers. 
They also find evidence that firms owned by large private shareholders tend to underperform.  
Xu & Wang (1999) and Sun, Tong, & Tong (2002) use accounting data, market-to-book 
ratio (MBR), as a measure of firms’ performance. Xu & Wang (1999) report a positive and 
significant correlation between ownership concentration and profitability. Moreover, Chinese 
firms’ profitability is positively correlated with the fraction of institutional shares, but either 
negatively or uncorrelated with the fraction of state shares and privately-owned tradable 
shares. On the other hand, Sun, Tong, & Tong (2002), report that Chinese government 
ownership and firm performance are positively, but nonlinearly, related. Yet, the relationship 
is nonlinear. When an SOE begins selling a small portion of shares to the public, the firm’s 
performance improves. Beyond a certain level, increased selling of government shares to the 
public is correlated with poorer firm performance. They argue that the government plays 
some important and supportive roles for SOEs.  
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2.4.2.3. R&D Intensity 
  In accordance with internalization theory, the relationship between R&D and cross-
border M&A performance has been explored by a number of researchers. Harris & 
Ravenscraft (1991) find that cross-border takeovers are more frequent in R&D-intensive 
industries than in domestic ones. Morck & Yeung (1992) find firms with information-based 
assets are likely to experience a significantly positive stock price reaction upon announcing a 
foreign acquisition. By contrast, firms without such assets experience, at best, zero, abnormal 
returns.  
         Francoeur & Montreal (2005) suggest in their paper that acquirers engaging in cross-
border M&As are able to realize efficiency gains and create value for their shareholders 
under certain condition such as possessing high levels of R&D and a strong combination of 
R&D and intangibles. Cross-border M&As create value for the acquirers because they can 
bring their expertise and know-how into the international market. 
2.4.2.4. OFDI Experience 
      With respect to the OFDI experience, Dunne & Ndubizu (1995) point out that acquirers 
with previous experience in the U.S. market transfer more wealth to target shareholders than 
those entering the U.S. market for the first time. Uhlenbruck (2004)  use 170 acquisitions in 
Central and Eastern Europe and find evidence that MNEs’ pre-acquisition experience in host 
country are positively related to the growth of acquired foreign subsidiaries.  
2.4.3. Target Location and OMA Performance 
     The location of the target firm becomes an important issue in cross-border M&A deals. 
Different foreign locations will have different levels of country risk, cultural distance, 
exchange rate exposure, and different economic growth rates. These all relate to M&A 
performance. 
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Doukas & Lang (2003) present evidence that geographic diversification increases 
shareholder value and improves long-term performance. Child et al. (2003) shows that 
environment determines business performance (natural selection). They examine business 
environment variables (market attractiveness, intensity of competition, environmental 
unpredictability and resource availability) and institutional environment variables (legal 
support, importance of guanxi, official intervention and arbitrariness of officials) in their 
study. The results show that Hong Kong firms operating under more favourable external 
circumstances in China have a better cross-border M&A performance.  
2.4.3.1. Country Risk  
 Country risk is one of the most important elements in creating differences in cross-
border M&A performance. Generally speaking, developed countries have lower country risk 
than developing countries. Countries with dissimilar social systems have different degrees of 
transparency. Under democratic political systems, a party’s reign is supervised by opposition 
parties, which breeds more transparency in the political environment. In autocratic countries, 
at the opposite end of the spectrum, expropriation occasionally happens, which is considered 
to be a foreign direct investment (FDI) risk by investors. At the same time, corruption is a by-
product of the centralization of power, which acts as a negative investment incentive to 
foreign investors as well.  
2.4.3.2. Cultural Distance 
Cultural distance is another consideration. There are two levels of culture distance. 
Firstly, culture is a ―common psychological process‖. Nations that cannot be grouped by a 
shared language, set of religions or customs are deemed to be different in culture. Similarly, 
at the company level, corporate culture develops in tandem with the firm and becomes one of 
its intangible assets. Staff in the same corporation gradually settle on a shared way of 
40 
 
thinking as to how things should be done, which helps with cooperation in teamwork and 
communication.  
On the other hand, culture differences between corporations will block communication 
and raise transaction costs (Hofstede, 1980; Kogut & Singh, 1988; Morosini, Shane, & Singh, 
1998). It is one of the crucial elements that influence firms’ cross-border M&A strategy. 
Some researchers have found that cultural distance has a negative effect on post-merger 
performance (Li, Lam, & Qian, 2001).  
Others, however, obtain the opposite result. Morosini et al. (1998) examine 52 cross-
border M&As in 1987-1992 and they find a positive association between national cultural 
distance and cross-border acquisition performance. Larsson & Finkelstein (1999) also argue 
that cultural distance improves post-merger performance, and that cross-border M&As lead to 
higher potential firm value and lower staff attrition because of mutual complementarity of 
resources. Cultural distance is thus deemed to be a ―soft‖ resource of comparative advantage.  
2.4.3.3. Foreign Exchange Rate 
Foreign exchange rate has little effect on domestic M&A performance. However, it does 
matter for bidders and targets in cross-border M&A transactions. Furthermore, the 
relationship between foreign exchange rate and OMA performance has multiple dimensions. 
The first is transaction exposure. When bidders and targets successfully finish their 
negotiation, the exchange rate variation between two or more currencies will decide the final 
deal value in their local currencies. If currency in the acquirer’s home country has 
depreciated, it raises the transaction costs for the acquirer. Alternatively, if the currency in 
target’s country has depreciated, the bidders will pay less for the same deal.  
The second aspect is operating exposure. This is also called economic exposure with 
respect to cross-border M&As. Subsidiaries of multinational enterprises in different host 
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countries will face exchange rate exposure in their ongoing business with their overseas 
parents. For example, when they import work-in-process inventories from the parent 
corporation, exchange rate fluctuation will affect the deal value, which will have a 
downstream effect on costs, future sales volume and price. Multinational enterprises with 
international investment experience can eliminate this exposure in the long run in a number 
of ways. For instance, they can use re-invoicing centres to cluster exchange rate exposure in 
different affiliates and employ hedging (with financial derivatives) to manage the distribution 
of expected cash flow. 
The third aspect is accounting exposure. This relates to the potential for accounting-
derived changes in owner’s equity to occur because of the need to translate foreign currency 
financial statements of foreign affiliates into a single reporting currency for worldwide-
consolidated financial statements. This exposure shows on the balance sheet and has no 
actual influence on operations.  
Cushman (1985) argues that random fluctuations in the real exchange rate lead to a 
range of risk and expectation effects on FDI. His empirical study shows that increases in the 
current real value of foreign exchange are associated with significant reductions in U.S. direct 
investment. 
Froot & Stein (1991) present a model to examine the connection between exchange rates 
and foreign direct investment. They show a depreciated currency can give foreigners an edge 
in buying control of productive corporate assets. In another word, the relative wealthier 
buyers find it easier to acquire foreign assets. Cebenoyan, Papaioannou, & Travlos (1992) 
provide significant evidence that exchange rate, tax regimes and technology influence foreign 
takeovers. Foreign takeover competition offer the most powerful and consistent explanation 
of the difference in wealth gains. 
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Dewenter (1995) employs data on foreign acquisitions of US targets during 1975-1989 
to explore the relationship between the value of the dollar and the flow and prices of cross-
border acquisitions. 3036 transactions involving at least a 10% equity investment and $1 
million in value are investigated. The result shows that the exchange rate variable clearly 
impacts corporate wealth.  
This finding is in stark contrast to that of Pettway et al. (1993) who find that the 
magnitude of the gains depend more on the relative market power among the buyers and 
sellers and on the nature of the assets being purchased, rather than on variation in exchange 
rates. 
2.4.4. Discussion 
As the previous survey indicates, there are many determinants involved in cross-border 
M&A performance. The complexity of their interrelationships makes it difficult to select 
representative independent variables that are not highly correlated with each other.  
The task is further complicated by the fact that there are there are three levels of 
determinants (M&A transaction characteristics, targets’ location and bidders’ endowment), 
with multiple variables within each level. 
Another consideration is that we need to combine the motives of Chinese overseas 
M&As with the determinants of the M&A performance. Consider the case of Chinese 
overseas M&As which are upstream OFDI (i.e, the acquirer is from a developing country, 
while the target is from a developed country). M&As that fall into the upstream OFDI 
category may be much less likely to achieve positive abnormal returns. However, top 
managers of Chinese MNEs or the government regard this category of M&A as a strategic 
investment that gives access to strategic resources. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter reviews the literature related to my thesis — ―A Study of Chinese Overseas 
M&A:1994-2009‖. We follow a framework of four sections: Motives, Methodology, 
Performance and Determinants.  
The motive section provides the possible answers for the recent Chinese OMA wave. 
The methodology section introduces event study procedures and asset pricing arguments 
related to an evaluation of OMA performance. The performance section reports general 
empirical results on domestic/ cross-border M&A performance among industries in 
developed/ emerging markets. The determinants section concludes by relating transaction 
details, bidders’ endowment and targets’ location variables to OMA performance. 
When it comes to an analysis of Chinese OMAs, the important role played by Chinese 
governments and state-owned enterprises needs always to be kept in mind. With respect to 
firm-specific level motives, these relate to resources and strategic asset seeking.  
Because this thesis is based on an empirical analysis of short and long-run performance 
and determinants, we review the literatures on the event-time and calendar-time approaches, 
and asset pricing benchmark models (the market model and the Fama French Three Factor 
Model). We will apply these in evaluating Chinese short-run and long-run OMA performance 
respectively. 
Although efficiency market theory implies short and long-run M&A performance to be 
identical, empirical analyses frequently end up with conflicting results across 
developed/emerging markets, and industries. Researchers try to explain these market 
anomalies with various arguments. They highlight OMA performance determinants in three 
aspects: transaction details, bidders’ endowment and targets’ location. Finance researchers 
focus on firm-specific factors; for example, payment method, form of acquisition, and agency 
issues in corporate governance. International economists emphasize policy, country risk, 
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exchange rate variation and cultural differences. Both finance and economic literatures pay 
attention to bidders’ endowment in OMA. However, finance papers investigate the 
relationship between firm size/leverage level with OMA performance, while international 
economists look at acquirers’ ownership and internalization advantages and their OMA 
performance. 
There are a few empirical literatures on emerging OMA performance. Papers on Chinese 
OMAs, however, have shown more interest in analysing strategic motives and the 
determinants of OMA itself, instead of carefully analysing performance.  
China still maintains a communist system and pursues a ―dual track‖ approach. ―Market 
track‖ and ―planned track‖ are two legs in the ―dual-track‖ approach of the Chinese economic 
system. Firm-specific profitability is one of the essential conditions in order to achieve 
national goals. Therefore, shareholders’ interests in OMAs are necessarily components of 
government strategy, especially in the long-run. This motivates our research to study Chinese 
OMA performance and its determinants from a firm-specific perspective. 
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Chapter Three Chinese Overseas M&A Performance and Go 
Global Policy 
 
This chapter provides a thorough analysis of Chinese outbound merger and acquisitions 
(OMAs) over the period 1994-2009. We use event-time approach to analyze the performance 
of OMAs by Chinese acquiring firms. With a sample of 157 OMA events, we find that on 
average, Chinese OMAs produced positive abnormal returns. However, markets responded 
less favorably after the ―Go Global‖ strategy of the Chinese government. 
We hypothesize three reasons for this: (i) The Demand and Supply Hypothesis: The 
deregulation of overseas investment after the ―Go Global‖ era increased the number of deals, 
which decreased the inframarginal rents associated with those deals. (ii) The Government 
Capitalization Hypothesis: ―Go Global‖ re-directed investment towards industries having 
national strategic value but diminished profit value of shareholders. (iii) The Hubris and 
Herding Hypothesis: hubris and herding behavior of top managers misled decision-making in 
OMAs. The subsequent expansion of OMAs under ―Go Global‖ resulted in Chinese firms 
pursuing less attractive targets, on average. We find no evidence to support the latter two 
hypotheses. Thus, to whatever extent strategic or top managers’ interests may motivate 
China’s ―Go Global‖ policy, it does not appear that their pursuit has come at the expense of 
shareholder’s wealth. 
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3.1. Introduction  
 
The exceptional performance of the Chinese economy has been the subject of many academic 
analyses. Over the last fifteen years, Chinese GDP growth has averaged approximately 10 
percent. Associated with this growth has been a dramatic increase in the Chinese trade 
surplus and foreign exchange reserves.
26
 ―Go Global‖ is the banner name of a national policy 
encouraging outward investment by Chinese firms.  It was initially introduced in 1999, but 
has evolved over time to represent a conglomerate of individual policies. Apart from reducing 
appreciation pressure of Chinese RMB, the ―Go Global‖ policy addresses concerns of 
sufficient resources for sustainable development. Moreover, it motivates Chinese firms to 
modernize their business via the appropriation of foreign technology and the assimilation of 
modern business practices.  
    By one measure, Chinese overseas mergers and acquisitions (OMAs) activity rose from 
US$307 million in 1994 to over US$26.5 billion in 2008.
27
 This increase in OMAs sustained 
itself even after the world financial crisis. Clearly, the Chinese OMA wave in 2002-2009 is 
an important part of government Go Global policy. 
    This raises a number of questions: 
1. Do Chinese OMAs create value for shareholders? 
2. Does the Go Global policy damage shareholders’ wealth? 
    Surprisingly little is known about the performance of Chinese OMAs. To the best of our 
knowledge, the only academic study that measures stock market reactions to Chinese OMA 
announcements is Chen and Young (2009). They examine 39 deals and find a negative but 
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 Over the period 1994 to 2007, Chinese foreign exchange reserves increased from US$52 billion to over 
US$15 trillion (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 1996, 2008). 
27
 World Investment Report, United Nations, 2006, 2008. 
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statistically insignificant market response to OMA announcements on the (-1,0) window.  
They also report a negative relationship between government ownership and cumulative 
abnormal returns.   
 Among the non-academic literature, Hemerling and Michaelis (2006) study 16 deals 
and find that ―relative total shareholder returns‖ around the announcement day were positive 
in 56% of deals.
28
  Luedi (2008) analyzes 56 deals over the period 1995-2007 and reports that 
Chinese acquirers ―overpaid‖ for foreign assets in 55 percent of deals, as measured by the 
change in share prices around the announcement day.
29
  Other studies summarize various 
features of Chinese OMAs, such as location of target firms, characteristics of target industries, 
and motivations underlying foreign acquisitions (Deng, 2007; Liao, 2006; Rui & Yip, 2008).  
However, these rely largely on summaries of aggregate activity, and case studies of a few 
firms without any formal analyses.  This study provides the most comprehensive analysis of 
Chinese OMAs to date, analyzing a total of 157 deals made over the years 1994-2009. 
    In this chapter, we first employ event study methodology to evaluate the stock market 
performance of Chinese acquirers. We next assess whether the national strategic goals of this 
policy have come at the expense of shareholders of Chinese, acquiring firms. 
The results show that Chinese outbound M&As (1994-2009) have achieved significant 
positive abnormal returns in total, which indicate a successful ―globalization‖ strategy for 
Chinese giants. 
However, Chinese OMAs after ―Go Global‖ underperformed compared to before the 
policy, though the differences are not significant. It might be the outcome of the interaction 
of international supply and demand in OMA targets. Or motivation conflict between 
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 ―Relative total shareholder return‖ is defined as ―Total shareholder return‖ minus ―Return of stock market 
index of the local market‖ as measured during the (-5, 5) window. 
29
 Luedi (2008) defines ―overpaid‖ as a negative share price movement in the (-2, 2) window. 
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shareholders’ wealth effect and government’s strategy. Thirdly, it might reflect the fact that 
Chinese firms acquired less attractive targets perhaps because hubris and herding behavior 
led to irrational investment and decreasing firm value.
3031
  
To distinguish these hypotheses, we employ both multivariate analysis and a Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition procedure to identify the source of the lower, post-Go Global 
underperformance. We find no evidence to support that lower abnormal return is associated 
with government-owned characteristics. Nor does it have any relationship with energy and 
natural resources and high-technology sectors, which are regarded as national strategic 
industries. On the contrary, the mean and estimated coefficients in the decomposition 
procedure suggest improved OMA performance with policy-related variables. Thus, the 
reason for lower abnormal returns might not come from national strategy diminishing profit 
value, nor hubris and herding, but from diminished prospects for extraordinary profit 
opportunities. 
    Section II in this chapter focuses on literature relevant to this study. Section III reports data 
and methodology. Section IV reports the empirical results. Section V draws the conclusions. 
3.2.   Related Literature  
3.2.1.  Chinese Go Global Policy  
 The Chinese government’s promotion of overseas investment came into force with the 
unveiling of its ―Go Out Policy‖ or ―Going Global Strategy‖ -- henceforth ―Go Global‖ – in 
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 Firth(1997), Jensen(1986) argue that top managers employ cash only payment when they have enough cash 
flow and very bright prospects for post-merger performance. Mix payment, however, means acquirers tend to 
share risk with the targets by making the target shareholders equity-holders in the acquirer. Loughran & Vijh 
(1997) and Sudarsanam & Mahate (2003) find that cash payment is associated with positive and significant 
wealth effects. Harford et.al argue that cash-rich firms are more likely to attempt acquisition. Less controlled 
managers tend to spend cash in inefficient M&A activities (Harford, 1999; Harford et al., 2008). 
31
 Hubris and herding hypotheses state that overconfident managers overvalue the synergy of OMAs or high 
reputation but low ability managers make OMA decisions simply following the leading firms in the industry, or 
weakly controlled managers in cash-rich firms choose to spend cash quickly in an inefficient way, please see 
Graham(1999) and Roll(1986) for details. 
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1999.
32
  As a national policy, it was elevated in importance when it was adopted as part of the 
10
th
 Five Year Plan (2001-2005).
33
  The nature of this promotion has taken numerous forms, 
and continues to evolve to the present day.
34
   
   One major thrust of the Go Global policy has been the loosening of controls on outward 
investment by Chinese firms.  Outward investment requires approval by China’s Ministry of 
Commerce, with concomitant foreign currency approval from the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange (SAFE).  In 2002, SAFE authorization was decentralized from the central 
agency to selected local authorities for projects of US$1 million or less, with an overall 
investment cap of US$200 million.  Subsequent decentralization continued in 2005 such that 
foreign exchange authorization was extended to all provinces, municipalities, and 
autonomous regions; the local limit was increased to US$10 million; and the overall 
investment quota was expanded to US$5 billion.  In June 2006, the overall investment quota 
was abolished. Meanwhile, authorization from the Ministry of Commerce was decentralized 
to local commercial administrations in October 2004, except for large state-owned enterprises. 
 A second thrust has involved direct support from the Ministry of Commerce.  Some of 
this has consisted of informational support and bureaucratic expertise in navigating foreign 
investment rules.  In July 2004, the Ministry of Commerce along with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs provided a ―guidance list‖ of industries that should be preferred for outward 
investment. Additional support has come in the form of preferential treatment of outward-
investing Chinese firms in terms of direct grants, tax benefits, low- or no-interest loans, 
access to foreign exchange, etc.  This culminated in November of 2004 with the creation of a 
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 See ―http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Go_Global.‖ 
33
 See ―http://www.gov.cn/node_11140/2006-03/15/content_227686.htm‖ (in Chinese). 
34
 See Hagiwara (2006) for subsequent discussion of the Go Global policy. 
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formal loan support system under authority of the National Development and Reform 
Commission and the Export-Import Bank of China. 
 This brief summary documents some of the changes and expansions that have 
occurred in China’s Go Global policy since its inception in 1999.  The policy is associated 
with at least three main motivations.  First, with overwhelming foreign exchange reserves, it 
provides a means of reducing appreciation pressures on China’s currency, the Renminbi.  
Second, it addresses concerns that there be sufficient resources to sustain China’s growth 
over the middle- to long-term.  And third, it presents an opportunity to modernize Chinese 
business via the appropriation of foreign technology and the assimilation of modern business 
practices.  To the extent that government involvement in firms’ OMA decisions is prompted 
by these motivations, with interventionist government control over the economy and an 
uncertain investor protection environment, it sets up a potential conflict between the 
maximization of shareholder wealth and the pursuit of national goals.  
3.2.2.  Policy and M&A Waves 
A large literature exists to explain the phenomenon of M&A ―waves‖ after policy, economic, 
social and regulatory changes.  
The early M&A waves of the 1890s and 1920s in the world are purported to have been 
driven by antitrust legislation, while that of the 1980s appears to have been brought on by 
widespread market deregulation (Gregoriou & Renneboog, 2007). Sudarsanam (2003) argues 
that the enforcement of antitrust laws was responsible for M&A waves in the 1890s and 
1920s as anti-trust policy was aimed at cracking monopolies, dominant firms were broken up 
and their parts divested. Subsequently, firms focused on expansion through vertical 
integration. Harford (1999) stresses that the M&A waves are due to deregulation of financial 
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constraints, when companies build up large cash reserves, or when their access to external 
financing is eased.  
Martynova & Renneboog (2005) argue that the wave of the 1980s was set off by 
changes in antitrust policy and the deregulation of the financial services sector. Furthermore, 
they claim that the medical services and pharmaceuticals sectors experienced intensive 
takeover activity to take advantage of cost reductions after the introduction of a new 
reimbursement policy in 1983 in the US.  
Jovanovic & Rousseau (2002) develop the Q-theory of takeovers. They argue that 
takeover waves are frequently driven by industrial and technological shocks, which cause a 
higher degree of dispersion of corporate growth opportunities. This triggers the reallocation 
of resources to more productive firms and more effective management (higher Q-ratio firms).  
 Wells (1983a) highlights the comparative advantage of emerging giants in smaller scale 
markets. Lecraw (1993) and Lall (1986) argue that emerging giants invest abroad based on 
firm-specific advantages achieved from their home countries; such as, cheaper labor cost, 
nationality products, etc. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) from emerging markets are less 
likely to achieve efficiency and profitability compared to their developed competitors. 
Dunning & Lundan (2008) address government support of ―resource seeking‖ in emerging 
countries, especially in energy, natural resources, and high technology industries. They argue 
that emerging OMAs are promoted by government policy. Emerging giants direct themselves 
to strategic industries in order to achieve government-sponsored policy benefits -- such as 
preferential loans, deregulated financial services, and favourable tax treatment -- rather than 
for efficiency reasons. 
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3.2.3. Hubris and Herding Behavior and OMA Performance 
Another group of researchers highlight self-interested managerial decision-making in 
takeover clustering. After Jensen highlighted the agency problem in corporate governance, 
Roll (1986) stressed the hubris hypothesis to explain corporate takeovers on overvalued 
targets. He argues that managers overestimate the creation of synergy value. They usually 
pay too much for their targets and end up with poor performance. Scharfstein & Stein (1990) 
and Graham (1999) investigate herding behavior in decision-making. They find managers 
mimic the investment decisions of the leading firms, ignoring substantive private information, 
and this leads to irrational M&A decisions and lower profits.  
     Martynova & Renneboog (2005) argue that managerial hubris and herding behavior 
increase during takeover waves. Bhagat Dong, Hirshleifer, and Noah (2004) and Harford 
(2003) find that the highest M&A gains come at the beginning of takeover waves. Herding 
combined with hubris may mean that inefficient takeovers are more likely to follow efficient 
ones (Auster & Sirower, 2002). 
3.2.4. Chinese OMAs and Government Control 
     With respect to China, a number of authors have noted that no discussion of Chinese 
OMAs is complete without special recognition of the role of the Chinese government 
(Huaichuan & George, 2008; Morck et al., 2008; Ping, 2007).  The relationship between 
Chinese government and business enterprises is complicated.  Government can be involved 
directly -- via direct ownership and control; or indirectly -- via participation in share markets.  
Further, different levels of government may be involved; with national, provincial, and 
municipal governments engaged individually, or operating together as joint ventures.  This 
makes the distinction between government- and private-ownership blurry at best (Antkiewicz 
& Whalley, 2007).  Liu (2005) estimates that 61.4 percent of Chinese listed companies are 
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under local government control, 15.3 percent are under central government control, and 3.4 
percent are cooperatively controlled by different levels of government.  Only 12.8 percent are 
identified as privately controlled.
35
  Similarly, Morck, Yeung, and Zhao (2008) find that 65.9 
percent of shares listed on the two mainland exchanges are owned by some level of Chinese 
government or related government agencies. 
The implications of government control are manifold.  Government can influence the 
appointment of senior company executives, can exert direct control over the kinds of business 
activities undertaken and the manner in which they are implemented, and subsidize specific 
business activities either directly or indirectly via low- or no-interest loans from the Chinese 
Central Bank.  A relatively large literature explores whether government control has 
beneficial or detrimental effects on Chinese firm performance. The evidence is mixed 
depending on the particular performance metric employed (Gunasekarage, Hess, & Hu, 2007; 
Hovey, Li, & Naughton, 2003; Qi, Wu, & Zhang, 2000; Sun et al., 2002; Wei et al., 2005; Xu 
& Wang, 1999).  For our purposes, the salient issue is whether government control causes 
Chinese firms to pursue OMAs for reasons other than increasing shareholder wealth.  
3.2.5.  OMA Performance of Emerging Acquirers 
Previous studies have come to conflicting conclusions about the response of share 
markets towards acquiring firms announcing OMA deals in other emerging markets. Gubbi et 
al. (2010) evaluate 425 cross-border acquisitions by Indian firms during 2000-2007 and 
report positive and significant cumulative abnormal returns of 2.58% over the eleven-day 
window around the announcement date. Aybar and Ficici (2009) examine 433 cross-border 
M&As associated with 58 large multinational firms during the period 1991-2004.  They 
report significant, negative cumulative abnormal returns of -0.09% on the (-1,1) window.  
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 Ownership details for the remaining 7 percent were insufficient to identify the degree of government control. 
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Kim (2003) analyzes 270 events of overseas foreign investments (which include OMAs) by 
Korean firms from 1991-1997.  He reports a lagged, positive market reaction on the day after 
announcement of 0.26%, which is significant at the 10 (but not 5) percent level.  However, 
when he restricts analysis to the 30 largest chaebol-affiliates, he finds cross-border 
investments do not increase shareholder wealth.  
3.2.6. Expected Effects of China’s Go Global Policy 
   The Demand and Supply Hypothesis. 
   The preceding description of China’s Go Global policy allows us to hypothesize about 
stock market responses to OMA deals by Chinese firms before and after the policy. Let the 
demand and supply of OMA projects for Chinese, acquiring firms be given by FIGURE 1.  
The acquiring firm’s willingness to buy is represented by the height of its demand curve, and 
is the maximum amount it could pay and still earn a profit from the deal.  As not all potential 
target firms offer the same profit opportunities, the firms’ demand curve will be downward-
sloping, with more profitable targets sought-after first.  Likewise, target firms will be 
characterized by different willingnesses with respect to being acquired by the respective firms.  
This can arise because of an overall willingness/reluctance to being acquired, or because 
competition from other potential acquirers drives up a target firm’s acquiring price.  The 
result is that Chinese, acquiring firms will face an upward-sloping supply curve of OMA 
projects.  In the absence of constraints, firms would undertake Q* OMA projects. 
 The vertical distance between the demand and supply curve at a given quantity 
represents the wealth-creation potential (rents) associated with a given OMA deal.  These can 
be appropriated by the target firm, by receiving a price higher than its willingness to sell; 
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and/or by the acquiring firm, by paying a price lower than its willingness to buy.
36
  Without 
loss of generality, let us assume that acquiring and target firms split these rents according to 
some fixed proportion.
37
  If the acquiring firm pays a price lower (higher) than its willingness 
to buy for a given deal, stock markets should respond to its announcement by recording 
positive (negative) abnormal profits.   
 As discussed above, in the years preceding China’s Go Global policy, firms were 
heavily restricted from investing overseas.  Let us assume (for the moment) that government 
approval was given to those deals that had the greatest expected benefit to Chinese, acquiring 
firms.  Let this quantity of deals be represented in FIGURE 1 by Q (Before Go Global) < Q*.  
As long as these rents were not entirely appropriated by the target firms, we would expect 
share markets to greet their announcements with positive, abnormal returns. 
 The loosening of restrictions after Go Global allowed firms to pursue more OMA 
deals.  Ceteris paribus, these additional projects would be expected to generate smaller rents, 
reducing the profit gains from Chinese, acquiring firms and lowering share markets’ price 
responses to OMA announcements.  It is also possible that there could be pressure to pursue 
OMA deals that supported the national objectives of Go Global – such as acquiring foreign 
technology or locking in a long-term supply of natural resources – and that these could run 
counter to the private interests of shareholders.  This would be represented in FIGURE 1 by 
firms pursuing deals beyond Q*.  If this were the case, OMA deals would lower firm profits, 
and share markets would register negative, abnormal returns at their announcements. 
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 Most studies of domestic M&A performance find that shareholders from target firms acquire most if not all of 
the benefits from M&As (Andre et al., 2004; Healy, 1992; Michael C.  Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Loughran & 
Vijh, 1997; Masulis et al., 2007). In contrast, studies of cross-border M&As find that these deals are frequently 
wealth-creating for shareholders of acquiring firms (Harris & Ravenscraft, 1991; Lowinski et al., 2004; Morck 
& Yeung, 1992). As noted above, there are still relatively few studies of OMAs from less developed countries. 
37
 All the argument requires is that (i) OMA deal approvals were positively related to the expected benefit to the 
Chinese acquiring firm in the pre-Go Global period, and (ii) that the demand and supply of potentials deals was 
similar before and after Go Global.  
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  A key assumption in the preceding analysis is that, during the pre-Go Global period, 
OMA approval was positively related to the expected benefit to the Chinese acquiring firm.  
No doubt other factors also played a role:  Political connectedness of company executives, 
influence of government officials associated with public ownership of the firm, and the 
ability of the deal to contribute to important political and national interests were likely also 
important.  However, as long as these were not negatively correlated with the expected sizes 
of benefits to acquiring firms, we should still expect markets to respond with smaller 
abnormal returns to OMA announcements during the Go Global period compared to the years 
before.  
   The Government Capitalization Hypothesis. 
The government capitalization hypothesis assumes that in the absence of Go Global, 
Chinese giants grow along with rapid domestic economic development. They learn by 
international operations experience and their behaviour is governed by rational OMA 
decision-making.  
Possibly working against this are the actions of Chinese government. If firms purchase 
foreign companies by government influence rather than by narrow profit concerns, lower 
performance will be expected because of the conflicting interests of government and 
shareholders. It is well-known that governments consider factors such as social and political 
benefits, and are concerned with macro economic development. In contrast, shareholders care 
more about how to maximize their wealth in investment.  
The Hubris and Herding Hypothesis. 
As we argue below, the hubris and herding hypothesis is more likely to come into play 
with the introduction of the Go Global policy. With the reduction in financial constraints of 
overseas investment that occurred after Go Global, it is more likely that Chinese managers 
overestimated the creation of synergistic value. Similarly, firms with limited international 
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operations experience imitated the actions of a leader or a first-mover firm in the investment-
stimulated environment. As Harford, Mansi, & Maxwell (2008) discuss, weakly controlled 
managers choose to spend cash quickly on acquisitions and capital expenditures.
38
 Thus, 
successful takeovers may encourage other companies to try for similar transactions. However, 
the other companies may not be acting from clear economic motives; hence their takeovers 
may not result in the same efficiency.    
3.2.7.  Determinants of Chinese OMA Performance 
According to the above discussion, if Go Global affects the kinds of OMA deals acquiring 
firms undertake, government’s preferences for (i) high-technology and (ii) energy and natural 
resources targets should be reflected in OMA performance.
3940
   
Other factors, such as method of payment (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), industry 
relativeness (Doukas & Lang, 2003), professional advisors (Lowinski et al., 2004), exchange 
rate volatility (Dewenter, 1995) with the host country have also been shown to affect OMA 
performance.
414243
 Thus, we include the mentioned determinants as control variables in our 
analysis. 
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 Shareholders of emerging giants are believed to be explored in a less protective investment environment and 
possess less right in controlling irrational investment decision. 
39
 Xu & Wang (1999) investigate ownership structure of publicly listed companies in China within the 
framework of corporate governance. They find profitability of Chinese firms is either negative correlated or 
uncorrelated with the fractions of state shares, which imply inefficiency of state ownership. Wei, Xie, & Zhang 
(2005) exam the relation between ownership structure and firm value across a sample of 5284 firm years of 
China’s partially privatized former state-owned enterprises (SOE) from 1991-2001. They find that state and 
institutional shares are significantly negatively related to firm value.   
40
 Dunning & Lundan (2008) report that governments from developing economies often use OFDI for the 
purpose of acquiring technology and resources. Harris & Ravenscraft (1991) find that cross-border takeovers are 
more frequent in R&D-intensive industries than in domestic ones.  Morck & Yeung (1992) and Francoeur & 
Montreal (2005) find that acquiring firms experience a significantly positive stock price reaction when 
announcing foreign acquisitions possessing high levels of R&D.   
41
 Harris & Ravenscraft (1991) argue that firms in related industries usually possess similar technologies and 
managerial frameworks, which are elements that lead themselves to better communication and successful post-
merger integration. Hopkins (1999), Doukas & Lang (2003) find M&As in unrelated industries often leads to 
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3.3. Data and Methodology 
3.3.1. Data  
    The sample analyzed in this study contains Chinese firms engaged in overseas acquisitions 
over 15 years from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2009. The OMA data was drawn from 
Thomson’s SDC Platinum M&A Database. The selection criteria are as follow: 
--  Merger and acquisition transactions announced between January 1, 1994 and 
December 31, 2009 
--  Merger and acquisition transactions must be completed 
--  Chinese bidders and non-Chinese targets
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--  The bidders are listed in Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hong Kong or U.S. stock markets 
            --  Non-Financial firms
45
  
The time series stock prices and market indices data come from DataStream. Returns 
were computed by the logarithm form of adjusted stock prices, ),/ln( 1tt PP  
as discussed in 
Strong (1992). Shanghai Composite Index, Heng-Sang Index and S&P 500 Composite are 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
faulty strategic decision-making and misunderstandings in communication between the acquirers and targets. 
These are obstacles to post-merger synergy.  
42
Servaes & Zenner (1996) point out professional advisors help with a more informed M&A decisions and better 
post-merger integration. However, Lowinski,F., Schiereck,D & Thomas,T. W.(2004) figure out bidders should 
tolerate expenditures of huge sums of money as fees for their direction. Nevertheless, there are cases of failure 
M&As under the supervision of professional advisors.  
43
 Cushman (1985), Froot & Stein (1991), Cebenoyan, Papaioannou, & Travlos (1992) and Dewenter (1995) 
provide evidence that exchange rate variable clearly impacted on corporate performance. However, Pettway et 
al. (1993) find magnitude of firms’ gains depend more on the relative market power among the buyers and 
sellers and on the nature of the assets being purchased, rather than on variation in exchange rates. 
44
 There are only 112 Chinese outbound M&A events in SDC M&A database in 1994-2008 period when I 
searched by ―public bidders‖ criteria. However, when we go further to employ ―government‖ and ―Hong Kong 
bidder‖ criteria, I got another 120 Chinese listed companies. I have kept records for the ―Hong Kong bidder‖ 
ones that included in our sample as we visited their company websites and there are strong evidence showing 
they are Chinese mainland firms listed in Hong Kong (According to their ownership/location of headquarter, 
business/ nationality proportion of employees). 
45
 Financial firms are subject to special accounting and regulatory requirements, making them difficult to 
compare with other firms. 
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selected as the local market indices respectively. The estimation period contains 126 daily 
returns before the event window (21 days). 
3.3.1.1.  Time Distribution of Chinese OMAs -- Before and After “Go Global”  
The initial sample contains a total 198 events. However 41 events were eliminated with 
more than 50% zero daily returns over a 147-dayinvestigation period.
46
 Table 3.1 shows the 
distribution over time of 157 Chinese outbound M&A transactions in the final sample.
47
  
There is a strong event and deal value cluster in the period 2002-2009. The number of 
transactions peaked in 2009, accounting for 29 deals. The highest average transaction value is 
in 2005 and 2006; 707.27 and 943.36 million USD respectively. Apparently, Chinese 
enterprises became more active in OMA activities after Go Global. Both deal number and 
deal value soared after 2002. Average transaction value rose from USD 68.95 million per 
year in 1994-2001 to USD 485.99 million in 2002-2009. To our great surprise, Chinese OMA 
deals grew dramatically even in the world recession. Data shows 45% of the Chinese OMA 
deals happened during the year 2007-2009, though there was a sharp drop in average 
transaction value to USD 172.65 million per year. 
3.3.1.2.  Target Location of Chinese OMAs   
Table 3.2 reports the distribution of Chinese OMAs by target location. The sample shows 
developed targets account for approximately 69% of completed Chinese overseas deals, and 
65% of the available deal value in the year 1994-2009. Asian targets rank second both in 
number of deals and deal value. 19% of deals and 22% of available deal value come from 
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 147 days comes from 126 days in the estimation period plus 21 days in the event window.  
47
 Even accounting for the fact that our study includes (i) more years and (ii) listings in U.S. markets, we still 
identify many more OMA events than Chen and Young (2009).  One possible explanation for this discrepancy is 
that Chen and Young (2009, page 8) hand-collected their data through news announcements published by the 
China Mergers and Acquisitions Association (CMAA).  In contrast, we identified our OMAs through the 
Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database. 
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Asia. Africa ranks first by its average USD 1447.25 million per deal. We note that a 
disproportionate number of OMA activities target Chinese Hong Kong firms, followed by the 
United States and Australia.
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3.3.1.3.  Industry Distribution of Chinese OMAs 
Table 3.3 reveals the industry distribution of Chinese OMAs. It is obvious Chinese OMAs 
cluster in high technology and energy, and the natural resources sector. The 
Telecommunication and Electronics, Prepacked Software sector achieves the highest 
frequency in transactions; whilst the Energy and Natural Resources sector attracts 67% of the 
outflow capital.  When we break the time period into before and after Go Global, we notice 
that most M&As in energy and service sectors happened after the policy. OMA deals tripled 
in the Telecommunication and Electronics, Prepacked Software and Manufacturing sectors in 
2002-2009. 
3.3.1.4.  Market Distribution of Investigated Stocks 
Some Chinese firms only list in foreign markets. Others list in multiple markets. Therefore, 
stock returns from cross-listed markets (Hong Kong, U.S.) are included in the sample. There 
are 213 observations in total when multi-listed observations are included.
49
 When aggregated 
performance of 157 events is estimated, we select among cross-listed shares by choosing the 
one with greatest liquid.
50
 The aggregated sample consists of 64 mainland listings, 62 HK 
listings and 31 US listings.   
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 Hagiwara (2006) suggests that a substantial portion of Hong Kong OMA activity is in fact ―roundtrip‖ 
investment that detours outside the mainland to take advantage of various tax, trade, and regulatory incentives. 
However, HK targets dropped sharply from 74.19% of the target location before policy to 18.57% in crisis 
period after policy. 
49
 64 mainland listings, 76 HK listings and 73 US listings. 
50
 Trading volume and market depth are considered as representatives of market liquidity. Therefore, I select 
highest trading volume ones when equities possess considerable higher market capitalization. If market 
capitalization is two or more times larger than highest trading volume ones among multi-listings, I come back to 
equities with highest market capitalization.    
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3.3.2.  Event-time Approach 
We employ the event-time approach to evaluate wealth effects of Chinese overseas M&A. 
Daily stock returns are collected over a 126-day estimation period. For the 21- day event 
window, abnormal returns (AR) of individual stocks are calculated as the difference between 
the actual individual return, ( )itR , and the expected return, )( itRE , 
from the estimation 
period:  
(1) ( ).it it itAR R E R   
where itR  and mtR  are the daily returns of share i and the market portfolio at time t during the 
estimation period. 
The market model is specified as  
(2)  it i i mtR R    
This model is estimated to produce estimated coefficients ˆi  and 
ˆ
i . These are then used to 
calculate expected returns during the test window as follows: 
(3)    ˆˆ ˆit it i i mtE R R R     
Thus 
(4)  ˆˆ
it it i i mtAR R R       
Average abnormal return (AAR) and average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) are 
used to estimate Chinese overseas M&A performance. To examine the significance of mean 
standardized residual between any two dates, we employ the test procedure proposed by 
Patell (1976) and Doukas & Travlos (1988) to investigate the significance of 21-event day 
abnormal returns.
51
  
AAR and ACAR are calculated as follow. For a sample of N firms: 
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 Please see appendix for details. 
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The expected value of ARt is zero in the absence of abnormal performance. To examine 
whether the average daily abnormal return is statistically different from zero, the average 
standardized abnormal return (ASARt) is calculated as 
 (7)
  
1
1 N jt
t
j jt
AR
ASAR
N S
   
where Sjt is the square root of firm j’s estimated forecast variance at time t during the test 
window, 
 (8) 
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and Sj
2 
is the residual variance for security j from the market model regression, L is the 
number of observations during the estimation period, Rmk is the return on the market portfolio 
for the kth day of the estimation period, Rmt is the return on the market portfolio for day t of 
the test period, and mR  is the average return of the market portfolio for the estimation 
period.
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 It follows that: 
 (9)
 Daily t
Z N ASAR  
Similarly 
 (10) 
2
1, 2
1 1
1
( )
T jN
jt
T T
j i T j jt
AR
ASCAR
N S 
    
 (11) 1, 2 2 1( ) / 1Interval T T j jZ N ASCAR T T    
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 The equations 6-10 are from Doukas & Travlos (1988). 
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3.3.3.  Performance Determinants of Chinese OMAs 
Part one of our analysis estimates abnormal returns both for the whole period, and separately 
for the pre- and post Go Global periods. Part two of our analysis attempts to explain observed 
differences between the two periods. We examine eight characteristics of deals.  These are 
described in Table 3.9. GOVTOWN is a dummy variable that identifies whether the acquiring 
firm is a government-owned enterprise.
53
  NATREL and ITIN are variables that indicate 
whether the target firm is located in the natural resources/energy or high technology 
industries.  THK is a dummy variable that indicates whether the target firm is located in Hong 
Kong.  The variable INDREL indicates whether the target firm is located in the same industry 
as the acquiring firm (as measured by 2-digit SIC code). ADVISOR is a dummy variable that 
identifies whether the acquirer employs professional advisors. FEX shows the percentage of 
depreciation/appreciation of Chinese RMB against USD on a daily basis. CASH is a dummy 
variable indicating whether the transaction is cash only payment. 
 The first three variables are designed to capture the influence of Go Global on firms’ 
OMA decisions. Firms that are government-owned should be more willing to trade off the 
interests of other shareholders in favour of national strategic interests.  Further, since two of 
the three motivations underlying Go Global are to secure natural resources and appropriate 
new technologies, we would expect to see the lower abnormal returns in the Go Global period 
related to deals with target firms in these industries. The remaining five variables are control 
variables in M&A transaction details.  
 Differences in the respective contributions of those determinants may explain 
differences in announcement returns. Accordingly, we will estimate the following three 
models. Model 1 regresses the firm’s three-day cumulative abnormal return around the 
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 The concept ―government-owned enterprise‖ in my study means a firm that ultimate parent is defined as 
Chinese government in SDC Platinum. 
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announcement day, CAR (-1,1), against a policy dummy variable. Model 2 adds three policy-
related variables (GOVTOWN, NATREL and ITIN) to Model 1 to see whether they have any 
influence on the policy dummy because of omitted variable bias.  
For the same reason, we add 5 more control variables to Model 3: THK, INDREL, 
ADVISOR, FEX and CASH. Chinese RMB appreciated against the USD in 1994-2009. 
Currency appreciation is highlighted as one of the important determinants of OMA 
performance. Therefore, we include it as a control variable in Model 3. About 37% of 
Chinese OMA targets are in HK, so we’d like to control this when testing performance 
determinants. The other 3 variables are included to investigate misbehaviour of top managers. 
Generally speaking, if related industry dummy gets a negative coefficient against 
performance, it indicates OMAs haven’t generated synergy and implies an inappropriate 
investment decision-making. Similarly, professional advisors are believed to contribute value 
to OMA transaction. If we estimate a negative relationship between OMA performance and 
professional advisor, it implies top managers have made a wrong decision when choosing 
advisors, or have paid too much for their services. Either of these possibilities is consistent 
with the hubris or herding hypothesis. As mentioned in the literature review above, cash-only 
payment is a signal of positive abnormal returns. A negative relationship with performance 
also suggests that top managers abuse their power on excessive cash flow, consistent with the 
hubris and herding hypothesis. 
Define the variable Policy to take the value 1 during the Go Global period. The three 
models are given below. 
Model 1 
(12)  0 1( 1,1) iCAR POLICY error                                     
Model 2 
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(13)  
0 1 2
3 4
( 1,1)
i
CAR POLICY GOVTOWN
NATREL ITIN error
  
 
   
  
                        
Model 3 
(14) 
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9
i 0 i i i
i i i
CAR(-1,1) β POLICY+β GOVTOWN β NATREL β ITIN
β THK β INDREL ADVISOR+ FEX+ CASH+error  

  
   
  
          
We will estimate the coefficient on the POLICY variable and observe what happens to the 
coefficient as additional ―policy‖ variable are added to the model. 
3.3.4. Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition Procedure 
    An alternative approach to explain the difference in estimating CAR(-1,1) before and after 
Go Global is the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition method (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaco, 1973).  
This procedure is commonly employed in the labor economics literature to analyze wage 
differences between two different groups (e.g., male and female workers).  It decomposes the 
mean difference in the dependent variable, e.g. wages into the portion that can be explained 
by (i) differences in the characteristics of the two groups, and (ii) differences in the estimated 
coefficients in an Equation (14)-type regression, without the policy variable. 
  Let 1Y  and 2Y  represent the sample means of the dependent variable for two groups.  
It follows that 
11 βX
ˆ1Y  and 222Y βX
ˆ ; where 1βˆ  and 2βˆ  are the estimated coefficients 
from regressing Y on X for the two groups, and 1X  and 2X  are the vector of sample means 
of the respective explanatory variables.  Two common methods for decomposing 12 YY   are 
(15a)    12212112 YY ββXXXβ ˆˆˆ   , and 
 
(15b)    12112212 YY ββXXXβ ˆˆˆ  . 
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           Method A weights the difference in characteristic sample means  12 XX   by 1βˆ , and 
the difference in estimated coefficients,  12 ββ ˆˆ   by 2X .  Method B uses the weights 2βˆ  and 
1X , respectively.   
 If ―Go Global‖ directed investment towards targets that benefitted national strategic 
interests at the expense of firm value, this should be reflected in either the effect of the 
differences in sample means,  12 XX  , or the differences in estimated coefficients, 
 12 ββ ˆˆ  , or both.  For example, suppose natural resource firms generally make less 
attractive targets for Chinese acquirers than firms in other industries.  Then an increase in the 
number of NATREL deals would be associated, ceteris paribus, with lower abnormal 
announcement returns.  In other words, the effect of Go Global would be reflected in the 
 12 XX   component.   
 Alternatively, suppose that prior to Go Global, Chinese firms only acquired natural 
resources targets that were likely to increase shareholder wealth.  But after Go Global, 
government policy-makers encouraged them to acquire natural resources targets even if it 
was likely to lower profits.  In this case, the effect of Go Global would show up in a lower 
estimated coefficient on the NATREL variable; and the effect of Go Global would be reflected 
in the  12 ββ ˆˆ   component.  
We also use multivariate regression analysis to get at the same question. Specifically, we 
investigate the extent to which explanatory variables associated with the (i) Government 
Capitalization and (ii) Hubris and Herding hypotheses can explain differences in abnormal 
returns before and after Go Global. An advantage at this approach is that we can use a pooled 
sample and get larger sample sizes than with the decomposition approach. In contrast, the 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition approach relies on breaking down the sample into before and 
after policy periods and comparing both their respective means and estimated coefficients. It 
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allows us to calculate the percentage contribution of specific variables to the observed 
difference in abnormal returns between the Pre- and Post- Go Global periods.  
3.4.  Results of Empirical Analysis 
3.4.1.  General Performance of Chinese OMAs 
Table 3.4 shows daily performance of Chinese OMAs in the test period. We employ event 
study methodology to estimate announcement effects of OMAs on stock returns. Day 0 is 
defined as the announcement date. The market model is applied to estimate benchmark 
returns. We report both average abnormal returns (AAR) and average standardized abnormal 
returns (ASAR). We estimate a positive 0.44% average abnormal return (AAR) on day 0, 
though this is insignificantly different from zero. Further, returns are positive for each day 
over the (-1,1) period, though the returns for each day are insignificant. Standardized 
abnormal returns behave similarly. However, abnormal returns become negative after day 1, 
though daily returns continue to be insignificant. We hypothesize that markets may retreat 
from their optimistic evaluation once they get better informed about it. Since we could not 
make a conclusive judgment only by daily performance, we move to test interval abnormal 
returns. 
Table 3.5 reports interval responses for Chinese OMAs. We choose intervals before, 
within and after announcement. For example, (-10,-1) is the ten day interval before the 
announcement. The interval CAR (-1, 1), indicates a 1.2% positive abnormal return on the 
three day interval around the announcement day. This is significant at the 5% level. However, 
over the longer (-10, 10) interval, ACAR is very close to zero, (0.06%), and insignificant. 
These results suggest that markets responded positively to announcements of Chinese OMAs 
over the 1994-2009 period, and the market is efficient in general because the announcement 
effect is only significant on day (-1,1) window.  
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3.4.2.  Performance in Three Listing Markets 
In this next section we take a closer look by analyzing returns from each of the three 
markets (see Table 3.6). If we examine daily returns over the (-1,1) period, we find that 
across the 3 markets, each of the ACAR values are positive with one exception: Day 1 in the 
mainland market. Two are significant, and they are each positive: Day (-1) in the mainland, 
and Day (1) in the US. Outside the (-1,1) window there are some puzzling results (such as 
Day -7 in the US). Given the large number of daily results, some of these significances may 
be spurious.  
Since the daily ARs are noisy, we look to the interval performance of Chinese OMAs 
in Table 3.7. Chinese mainland markets show significant positive abnormal returns of 2.20% 
and 1.49% before the announcement over intervals (-10,-1) and (-5,-1) respectively, at 5-
percent level. Thus, Chinese mainland markets responded positively before the 
announcement, which is evidence of information leakage. In the Hong Kong market, we find 
a 1.17% positive and significant abnormal return over the interval (-1, 1), at the 5-percent 
level. In the U.S., none of the intervals showed significant abnormal returns. This suggests 
that markets behave differently to the initial announcements of Chinese OMAs due to 
diversified information sets. 
3.4.3.  Performance Comparison Before and After “Go Global” 
Table 3.8 compares market responses to Chinese OMAs before and after Go Global. We find 
positive ACARs (-1,1) in both periods, 3.39% before ―Go Global‖ and 0.66% after. These are 
significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. ACAR(-1,1) before ―Go Global‖ policy is 
2.73% higher than ACAR(-1,1) after. This suggests that ―Go Global‖ may have had negative 
effects on firms’ performance. However, since the difference is not significant, these results 
are not conclusive. 
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3.4.4.  Sample Description on Performance Determinants    
Table 3.9 describes all the variables employed in the subsequent analysis of the differences in 
AARs before and after Go Global. Table 3.10 reports summary statistics. The dependent 
variable, CAR (-1, 1) has a mean value of 1.2% with a maximum of 63.2% and minimum of -
13.8%. For the policy-related variables, 80% of the OMA events happened after Go Global 
(POLICY). Having so many deals occur in the Go Global years suggests that the Go Global 
policy sparked much OMA activity. 47% of the acquirers are government-owned enterprises 
(GOVTOWN). Targets in natural resources (NATRES) and high-technology sectors (ITIN) 
constitute about 26% and 34% at all deals respectively. With respect to the control variables, 
we note that 37% of all deals are targeted in HK. Half of the deals are between related 
industries (INDREL). 30% of acquirers take advantage of professional advisors in their 
transactions (ADVISOR). On average, Chinese RMB appreciated against the USD in the 
1994-2009 period (FEX). 56% of the transactions are cash payment only. We also list 
alternative variables for robustness checks. Cultural Distance is an index describing cultural 
differences between China and the host countries (CULDIS). A larger number indicates a 
bigger cultural difference. Table 3.10 reports that the average cultural distance between China 
and the host countries is about 1.44. 76% of targets are in developed nations or areas 
(DEVDC).
54
 The average transaction value is USD 292 million (TRAVALUE), the average 
market capital of acquirers is USD 11,433 million (MV6b) with a mean book-to-market ratio 
(BM) is 0.6. 38% of the acquirers list in the Hong Kong stock exchange (HKM), whilst 20% 
of them list in the US (USM). 44.6% of OMA deals happened after the 2007 financial crisis 
(CRISIS). 
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 54% (58/108) are in HK, and the reminder of the 46% (50/108) are in other developed nations or areas. 
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As noted above, the fact that approximately 58% of the acquirers are cross-listed firms 
in foreign stock markets (namely HK and US), implies that firms with international 
experience are more likely to invest abroad. Unfortunately, data for cultural distance, 
transaction value and book-to-market ratio are not available for all observations.  
Before we use the variables in our regression equations, it is useful to observe the simple 
correlation between variable pairs. In Table 3.11, we find 4 correlation coefficients larger 
than 0.5. These are CULDIS and THK, INTRAVALUE and ADVISOR, CRISIS and FEX, 
and LNMV6B and LNTRAVALUE.  
A correlation coefficient of 0.91 between CRISIS and FEX suggests that RMB 
appreciation moves generally in the same direction as the financial crisis. This suggests that 
substantial multicollinearity could occur if both variables were included in a model. Not 
surprisingly cultural distance is highly negatively correlated with HK targets (-0.77) because 
HK and the Chinese mainland are ―culturally close‖. Transaction value achieves a 0.56 
correlation coefficient with advisor, and firm sizes get a 0.57 correlation coefficient with 
transaction value. This implies that firms are more cautious and tend to invite professional 
advisors for help when the transaction value is larger. Bigger Chinese acquirers are more 
likely to initiate larger transaction deals. 
3.4.5.  Policy Impact Analysis by Multivariate Regressions 
Table 3.12 reports OLS regression results of ―Go Global‖ policy models using our total 
sample of 157 Chinese OMA events. It is noteworthy that the policy dummy (POLICY) has a 
negative coefficient in each of the three regressions. Cumulative abnormal returns on the (-
1,1) interval are approximately 3 percent lower in the Go Global period, and is relatively 
unaffected by the inclusion of other explanatory variables. However, the POLICY coefficient 
is insignificant in all three models.    
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   However, we find that the high-technology dummy (ITIN) is negatively and significantly 
(at the 10-percent level) associated with Chinese OMA performance. Interestingly this 
indicates that high-technology OMAs generally underperform other industries. Model 2 
reports a 2.8% lower CAR (-1,1) on Chinese OMAs in high-technology sector. Model 3 
reports an estimate that is 2.5% lower. Although high-technology targets tripled in deal 
number after policy, its proportion of all Chinese OMAs reduced from 35.5% to 27% in the 
sample after policy. This likely reflects an industry performance gap rather than a policy 
impact.  
   Finally we note that the R
2
s are very low for all three models. We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that all coefficients in each model equal zero. In other words, none of the 
explanatory variables are significantly related to the initial responses of markets to OMA 
announcements. 
3.4.6. Policy Impact by Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition Analysis 
3.4.6.1.  Comparison of Sample Means and Estimate Coefficients 
We next employ Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to compare sample means and estimated 
coefficients of policy-related and other control variables before and after ―Go Global‖. 
Further, we investigate their contribution to OMA performance in the pre- and post policy 
period. Sample means and the results of regression analysis for the before and after Go 
Global periods are reported in Table 3.13 (See panels A and B).  
   As noted above, 80% of OMA deals were completed after Go Global.
55
 The sample mean 
section shows that the percent of government-owned acquirers dropped from 55% to 45%.
56
 
On the other hand, the huge domestic demand for energy and natural resources is reflected by 
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 Furthermore, 45% of the deals are executed after world financial crisis. It seems that Chinese economy is less 
hammered by the world financial crisis due to intensive financial control. On the contrary, Chinese acquirers are 
motivated to pursue foreign targets at lower expenses during the world recession period. 
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 And even 31% in crisis period. 
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the sharp climb in energy and natural resources OMAs, from 3% to 33%. After Go Global, 
more OMAs targeted firms in related industries and used professional advisors. Fewer HK 
targets were involved. 
  Panel A of Table 3.13 reports the results of OLS estimation of Equation (13) without the 
policy variable. To some extent, it reveals Chinese acquirers are making progress in handling 
OMA with preferred policy and more international operation experience. For policy-related 
variables, natural resources OMAs change their estimated sign from negative to positive, 
which is suggestive of improving performance after policy. Coefficients on government-
owned and high technology dummies are less negative after policy, but not significant.  
  Panel B of Table 3.13 uses OLS to estimate Equation (14) without the policy variable. We 
add 5 control variables to the policy-related variables. The results reveal that 4 out of 7 
variables change their estimation coefficients from negative to positive, though many of them 
are not significant.  It seems that most of the estimated coefficients of control variables 
(associated with the hubris and herding hypothesis) become ―rational‖ after policy. Industry-
relatedness ceases having a negative impact; likewise for professional advisors and cash-only 
transactions.  
3.4.6.2.  Blinder-Oaxaca Analysis    
Table 3.14 reports the results of applying the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to the difference 
in ACAR values in the pre- and post-Go Global periods.  Changes in (i) mean sample 
characteristics,  12 XX  , and (ii) estimated coefficients,  12 ββ ˆˆ  , are identified by ―Means‖ 
and ―Coefficients‖ respectively.  The numbers in the table represent the percentage difference 
―explained‖ by the respective change for each variable, including changes in the estimated 
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value of the constant.
57
  A positive number suggests that the change contributed to the 
difference in ACAR values.  A negative number suggests the opposite; namely, that the 
observed gap is smaller as a result of the respective change.  We are looking for variables 
with large positive values for either ―Means,‖ ―Coefficients,‖ or both to identify the 
contributors to negative ACAR gap. A value of 100 indicates that the respective change 
counts for 100 percent of the difference in ACAR (-1,1) before and after Go Global. 
For example, average cumulative abnormal returns on the (-1,1) window were 
approximately 2.73 percent lower during the Go Global years (cf. ACAR2002-2009 - ACAR1994-
2001 = -0.0273 in Table 14). At the same time, a higher percent of deals involved targets in the 
NATRES industries.  Thirty-three percent of OMA deals targeted NATRES firms after Go 
Global, compared to only three percent before (cf. TABLE 3.13).    
Panel A of Table 3.14 reports that approximately -30 percent  (= 101.0-130.9 using 
Method A; = -17-13 using Method B) of the 2.73 percent decrease in abnormal returns during 
Go Global can be ―explained‖ by the combined effects of the changes in means and estimated 
coefficients associated with the NATRES variable. This suggests that the lower abnormal 
return is smaller in absolute value as a result of the change in the policy-related variable 
NATRES. 
The other two policy-related variables, GOVTOWN and ITIN, also explain a ―negative‖ 
share of the change in ACAR (-1,1): -198.3 and -150 percent respectively. This again 
indicates the decrease in abnormal return is not as low as it might otherwise be because of the 
change of the two policy-related variables. In summary, the results of this analysis suggests 
that the policy-related variables are not contributing to the negative ACAR gap. 
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 Note that the ―Sum‖ of the ―Mean‖ and ―Coefficients‖ contributions over all variables (including the constant 
term) must equal 100 percent. 
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The addition of more control variables in Panel B (THK, INDREL, ADVISOR, FEX, 
CASH) does not change the outcome very much. All the 3 policy-variables are found to make 
negative contributions to the ACAR gap: NATRES (-48.1%), GOVTOWN (-105.8%) and ITIN 
(-191%). This is consistent with the preceding results in Panel A.  
Further, the control variables THK (-212.5%), INDREL (-81.7%), ADVISOR (-29.3%), 
FEX (-300.4%) and CASH (-69.5%) also fail to explain the decrease in cumulative abnormal 
returns during Go Global. On the contrary, the decomposition results suggest that the 
observed ACAR gap before and after policy would be larger without the changing of the 
above variables.  
In conclusion, the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, like the multivariate analysis before it, 
finds no support for the hypothesis that the lower abnormal returns during the Go Global 
period are due to changes associated with one or more of the listed variables.  Indeed, the 
sum of the associated contributions suggests that the difference in ACAR values would have 
been even larger were it not for changes in these variables.   
       Table 3.14 is noteworthy for two additional thing: one for what it doesn’t show, and one 
for what it does.  First, there is no firm characteristic that is consistently identified with the 
decline in positive announcement effects during the Go Global period.  Second, the decline is 
―explained‖ by the constant term. This is consistent with the fact that it is the overall increase 
in the number of deals -- neither government-influenced investment pursuing public interests 
at the expense of private shareholders, nor hubris and herding behaviour of top managers -- 
that is responsible for lower announcement returns during the Go Global period. 
3.5.  Conclusion 
    In this study we construct a comprehensive data set composed of all Chinese, overseas 
mergers and acquisitions (OMAs) activities over the period 1994-2009.  We then analyze 
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stock market returns centered on the announcement dates of these OMAs. While there has 
been much discussion in the popular press regarding Chinese OMAs, to date there has been 
little empirical analysis of this subject.  Previous studies have either failed to undertake a 
thorough analysis of the underlying data, or have not been comprehensive in their coverage 
of Chinese OMA activities. This chapter does both. 
    Our analysis is motivated by two questions:  
1. Do Chinese OMAs create value for shareholders? 
2. Does the Go Global policy damage shareholders’ wealth? 
    We answer these questions using an event-study methodology to investigate announcement 
effects of overseas mergers and acquisitions (OMAs) by Chinese, acquiring firms over the 
1994-2009 period.   
 The first question is of interest because of the heavy involvement of the public sector 
in the ownership of Chinese firms.  This raises concerns that OMA decisions by Chinese 
firms may not be concentrated on maximizing shareholder wealth.  Our analysis finds no 
support for these concerns.  We find some evidence that markets positively evaluated 
announcements of OMAs by Chinese acquiring firms, and no evidence that these 
announcements were negatively evaluated.   
 With respect to the second question, our theoretical analysis identifies three possible 
effects of the Go Global policy.  First, as Go Global relaxed restrictions on OMAs, it allowed 
Chinese, acquiring firms to pursue additional, albeit less profitable deals.  Second, it may also 
have re-directed investment towards industries having critical strategic value, such as 
resource and technology industries. Last but not the least, hubris and herding behaviour of top 
managers may have contributed to increased OMA deals by Chinese, acquiring firms. While 
the first effect should be wealth-increasing for shareholders, these additional deals could 
lower the average benefit of a deal to Chinese acquirers if only the most profitable deals were 
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approved during the pre-Go Global period.  The second and third effects could be wealth-
decreasing if Chinese firms were led to sacrifice shareholder interests in behalf of progressing 
national strategic goals or due to agency problem in corporate governance.  Thus, while all 
effects would be reflected in lower abnormal returns during the Go Global period, only the 
last two effects would be wealth-decreasing.   
 Our empirical analysis confirms that there were more deals during the Go Global 
period, and that the average benefit of these deals, as measured by market responses to 
announcements of OMA deals, was lower during the Go Global period, though the decrease 
was not statistically significant. However, we find no evidence of negative abnormal returns 
under Go Global. 
To further investigate the second effect, we use multivariate analysis and a Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition procedure (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) to determine whether the 
lower abnormal returns associated with the Go Global period are due to variables associated 
with government strategy.  We find no evidence that the lower returns were associated with 
firms being government-owned, or with deals being natural resources or high-tech-related. 
Nor do we find any evidence that managers were less concerned with increasing shareholder 
wealth in the Go Global years. 
 In conclusion, under Go Global there have been more deals with generally lower 
expected benefits to shareholders.  However, there is no evidence that Go Global has caused 
Chinese acquiring firms to sacrifice shareholder’s wealth in order to pursue national interests. 
Nor does top managers’ hubris and herding behaviour mislead OMA decision making. The 
decrease in OMA performance in recent years may simply reflect diminishing returns to 
Chinese OMAs.   
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Chapter Four  An Analysis of the Long-run Performance of 
Chinese Overseas M&As: 1994-2008 
 
This chapter examines the long-run performance of Chinese OMAs. We study 122 deals over 
the 1994-2008 period.
58
 We focus on the one-year, two-year, and three-year returns after an 
OMA event occurs. While we find some evidence of significant abnormal returns over the 
one and two year horizon, by the third year after an OMA event, these returns become small 
and insignificant. The one consistent finding that we obtain is that government ownership is 
negatively and significantly related to long-run performance of Chinese OMAs. 
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 Since this chapter is concerned with long-run performance, and sufficient 3-year time series data is 
unavailable for deals effective after December 31, 2008, there are fewer observations. 
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4.1. Introduction 
China’s remarkable growth was again evidence in 2010 with a 10% GDP growth rate, the 
highest in the world.
59
 However, it is clear that the Chinese economy is at a transition point. 
Traditional labour intensive, trade-oriented industries are facing increasing challenges in the 
world recession. The development of high-energy consuming, high-pollution firms in China 
are damaging the environment, and intensifying resource shortages. To make matters worse, 
labour disputes in Guangdong suggest that the cheap ―unlimited‖ supply of blue-collar 
workers is now falling short of demand. The result must be an increase in wages, which some 
are concerned will stifle growth in China.
60
 
Beginning in the 1980s, China embarked on a strategy of enhancing industry 
concentration ratios (CR) and competitive power in the global market, and restructuring 
industry.
61
 This same strategy continues today. Beijing announced the scrapping of export tax 
rebates for hundreds of products on June 23
rd
, 2010. Included in the list were many high- 
energy consuming and high-pollution industries.
62
 As a result of substantial appreciation of 
the Chinese Renminbi, overseas merger and acquisitions provide an alternative channel to 
increase industry CRs and restructure industry.
63
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 Details please see AB Practice, June, 2010, pg 11. 
60
 On June 6
th
, the owner of Foxconn double the basic pay it previously offered, following a string of widely 
publicised suicides; on the same time, Honda Guangdong Branch suffered a strike requesting pay rise. Details 
please see The economist June 12
th
, 2010, pg88.  
61
 The Concentration Ratio is the percentage of market share held by the largest firms (m) in an industry. CRm= 
Σni=I xi; Therefore it can be expressed as: CRm = s1 + s2 + .... + sm where si is the market share and m defines the 
i
th
 firm. No concentration: 0% means perfect competition or at the very least monopolistic competition. If for 
example CR4=0 %, the 4 largest firm in the industry would not have any significant market share. Total 
concentration, 100% means an extremely concentrated oligopoly. If for example CR1= 100%, we talk of a 
monopoly.  Details please see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concentration_ratio. 
62
 For example, steel and petrochemical, agriculture products are on the list. Details please see 
http://business.sohu.com/s2010/quxiaotuishui/ 
63
 Under continuous pressure to end the renminbi’s peg to the dollar from the west, China announced to allow 
more flexibility of its currency exchange rate on June 19
th
,2010. Benn Stell, Lesson from the 1930s for a rising 
renminbi, Financial Times, June 23, 2010. pg 9. 
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      Overseas mergers and acquisitions (OMAs) are an ideal strategy for the Chinese 
government to help firms increase their size and compete successfully with rivals in the 
marketplace. Chinese firms can purchase technology, market networks, human capital, and/or 
intangible assets that would have taken years or decades to build up by themselves. They also 
enable the acquisition of valuable energy and natural resources. 
      In 1999, Beijing initiated its ―Go Global‖ policy. In 2001, China became a member of the 
WTO. Since then, China has embarked on a remarkable path of resource-seeking overseas 
M&A growth. Chinese overseas M&A transactions have continued to expand through the 
world financial crisis.
64
 Since half of the acquirers are government-owned enterprises and 
many of the rest have stake government ownership are heavily influenced by government, 
we can infer that the Chinese OMA wave is part of government’s strategy of long term 
development. Furthermore, since Chinese OMAs have been clustered in the energy, natural 
resources and high technology industries, we are interested in testing how these M&As have 
fared in the long run. 
In summary, this chapter investigates Chinese OMA performance and their interaction 
with industry restructuring in the period of 1994-2008.
65
 Since China is a typical 
government-oriented economy, short-term profitability may not be the most important 
concern. Of greater importance may be whether these OMAs help the government to achieve 
its industry restructuring goals and whether these economic investments are profitable in the 
long term.  
Our research questions are:  
1. Do Chinese OMAs create value for shareholders in the long run? 
2. What are the determinants of Chinese OMA performance in the long run? 
                                                 
 
64
 Please see table 1-3 for details. 
65
 Due to three years time series stock prices after OMA are needed to evaluate long-term performance in 
calendar-time approach, Chinese OMAs in 2009 are not included. 
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We investigate 122 Chinese OMA events in the 1994-2008 period. We employ the 
Calendar-time approach to test long term OMA performance over a 3-year horizon. We find 
no evidence of significant returns over the 3-year horizon. However, we do find some 
evidence that long-term OMA performance is correlated with industry characteristics. 
Interestingly, OMA long-term performance appears to be greater after Go Global compared 
to before. There is some evidence to suggest that the opposite result holds in the short-run. 
Finally, government negatively and significantly correlated with long term OMA 
performance. Government-owned acquirers underperform private acquirers by 10-22%.   
      Due to time period data limits, there are few studies on long-term OMA performance for 
emerging acquirers. Our study fills that gap. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
study to investigate the long-run performance of Chinese OMAs. Among other things, our 
results suggest that government efforts to pursue national strategic goals do not harm the 
long-run wealth of shareholders. 
       The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 
presents data and methodology. Section 4 reports the results and Section 5 concludes. 
4.2.   Related Literature 
4.2.1. Industry Restructuring and The Chinese OMA Wave 
Much research has documented merger clusters by industry. Mitchell & Mulherin 
(1996) study industry-level patterns in takeover and restructuring activity during the 1982-
1989 period. They find significant differences across industries. Andrade, Mitchell, & 
Stafford (2001) hypothesize that merger activity is the result of industry-level shocks. These 
shocks include: technological innovations, which can create excess capacity and the need for 
industry consolidation; supply shocks, such as oil prices; and deregulation. For these and 
other reasons, most papers control for industry when examining M&A performance (Lyon et 
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al., 1999; Savor & Lu, 2009; Wei et al., 2005). The restructuring of industries has 
implications for firms’ short- and long run OMA performance.  
4.2.2. Ownership Structure and OMA Performance 
 Ownership structure can influence OMA performance too. Xu & Wang (1999) 
investigate ownership structure of publicly listed companies in China within the framework 
of corporate governance. They find profitability of Chinese firms is either negatively 
correlated or uncorrelated with government ownership. They attribute this to the inefficiency 
of public control. Wei, Xie & Zhang (2005) exam the relation between ownership structure 
and firm value across a sample of China’s partially privatized, former state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) from 1991-2001. They find that state and institutional shares are significantly 
negatively related to firm value. They also find that foreign ownership is significantly 
positively related to firm value. They argue that the agency problem is relatively more severe 
in many emerging markets due to the absence of strong legal protections and other 
governance mechanisms. Managers/insider stock ownership in China is minimal and insiders 
can gain control either through direct government appointments or indirect political influence.  
4.2.3. Other OMA Determinants 
Research on OMA determinants has focused on three categories of determinants. Many 
studies find that transaction details, such as method of payment (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), 
industry relatedness (Doukas & Lang, 2003), and professional advisors (Lowinski et al., 2004) 
affect OMA performance. Other studies highlight bidders’ endowment factors: such as firms’ 
capabilities of internalization (Nocke & Yeaple, 2007);
66
 firm size and book-to-market ratio 
(Gugler et al., 2002; Sudarsanam & Mahate, 2003); and associated ownership characteristics 
(Boubakri et al., 2008; Morck et al., 2008). A third set of determinants relate to the target 
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 As proxied by the firm’s listing market in this chapter. 
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location: such as  country-specific endowments (Kogut, 1985); cultural distance (Larsson & 
Finkelstein, 1999); host county’s growth rate (McDonald, 2001); and exchange rate volatility 
(Dewenter, 1995) with the host country. Buckley et al. (2007)  investigate the determinants of 
Chinese outward direct investment. Their results support that political risk, cultural proximity 
and host natural resources endowments significantly affect OMA performance. 
4.2.4. Different Targets, Different Drivers for Short- and Long-run M&A 
Performance  
      In the weak form of efficient markets, short term investors respond quickly to events in 
the light of available information and rational anticipation. In the long run, overreaction to 
information is about as frequent as post-event reversal. Fama (1998) concludes that market 
efficiency survives the challenge from the literature on long term return anomalies. Although 
individual bidders or targets might behave diversely, return anomalies tend to disappear over 
longer horizons. 
      Apart from market efficiency theory, there are numerous international finance 
management theories explaining the drivers of overseas M&A performance. Failure to 
achieve managerial synergy has been identified as a severe problem in overseas transactions 
(Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999). Differences in the cultural backgrounds of bidders and targets 
can destroy firm value (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Morosini et al., 1998). Level of political 
risk in the host countries, including exchange rate variation (Cebenoyan  et al., 1992) or 
changes in economic policies in the home or host countries, can generate huge volatility in 
long term performance. All of these are difficult to reliably predict into the post merger 
period. 
      Doukas & Lang (2003) find that the performance of short- and long-run green field 
investment depends on the extent of geographic and industry diversification. O’Regan & 
Ghobadian (2004) argue that improvement of short and long term performance is affected by 
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strategy, leadership, culture and organizational efficiency variables. Short-term performance 
is ―internally orientated‖ while long term performance is more likely to be ―externally 
orientated‖. Zero2IPO Research Center (2010) reports that short- and long-term M&A 
performance of Chinese listed firms frequently diverge. Insignificant short term performance 
is followed by positive long term performance. 
      Indeed, it is questionable whether short- and long-run performance of Chinese OMAs is 
determined by the same factors. For example, government policies may target, not 
profitability, but many other strategic concerns such as energy security or industry 
restructuring (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). This may lead to negative short-run returns but 
positive long-run performance. On the other hand, SOEs might fail to achieve shareholders’ 
expectations due to their inefficient management mechanisms (Wei et al., 2005).  
      In all, different targets, different drivers lead to different OMA performance. We 
therefore expect the long-run determinants of Chinese OMA performance to be different from 
their short-run performance. 
4.3. Data 
      We investigate Chinese acquirers’ stock performance one and three years after their OMA 
effective dates. We include the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong and US stock exchanges in our 
analysis. Our sample consists of completed Chinese OMAs effective between January 1
st
, 
1992 and December 31
th
, 2008. We apply the Calendar-time approach using monthly returns 
as calculated according to their adjusted prices.
67
 We delete observations with more than 50% 
zero returns in the 0-41month observation period. Our sample includes some shares that are 
listed on more than one market. When this happens, and when we need to choose only one 
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 We apply the following formula for stock returns:
1ln( / )t tP P . Please see Brown & Warner (1985) and 
Norman (1992) for details. 
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listing, we select the share with the highest-trading volume. In the event that a security has a 
larger market capitalization but a smaller trading volume, we select the security with highest 
market capitalization if its market capitalization is at least two times larger.  
4.3.1.  Firm Size and BM Ratio 
Firm size is measured by market capitalization on the effective date.
68
 Book to market 
ratio (BM) is calculated using end-of-the-fiscal year book values for the year preceding the 
effective date. Market values are calculated six months prior to the effective date. We note 
that shares listed on different markets have different fiscal years. The end of the fiscal year 
for Chinese mainland market is December 31
st
. The fiscal year end dates for the Hong Kong 
and US markets are March 31
st
 and September 30
th
, respectively. We use the appropriate 
fiscal year book value depending on the market in which the security is listed. 
In calculating the small minus big variable for use in the Fama-French 3 Factor model 
(FF3FM) we use largest median firm size in the HK market to categorize small- and big-sized 
firms for the return portfolio of small minus big (SMB).
69
 For calculating the high minus low 
variable, we divide firms into three BM ratio categories: those having BM ratios in the (i) 
highest 30%, (ii) middle 40%, and (iii) lowest 30% groups. We then calculate the portfolio 
return as the ratio of returns from the highest 30% over the lowest 30%. 
4.3.2. Market Return 
      For the purposes of calculating market returns, we used the Shanghai Composite Index, 
Hang Seng Index and S&P 500 Index for the three markets (following the same procedure we 
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 Effective date is the date when M&A transactions are officially completed. 
69
 In Fama and French (1992,1993), they allocate size portfolios based on NYSE breakpoints although stocks in 
AMEX and NASDAQ are included in their sample. They argue that if they used stocks from all three exchanges 
(NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ) to determine the size breakpoint, most portfolios would end up with only small 
stocks. For the same reason, we allocate our size portfolios based on HK listings in our sample, where largest 
market value locates among the three listings (Chinese mainland, Hong Kong and U.S.). Please note market 
equity (market value) of U.S. listings in our sample are ADRs and have smaller market value comparing to 
mainland or Hong Kong listings.    
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used for the event time approach). We also tried using the MSCI world index as a common 
market proxy. 
4.3.3. Risk Free Rate 
      A common approach for estimating the risk free rate consists of using the 1-month or 3-
month T-bond. However, we could not find 3-month T-bond until year 2008 for the China 
mainland. Nor could we find T-bond assets for the Hong Kong market. To make risk free 
rates in the three markets comparable, we choose the China 1 year time deposit, the 1 year 
Hong Kong Dollar interest rate, and the annualized US Federal funds rate, respectively. 
These were converted to monthly rates by dividing by 12. 
4.3.4. Firm Survivorship and Data Availability 
     Our investigation covers a three-year period. Accordingly, we rebalance market 
capitalization and BM ratios of firms for each year of the sample. Firms delisted from the 
stock exchanges during the analysis period are removed. We omitted all firms for which 
DataStream did not maintain data relevant for calculating the BM ratio or market 
capitalization for portfolio grouping.   
4.4. Methodology  
4.4.1. Long Term Performance Estimator 
     The Calendar-time approach is a popular estimation procedure for calculating long term 
performance. The Fama-French Three Factor Model (FF3FM) is widely used in calendar- 
time approach (Fama & French, 1992; Fama & French, 1993).  
        Fama & French (1993) note that when excess market return is the only explanatory 
variable in time series regressions, the intercepts for stocks include both the size and BM 
effects. The intercept for the smallest portfolios exceed those for the biggest by 
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approximately 0.22%-0.37%; in every size quintile, the highest BM quintile exceed those for 
the lowest by 0.25%-0.76%.  When three factors (market excess return, SMB portfolio return 
and HML portfolio return) are included in the regressions, the intercepts were pushed from 
strong positive values towards 0, which reveals that three factors absorb common time-series 
variation in returns and do a good job explaining the cross-section of average stock returns. 
     In the three-factor regressions in Fama & French (1993)--reproduced in Table 5A, the βs 
for the smallest-low BM and biggest-high BM are 1.04 and 1.06 respectively. These compare 
to 1.40 and 0.89 in the univariate regressions. This indicates that the addition of SMB and 
HML to the regression pushes the βs towards 1.0; low βs move up towards 1.0 and high βs 
move down. Fama and French argue that this behavior is due to correlation between market 
returns and SMB and HML. Further, Fama & French (1993) find that R
2
s are much higher in 
three factor regressions compared to one-factor and two-factor models,  The average R
2
 in 
FF3FM is larger than 0.93. (See Table 5A for details.) 
      Some studies simply regress abnormal returns over time on an intercept term (Eberhart et 
al., 2004; Ivkovich et al., 2006). Others estimate calendar-time abnormal returns (CTAR) or 
so-called mean monthly abnormal return (MMAR). The FF3FM is taken as the benchmark 
model to get expected returns. CTAR is calculated as the difference between actual and 
expected returns. After analyzing various methods to test for long-run abnormal stock returns, 
Lyon, Barber, & Tsai (1999) recommend CTAR as a reliable procedure for investigating long 
term performance.  
      Mitchell & Stafford (2000) employ CTAR to test performance of M&As, seasoned equity 
issues, and equity repurchases in US markets during July 1961 to December 1993. They find 
negative, 3-year CTARs in M&A activities for all control groups except value firms. Byun & 
Rozeff (2003) study 1-year CTARs after 12,747 stock splits in the US from 1927 to 1996. 
They find small or negligible 1-year CTARs, except for subsamples of 2-1 splits. Savor & Lu 
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(2009) find significant and insignificant negative, 3-year CTARs for US stock acquirers and 
cash acquirers, respectively, in 1978-2003.  
4.4.2. Long Term CTAR 
     We measure post-OMA long-run performance using calendar-time abnormal returns.  
Fama and French (1992) find that along with beta, firm size and book-to-market ratio are 
statistically significant in explaining returns. We use the Fama-French (1993) three factor 
model (FF3FM) to evaluate abnormal returns in the sample: 
(1)       titiftmtiiftit HMLhSMBsRRRR  )(  
where itR  is observed returns for security i in month t, 
            ftR  is risk-free rate in month t, 
            mtR  is observed market return in month t, 
    tSMB  equals the small minus big mean return in month t, a ―size‖ factor;  
   tHML  represents the high minus low mean return in month t, a ―book-to-market‖ 
factor. 
Note that )( ftmt RR  measures the market risk premium and )( ftit RR  measures abnormal 
returns. t is measured in months. 
To generate size and book-to-market factor values, we create six portfolios by splitting 
the firms in two size groups and in three book-to-market groups. The high book-to-market 
portfolio consists of the 30% of stocks with the highest book-to-market ratios in a given year. 
The low book-to-market portfolio consists of the 30% of stocks with the lowest book-to-
market ratios. The groups of small and big firms break at the median of firm market value on 
the effective date. 
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We estimate the FF3FM of equation (1) to get estimates of coefficients, i , i , is , and 
ih . We calculate monthly calendar-time abnormal returns (CTARs) according to the 
following formula: 
(2)  );( ititit RERCTAR    where 
(3) 
titiftmtiiit HMLhSMBsRRRE
ˆˆ)(ˆˆ)(    
 where  iˆ , iˆ , isˆ , ihˆ  are obtained by estimating Equation (1) as described above. 
We aggregate monthly CTARs, average across securities and report their long-run 
performance over a three-year horizon. The associated t-stat for long-run performance is 
given by: 
(4)   1 1
N T
it
i t
t
CTAR
N
t
T 
  

;  
where T indicates the months aggregated, N refers to securities involved, and t is the 
standard deviation of CTARt. Note that Equation (4) is analogous to IntervalZ  in Chapter Three. 
Note further that the standard deviation represents an in-sample standard deviation as there 
are not separate ―estimation‖ and ―test‖ periods. In order to calculate more reliable coefficient 
estimates, we divide our sample into 16 portfolios due to their firm size (4 groups) and BM 
ratio (4 groups). Equation (1) is then estimated separately for each subsample. These 
coefficients are then used to calculate expected returns, )( itRE .      
4.4.3. Determinants of Chinese OMA  
    There are many factors involved in overseas M&A performance. The complexity of their 
interrelationships makes it difficult to select representative explanatory variables that are not 
highly correlated with each other. Our approach is as follows.  
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      Following the organization of the established literature (see above), we categorize the 
explanatory variables into three groups: 
(1) M&A transaction details. These variables include information on transaction value, 
method of payment, related takeover, target’s attitude (as in hostile or friendly), number 
of bidders, professional advisor involvement,  etc. Because there are no competitors in 
the bidding and all the takeovers in our sample are friendly takeovers, we use the 
variables INDREL (related takeover), CASH (cash only payment), LNTRAVALUE 
(transaction value) and ADVISOR (professional advisor dummy) to represent the factors 
associated with M&A transaction details.  
(2) Target location. These variables include variables that measure firm and market 
characteristics associated with the target and acquiring firms. The variables CULDIS 
(cultural distance between bidders and targets), FEX (change on exchange rate), DEVDC 
(dummy variable indicating target is from a developed country) and THK (HK targets) 
all belong to this group. 
(3) Bidders’ endowment. These variables include LNMV24A (bidders’ firm size), Y2BM 
(book-to-market ratio) and dummy variables to identify the listed market.  
        We also include variables that are specific to our Chinese sample. China is an emerging 
economy. Most of the Chinese firms are not expected to achieve competitive power in the 
market place. To some extent, the Chinese OMA wave might represent strategic decisions 
made at the government, rather than firm, level. Government impact could be an important 
driver of OMA transactions. Therefore, we also include variables that measure the influence 
of government. These are GOVTOWN (dummy variable indicating the enterprises is 
government-owned) and POLICY (a dummy variable indicating the OMA event occurred 
during the years 2002-2008). It is very clear from a listing of Chinese OMA events that 2002 
seems to be a break point for both the number of OMA deals and their transaction value. 
90 
 
Both of these increase dramatically after 2001. The Chinese government initiated its ―Go 
Global‖ policy in the year 1999. Further, China became a WTO member in 2001. These two 
policy events are the likely causes of the subsequent spark in OMA deals and values. The 
variable POLICY is designed to capture the influence of these policy events. 
      Another consideration unique to our sample, is that many of the firms list across different 
markets: the Chinese mainland markets, the Hong Kong markets and US markets.
70
 Yun, 
Abeyratna, & David (2005) argue that stock returns in different nations are unlikely to be 
highly correlated. To capture persistent differences that may exist across these markets, we 
include market dummy variables. Finally, Mitchell & Mulherin (1996) argue that firms’ 
performance is distinctively different among sectors. Therefore, we also include industry 
dummy variables to capture differences across sectors. 
      We employ the following models to investigate determinants of the 3-year performance 
(Y3CTAR) of Chinese OMAs. All models include the variables for government ownership 
and book to market ratios (GOVTOWN and Y2BM) because preliminary analyses identified 
these as robust determinants of OMA performance. 
  Model 1 includes all variables: 
Model 1 






POLICYITINUSMHKM
ALNMVADVISORLNTRAVALUECASHINDRELTHK
DEVDCFEXCULDISBMYGOVTOWNCATRY
15141312
11109876
54321
24
23
 
Model 2  includes all the variables of Model 1 but omits the POLICY variable. 
Model 2 






ITINUSMHKM
ALNMVADVISORLNTRAVALUECASHINDRELTHK
DEVDCFEXCULDISBMYGOVTOWNCATRY
141312
11109876
54321
24
23
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 We delete all bidders listing other than mainland, HK or US to control the variation of their stock returns. 
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Model 3 focuses on target location variables. 
Model 3 




THKDEVDCFEX
CULDISBMYGOVTOWNCTARY
654
321 23
                               
Model 4 focuses on the long-run effect of Go Global 
Model 4 
  POLICYBMYGOVTOWNCTARY 321 23               
Model 5 focuses on variables associated with M&A Transaction Details 
Model 5 




ADVISORLNTRAVALUECASH
INDRELBMYGOVTOWNCTARY
654
321 23
                             
Model 6 focuses on Bidder’s Endowment variables 
Model 6 




USMHKM
ALNMVBMYGOVTOWNCTARY
54
321 2423
                           
Model 7 pays special attention to possible performance issues associated with the 
government’s strategic interest in the high technology and natural resource industries. 
Model 7 
  NATRESITINBMYGOVTOWNCTARY 4321 23           
Model 8 is a bare-bones model that focuses on the two robust determinants of OMA 
performance.  
Model 8 
  BMYGOVTOWNCTARY 23 21                                                
4.5. Results 
     Tables 4.1 through 4.3 report the distribution of OMA deals by year, country, and industry. 
These are similar to the distributions reported in Chapter 3. However, since this chapter is 
concerned with long-run performance, and sufficient 3-year time series data is unavailable for 
deals effective after December 31, 2008, there are fewer observations. 
      Table 4.3 shows that both the number of deals and the OMA activity increased 
substantially in the average transaction value increased dramatically in many of the sectors 
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after 2002.(i) Telecommunications and Electronics, Prepackaged Software, (ii) Energy and 
Natural Resources, and (iii) Miscellaneous Business Services sectors. 
4.5.1.  Long Term Performance of Chinese OMAs 
Table 4.4 reports the long-term performance of Chinese OMAs at six-month intervals. 
Six months after the effective date, Chinese acquiring firms experienced, on average, 
abnormal returns of 5.41%. Over time, these positive abnormal returns dissipated. After three 
years, Chinese acquiring firms experienced a cumulative abnormal return of negative 1.46%. 
However, none of the CTAR are statistically different from zero.  
Fama and French (1993) apply U.S. stock markets data to test their three factor model. 
Table 4.5A reproduces results from their Table 4.6 and 4.9. The main points of these tables 
are: 
1. Beta, SMB and HML factors are statistically significant in all 25 portfolios; 
2. Beta coefficients are close to one; 
3. The loadings of SMB factor decline monotonically as the size quintile gets larger 
(within the same book-to-market quintile), indicates higher risk premium for small 
sized firms; 
4. The loadings of HML factor increase monotonically as the book-to-market ratio gets 
larger (within the same size quintile), indicates higher returns for higher book-to-
market ratio firms (value firms); 
5. The abnormal return ―alphas‖ in FF3FM appear insignificant.  
6. FF3FM fits well with all very large R-squares in each of the 25 portfolios; 
However, when they apply a related model to international markets (two-factor model, beta 
and book-to market ratio), they find the multi-factor model does not work as well for 
emerging markets (Fama & French, 1998). 
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Table 4.5B reports our results of estimating the FF3FM (see Equation 1) for each of 
the sixteen portfolios. The dependent variable is observed, excess monthly returns for 
security i at time t. The independent variables are market excess returns for security i at time t, 
SMB portfolio return at time t and HML portfolio return at time t. 
We get mixed results in Table 4.5B. Fourteen of the sixteen Beta coefficients are 
insignificantly different from one. We do find some evidence that SMB and HML factors 
provide additional explanatory power. Three out of sixteen SMB coefficients and four out of 
sixteen HML coefficients are significant at the 5% level. In general, loading of firm size 
factor (SMB) decline as the size quintile gets larger (within the same book-to-market quintile) 
- though the change is not monotonic. The leverage factor (HML) results are not as 
favourable. Their loadings increase as the book-to-market ratio increases for two of the 
sixteen portfolios - but again the effect is not monotonic. Nine of the sixteen intercepts 
(alphas) are insignificant. Finally The R-squares are reasonably high although they are 
somewhat lower than Fama and French (1993). In all, our results are not as strong as Fama 
and French (1993), but they are generally supportive of the FF3FM, given the relatively small 
sample size on which the results are based. 
4.5.2.  Short- and Long- term Variation 
      OMA performance is broken down by year in Table 4.6. OMAs announced in 1997 
registered the highest wealth effect of 14%, followed by 4% in 1996. For 3-year, long term 
performance, OMAs announced in the year 2007 achieved the highest abnormal return of 
16%. The largest three year loss was associated with deals made in 1998. There is also an 
interesting divergence in short- and long-run OMA performance in the pre- and post- Go 
Global periods. OMAs before 2002 generally achieved higher short run abnormal returns 
(CAR [-1,1]) than those from 2002 afterwards. In contrast, long term abnormal returns 
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(CTAR) went in the opposite direction. Mean and median CTARs for the years 2002-2008 
are generally higher than for earlier years. 
4.5.3. Performance Differences in Segmented Markets 
      Table 4.7 reports OMA performance across the three markets (Chinese mainland, Hong 
Kong and US). A total of 182 observations are included in the three listed markets, with 50 
securities listed in the Chinese mainland markets; 68 in Hong Kong and 64 in U.S. markets. 
While there are notable differences across the markets, none of the CTAR values are 
significant, or even close to being significant. 
4.5.4.  Sector Performance and Interaction with Industry Restructuring 
      We next explore long-run performance by industry. Chinese OMA performance varies 
across industries during the 1994-2008 period (see Table 4.8a). The greatest short-run 
performance (CAR [-1,1]) is achieved in the Wholesale and Retail Trade sector (16%), 
followed by Miscellaneous Manufacturing Products(3%). After three years, the highest-
performing OMAs were those in the Miscellaneous Business Services (18%), Energy and 
Natural resources (8%), and Miscellaneous Manufacturing Products (5%). Abnormal returns 
were especially volatile for the Wholesale and Retail Trade sector. The largest short-run 
returns (10%), and also the lowest long-run returns (-27%, 2-year CTAR) were observed in 
this sector.  
      We use regression analysis to determine whether the industry differences noted above are 
statistically significant. Table 4.8b reports the results of regression analysis where the 
dependent variable is the respective performance measure (CAR [-1,1], 1-year CTAR, etc.) 
and the explanatory variable is a single dummy variable for the respective sector. For 
example, we find that the Telecommunications and Electronics, Prepackaged Software 
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industry experienced short-run abnormal returns that were 1.17% lower than other industries. 
However the difference was not statistically significant. 
      The only significant differences are those associated with the Wholesale and Retail Trade 
sectors. This industry experienced significantly greater returns in the short-run (CAR[-1,1]) 
and significantly lower returns in the long-run (1-year CTAR, 2-year CTAR). We 
hypothesize that the lowering of trade barriers as a result of China joining the WTO had 
particularly negative effects on the trade sector, as foreign imports chipped away at 
previously monopolistic trade markets.       
      We note that while these results are suggestive, they ignore the influences of other 
determinants of Chinese OMA performance. We further investigate industry differences later 
in this chapter when we control for the influence of other variables.  
4.5.5.  Top OMA Deals and Performance 
     Table 4.9 reports the top 15 Chinese overseas M&As in transaction value during the 1994-
2010 period. The top Chinese OMA deals cluster in the energy and natural resources sectors. 
We report both short- and long-run performance in the table. Four-fifths of the deals achieve 
positive CTARs after three years. Most of them employed foreign professional advisors. Of 
these, Goldman Sachs has the most successful record. All six of the OMA deals they advised 
achieved positive long term performance. In contrast, deals that Lehman Brothers advised did 
poorly. 
Take Top 1 Chinese OMA Deal in Table 4.9 as an example. CNPC announced to acquire 
PetroKazakhstan 100% shares on October 26, 2005. With cash payment 55 USD per share, 
the total transaction value was as high as 4141.2 million USD, listing the largest Chinese 
OMAs so far.  PetroKazakhstan is an integrated international energy company with upstream 
and downstream operations covering oil and gas exploration, development, refining and 
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marketing of refined products. It is also Kazakhstan's second-largest foreign petroleum 
producer, and the largest manufacturer and supplier of refined products. It is an UK-based 
firm according to SDC Platinum M&A database. However, because it is registered in Canada, 
many researchers consider it a Canadian-based firm. 
PetroKazakhstan evidenced an excellent performance in oil exploration, oil and gas 
development and production, crude processing, transportation and sales of refined products, 
HSE, and operational management in 2006, 1 year after the OMA transaction. Crude oil 
production of 10.5 million tons and crude runs of 4.03 million tons were achieved, the highest 
levels ever in the company's history. On December 2010, the First Phase of the Third 
Zhanazhol Oil & Gas Processing Plant was completed and became operational.
71
 
According to our research, the acquirer didn’t achieve positive abnormal returns at the 
announcement. The markets responded -2.5% abnormal return in (-1, 1) interval, which 
implies less confidence to the Chinese OMA in the market place. However, three years after, 
CNPC shareholders finally gain 12.4% abnormal return in stock markets, which indicates the 
Chinese acquirer (CNPC) benefits from the strategic OMA activities and the OMA event 
generates synergy effect after the acquisition. 
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 Information from CNPC website: http://www.cnpc.com.cn/eng/cnpcworldwide/euro-asia/Kazakhstan/ 
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4.5.6.  Chinese OMA Performance Determinants 
      The final stage of our analysis uses multivariate regression to estimate the determinants of 
Chinese OMAs. Table 4.10 defines the variables used in the analysis. As discussed above, we 
include: 
1. Government impact variables: government owned enterprises (GOVTOWN) and 
policy dummy (POLICY) 
2. Industry restructuring variables: high technology sector (ITIN) and natural resources 
sector (NATRES)
 72
 
3. Target location variables: cultural distance with targets (CULDIS), U.S. dollar 
depreciation against Chinese RMB (FEX), HK targets (THK) and developed targets 
(DEVDC)
 73
 
4.  Acquirers’ endowment: acquirers’ firm size, book-to-market ratio and acquirers’ 
listing markets
74
 
5. Transaction details: related industry, cash only payment, deal value and professional 
advisor involvement 
      Table 4.11 reports summary statistics for the respective variables. The mean short-term 
abnormal return (CAR [-1,1]), 1-year, 2-year and 3-year Calendar-time abnormal returns 
(Y1CTAR, Y2CTAR and Y3CTAR) are 1.3%, 5.2%, 2.8% and -1.46% respectively. The 
average cultural distance is 1.29. The positive, mean FEX value indicates that the Chinese 
RMB was appreciating against the USD over 1994-2008. 75.4% of the deals involve 
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 These two sectors are included in industry restructuring because many researchers argue that Chinese OMAs 
in these sectors are less likely for efficiency-seeking but Chinese government strategy of industry restructuring 
and economy security. 
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 Although high correlation between developed targets and HK targets are expected, we think it is still 
necessary to look at HK targets impact because 40% of the total targets and 54% of developed ones are from 
HK in our sample. 
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 We apply 1 year lag firm size and book to market ratio data here, which means to regress year 3 abnormal 
returns on year 2 firm size and book-to-market ratio under the assumption that investors make future investment 
decision according to exist information. 
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developed targets. HK targets constitute 40.2% of Chinese OMAs. Half of the deals involve 
targets in related industries; and half of the acquirers are government-owned enterprises. 
73.8% of the deals are initiated in the Go Global years. 54.1% of the deals are cash payment 
only. 25.4% of them are natural resources targets, 33.6% are hi-tech targets. The average 
transaction value of Chinese OMAs in the sample is 278.1 million US dollars, while the mean 
market value (firm size) of acquirers is 20715.6 million USD. The average acquirers’ book to 
market ratio is 0.56 and 29.5% of the acquirers employed professional advisors. About 42% 
of the acquirers list in Hong Kong, and 19% list in U.S.  
      The correlation matrix in Table 4.12 finds one correlation coefficient higher than 0.5 in 
absolute value. The variables CULDIS and THK have a simple correlation of -0.7. This is not 
surprising given that Hong Kong and the Chinese mainland share a largely common culture.  
      Table 4.13 reports the univariate regression results relating the determinants of long-run 
OMA performance. It reveals that CAR (-1,1) is significantly, negatively correlated with the 
previous year’s CTAR. Y1CTAR and Y2CTAR are significantly correlated with the 
appreciation of Chinese RMB. We find a significantly negative correlation between yearly 
CTARs and developed targets. Y3CTAR is positively and significantly related with industry 
relatedness (INDREL) and having a target in the natural resources sector (NATRES). Yearly 
book-to-market ratios are significantly negatively correlated with Y1CTAR and Y3CTAR. 
Listing market and employment of a professional advisor are significantly correlated with 
Y1CTAR, but not subsequent CTARs.  
       Table 4.14 presents the multivariate regression results. While a number of the variables 
are significant in any one regression, only two variables are consistently significant in all the 
regressions in which they appear (GOVTOWN and CULDIS). Government-owned acquirers 
have 3-year abnormal returns that are 10-22% lower than public firms. Further, the greater 
the cultural distance between acquirers and targets, the lower are 3-year abnormal returns. 
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4.6. Conclusion  
      In this chapter, we apply the calendar-time approach to investigate Chinese long-run 
OMA performance. We find that long-run abnormal returns are insignificantly different from 
zero. This finding generally holds across all listing markets and industry sectors.  
      We also investigate the influence of a large number of potential determinants of long-run 
performance. Not surprisingly, we find that cultural distance is a significant determinant of 
OMA success. Long-run profitability is likely to be positively and significantly impacted 
when acquirers and targets share common cultural values. We note that this significant 
relationship remains even when we have a separate variable for Hong Kong targets. 
A main finding of ours is that the long-run performance of Chinese OMAs is negatively 
associated with government ownership. Firms that are government-owned are likely to 
experience three-year abnormal returns that are 10 to 22 percent lower than public firms. 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) start from a position of monopoly power in Chinese domestic 
markets. We speculate that investors are not confident that SOEs can maintain their market 
power when going abroad. Secondly, SOEs are more likely to initiate strategic investments 
that pursue government objectives at the cost of shareholders’ interests. With this in mind, 
investors may prefer OMA acquirers with more private ownership.  
       Buckley et al. (2007) note that Chinese SOEs benefit from soft capital constraints and 
potential government guarantees in domestic financial markets. But too much cash flow can 
motivate inefficient OMAs. Furthermore, as enterprises from an emerging market, most 
Chinese acquirers do not have much international operations experience. Stimulated by the 
national Go Global policy, overconfident Chinese managers may overvalue targets and 
overestimate the creation of synergistic value. These negative consequences of being 
government-owned work against the positive advantages of government control. Ultimately, 
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it is an empirical question which one dominates.  Our analysis indicates that, at least in the 
Chinese context, markets have determined that the bad outweighs the good. 
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Chapter Five Using Multiple-Listing Information in Event 
Studies 
--Application to Chinese Overseas Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
      In an event study, we evaluate stock market returns according to economy-wide or firm-
specific events. Sometimes the sample firms have their common equities listed in more than 
one market. In most research, the corresponding home market equity, or equity from the most 
liquid market, is selected in investigating abnormal returns. The question arises as to which is 
the most appropriate market (or markets) to use for the purpose of estimating abnormal 
returns. The question becomes far more interesting in segmented market environments. For 
example, emerging markets may be segmented from developed ones and arbitrage activity 
across these markets may be restricted in some way. This implies that there may be 
substantial price deviations, with low return correlations. Estimating abnormal returns from 
just home listings or ―most liquid‖ listings potentially throws away valuable information. On 
the other hand, indiscriminate pooling is likely to count the same information more than once. 
Therefore, in this chapter, we try to solve the problem of (i) pooling all multiple listings in 
the sample, and (ii) ―weighting‖ individual listings by the new information they provide, so 
as to produce consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates of abnormal returns. We apply 
this new approach to estimate wealth effects of Chinese OMAs, using multi-listings of 
Chinese acquirers. 
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5.1. Introduction  
Event studies have become the predominant methodology for determining the effects 
of an event on the distribution of security returns. The hypothesis is that information shocks 
affect average stock returns, across firms with similar information arrivals. Initially, event 
studies were applied to single-country, developed markets.
75
 Recently they have been 
extended to multiple countries and/or emerging market settings (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; 
Campbell, Cowan, & Salotti, 2010). While this opens up opportunities for researchers, it also 
raises statistical issues associated with the properties of cross sectional returns.  
  In this chapter, we discuss the extension to multi-listings of the same asset in multiple 
markets in event studies.  The standard event study estimates the average abnormal returns of 
securities subject to the event of interest. The question arises as to which is the most 
appropriate market (or markets) for the estimation when some of the securities have their 
shares listed in more than one market. The most common approach is to use returns from 
each firm’s home market (Aktas, de Bodt, & Roll, 2004; Bailey, Karolyi, & Salva, 2006; 
Doidge, 2004; Faccio, McConnell, & Stolin, 2006; Kim, 2003; Wang & Boateng, 2007). 
Others use returns from the firm’s most liquid markets (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Baruch, 
Karolyi, & Lemmon, 2007; Campbell et al., 2010).     
The underlying theory of these approaches is based on the price discovery literature 
on cross-listings and market liquidity. There exists no consensus whether home- or foreign-
listing contributes more to price discovery. Some studies suggest that home markets play the 
dominant role (Chen, Li, & Wu, 2010; Grammig, Melvin, & Schlag, 2005; M. Kim, 
Szakmary, & Mathur, 2000; Lieberman, Ben-Zion, & Hauser, 1999; Pascual, Pascual-Fuster, 
& Climent, 2006). Yet, evidence from other studies lends support for a significant role for 
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foreign listings in price formation. This appears to be especially the care in high liquid 
markets, such as US markets (Chan & Subrahmanyam, 2005; Ranaldo, 2001). These studies 
argue that US markets have ―spill over‖ effects on price discovery in other exchanges in the 
world (Eun & Sabherwal, 2003; Lau & Diltz, 1994; Werner & Kleidon, 1996).   
Liquidity has long been considered an important variable affecting the prices of 
financial assets. The higher liquid of a given asset should be reflected in a higher price or a 
lower required return. However, the multidimensional nature of market liquidity makes it a 
tricky exercise to determine the highest liquid market in multiple market settings. The usual 
approach consists of breaking up liquidity into three components: tightness, depth and 
resiliency. Trading volume is regarded as a standard measure for market liquidity (Baruch et 
al., 2007; Chan & Subrahmanyam, 2005). But Ranaldo (2001) surveys nine liquidity proxies 
and argues that market depth, trading time and intraday bid-ask spread are also important 
dimensions of market liquidity, and critical components for price discovery.  
On the other hand, stock markets differ by investor protection, industry or ownership 
concentration, market liquidity, accounting standards or regulation. Different market 
characteristics can affect the statistical properties of stock returns. Mikkelson & Partch (1986) 
and Patell (1976) develop a parametric test based on standardized returns for better OLS 
estimation. Brown & Warner (1985) argue that event study methodologies based on OLS 
estimation of the market model and standard parametric statistics are well-specified even with 
non-normal and heteroscedastic return errors. However, the data they used in their 
simulations are from US markets (from the CRSP database). They do not discuss the situation 
when markets in diversified nations are pooled in the sample construction. Boehmer, 
Masumeci, & Poulsen (1991) develop a variance-change correction procedure, called the 
standardized cross-sectional test and Campbell et al. (2010) apply this test to non-US stocks. 
However, their approach reports point estimates and inference results according to 
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standardized residuals instead of non-transformed residuals. In other words, they report 
standardized abnormal returns and corresponding hypotheses tests, rather than the non-
transformed average abnormal returns.
76
 
  One feature common to these approaches is that they use single-listed observations in 
the estimation of abnormal returns. Presumably this reflects an assumption of semi-strong 
market efficiency. With unrestricted arbitrage across markets, inter-market price deviations 
will be small and transitory, rendering the choice of listing irrelevant to abnormal returns 
estimation. In other words, unrestricted arbitrage activity ensures that all listings of a firm’s 
securities quickly reveal the same information. Hence the event-study researcher can safely 
use any one (and only one) of these listings when estimating the firm’s event-period 
abnormal returns. 
Although several studies support the price parity view for developed markets (Eun & 
Sabherwal, 2003; Grammig et al., 2005), more recent work, which typically includes data 
from emerging markets, often discovers significant deviations from price parity (Blouin, Hail, 
& Yetman, 2009; Gagnon & Karolyi, 2004). In single-country studies, Melvin (2003), 
Rabinovitch, Silva and Susmel (2003), and Chen, Li and Wu (2010) all report significant 
deviations from parity for stocks from Argentina, Chile and China, respectively. 
Together, these results cast some doubt on the usual event-study practice of using 
returns from a single listing for each firm. Our approach is to aggregate cross-listings instead. 
According to our investigation in DataStream, 33.47% of active entity securities in the world 
markets are multi-listings. Put another way, including multi-listings allows one to increase 
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sample size by 57% (=88,631/56,477).
77
 Thus, it increases sample size, which can be an 
important consideration when undertaking event studies in emerging markets.  
Further, investors in different markets possess different information sets. Left to their 
own devices, they may respond differently to a given event. If arbitrage is unable to 
aggregate these multiple responses, then the use of single-listing yields abnormal return 
estimates that are incomplete in the sense that they ignore important information embedded in 
the price responses observed in other markets. In such circumstances, using returns from all 
markets in which each firm’s securities are listed enable ―full-information‖ abnormal return 
estimations to be obtained.  
However, pooling of multi-listing data involves not only non-constant variance but 
also cross-sectional dependence unless markets are fully segmented.
78
 The more integrated 
the markets, the higher the cross-sectional correlations. Brown and Warner (1980; 1985) 
discuss ―clustering‖ in calendar and industry results, which can bias hypothesis testing. 
Multi-listings can exacerbate ―clustering‖ in returns. When market model residuals are 
positively correlated with each other via multi-listings, such clustering will increase the 
variance of the performance measures. If the estimation procedure ignores this clustering, the 
null hypothesis will be rejected too frequently when multi-listed returns are positively 
correlated. What is required is a method that adjusts for both heteroscedastic errors and 
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 We suspect the integration of world markets. Cho, Eun,& Senbet (1986) provide an empirical investigation of 
the arbitrage pricing theory in an international setting. The results reject the joint hypothesis that international 
capital market is integrated. Griffin (2002) examines whether country-specific or global version of Fama and 
French’s three-factor model better explain time-series variation in international stock returns. Although the 
author focuses on markets that are likely to be integrated (U.S., UK., Canada and Japan), the results indicate that 
the model is better performed on country-specific basis than global version, which implies market segmentation. 
Even domestic markets in one country are not integrated. Hietala (1989) finds partially segmented market in 
Finland. The domestic securities are lower priced by their local citizens than foreign investors. Hung-Gay, Wai, 
& Wai Kin (2000) report the latent risk premiums for the A and B shares in China are only weakly correlated, 
which implies the two markets reflect different fundamental forces and partially segmented. 
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correlated returns due to multi-listings. In other words, the estimation procedure should 
extract the independent information from each listing while counting the common 
information only once. 
In this chapter, we outline a simple procedure that achieves this objective while 
producing consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates of abnormal returns. In the next 
section, we describe this ―generalized‖ approach in detail. In section 3, we illustrate its use by 
applying it to a sample of foreign mergers and acquisitions by Chinese acquirers. Section 4 
provides some concluding remarks. 
5.2. A generalized Methodology for Extending Event-study Analysis to 
The Case of Multi-listings  
5.2.1. The Standard Case: Single-market Listing of Securities (Error are  
homoscedastic and cross-sectionally independent ) 
Consider initially the data generation process (DGP) under the benchmark case where 
all firms in an event data sample are listed on a single exchange. This is the situation 
envisaged in standard event study analysis. We briefly outline the mechanics of that analysis 
in order to facilitate extension to the more general multiple-listing case considered below.    
 Let itAR  denote firm i’s abnormal return on day t of the test period, i =1,…, N and 
t=1,…,T. That is,    
(1) ˆit it itAR R R  ,  
where itR  is the observed return during the test period, and 
ˆ
itR  is the predicted return based 
on data observed during the pre-test period of length S. We assume the itAR  are independent 
and normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation  . Let the DGP 
associated with individual itAR  observations be given by the following equation: 
(2) εxy  β , 
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where  
y is an 1N  vector of abnormal returns, AR it , N1,2,...,i  ; x is an 1N vector of ones; β  
is a scalar representing the mean of the distribution of abnormal returns; and ε  is an N?  
vector of error terms,  NN I0ε 2N ,~ , N0  is an 1N vector of zeroes, and NI  is the NN   
identity matrix. 
  In this case, the OLS estimate of β , ˆOLS , is efficient. yxx)x(
1  OLSβˆ . It is easily 
shown that   
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where tAAR  is the ―average abnormal return‖. 
If 2  is known, then 1x)x(  2OLSβVar( )
ˆ , and 1x)x(  2OLSβs.e.( )
ˆ . The latter is 
easily shown to be equivalent to 
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forms the Z statistic, 
2
ˆ
ˆ
OLS
t
OLS
β
Z
s.e.(β ) 


 
 

1
1
(x x) x y
(x x)
 . This is easily shown to be equivalent to  
N
it
i 1
t
AR
σ
Z
N


 
    
 
1(x x) x y
). 
If 2  is unknown, we estimate it by 
1-N
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2




ˆ
ˆ . Then   is replaced with 
ˆ , in the Z formula, and critical t-values are used for hypothesis testing. 
The preceding analysis considers the case when there is only one day in the testing 
window.  But suppose there are multiple periods for the testing period, t=T1, T1+1, …,T2. The 
extension is straightforward.  Redefine the above such that 
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(3) εxy  β , 
where y  is an 1)1( 12 TTN vector of abnormal returns, itAR , N1,2,...,i  , 
211 T1...,,T,Tt  ; x is an 1)1( 12 TTN vector of ones, β  is a scalar that equals the mean 
of the distribution of abnormal returns, ε  is an 1)1( 12 TTN vector of error terms, 
 1)TN(T21)TN(T 1212N  I0ε ,~ , 1)TN(T 12 0  is an 1)1( 12 TTN vector of zeroes, and 1)TN(T 12 I  
is the identity matrix of order 2 1N(T -T +1) . 
  Once again, the OLS estimate of  , ˆOLS , is efficient. yxx)x(
1  OLSβˆ . In this case,  
ˆ
2
1
TN
it
i 1 t T
OLS
2 1
AR
ACAR
N(T T 1)

 
 
 

,  
where ACAR is the ―average cumulative abnormal return‖. 
If 2  is known, then 1x)x(  2OLSβVar( )
ˆ , and 1x)x(  2OLSβs.e.( )
ˆ , which is 
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5.2.2. The Generalized Case: Multiple-markets, Single-listing (Errors are 
heteroscedastic but cross-sectionally independent) 
We now consider the multiple-markets case where (i) error variances are 
heteroscedastic and (ii) abnormal returns for the same security are independent across 
markets. Let the DGP be given by 
(4) εxy  β , 
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where y is an 1N vector of abnormal returns; x is an 1N vector of ones, and β  is a scalar 
that equals the mean of the distribution of abnormal returns across multiple markets. Under 
the assumption that errors are heteroscedastic but cross-sectionally independent,  
ε  is an N?  vector of error terms, 
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,~ N0ε ,  where a N0  is an 
1N vector of zeroes and   is the NN  variance-covariance matrix. 
In this case, the OLS estimate of β  is inefficient.  The source of this inefficiency lies 
in the fact that OLS gives equal weight to every observation. The solution to this problem is 
to assign different weights to the individual observations. The estimation procedure that 
assigns an ―efficient‖ set of weights is called Generalized Least Squares (GLS). Define a 
―weighting matrix‖ P , where P  is an NN  , symmetric, invertible matrix such that 
1ΩPP  . Given  above, it is easily confirmed that  
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PP . 
Assuming the 
2
iσ , i=1,2,…,N are known, the GLS estimator of β  is given by 
yΩxx)Ωx( 111  GLSβˆ ,   11x)Ωx( GLSβVar ˆ , and   11 x)Ωx( GLSβs ˆ..e . Alternatively, 
define Pxx ~  and Pyy ~ . Then yx)xx( 1 ~~~~ˆ  GLSβ ,   1)xx(  ~~ˆGLSβVar , and 
  1)xx(  ~~ˆ.. GLSβs e . In other words, GLSβˆ  is identical to OLS applied to this equation: 
110 
 
εxy ~~~  β , where Pxx ~ , Pyy ~ , and Pεε ~ . Note that    ~ , ,N N N N Nε 0 PΩP 0 I . 
To test the null hypothesis that 0β  , form the Z statistic, 
ˆ
ˆ
GLS
t
GLS
β
Z
s.e.(β )


 
 

1
1
(x x) x y
(x x)
.  
Interestingly, 
ˆ
ˆ
GLS
t
GLS
β
Z
s.e.(β )


 
 

1
1
(x x) x y
(x x)
is NOT equal to 
t
N
it
ii 1
ASAR
AR
σ
Z
N

 
 
 


. We 
can see this by noting that: 
  
t
N
i
ii 1
ASAR
AR
σ
Z
N



 
 
  
 

 1
1
(x x) x y
(x x)
 and tZ
 
 
   
 
 
1 1
1 1
(x x) x y (x x) x y
(x x) (x x)
. 
tASAR
Z , and its multiple period analog, 
1, 2T TASCAR
Z are commonly used for hypothesis testing of 
abnormal returns in the presence of heteroscedastic returns (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Doukas & 
Travlos, 1988; Mikkelson & Partch, 1986; Patell, 1976).  
5.2.3. What Hypothesis Corresponds to ASARZ  and ASCARZ ? 
Given the widespread usage of 
tASAR
Z and 
1, 2T TASCAR
Z , we might ask what hypothesis 
corresponds to the Z statistic, 
t
N
it
ii 1
ASAR
AR
σ
Z
N

 
 
 


?   
Consider the following regression:  
(5) εxy  ~ , 
where  
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y~ is an 1N vector of standardized abnormal returns, it
i
AR

 
 
 
, N1,2,...,i  ; x is an 
1N vector of ones;   is a scalar that equals the mean of the distribution of standardized 
abnormal returns; and ε  is an 1N vector of error terms,  NN I0ε ,~ N . 
  Assuming the 
2
iσ , i=1,2,…,N are known, the OLS estimator of   is yxx)x(
1 ~ˆ  OLS , 
which is easily shown to be equivalent to 
N
it
ii 1
t
AR
σ
ASAR
N

 
 
 


. The OLS estimate of   is 
efficient. Further, 1x)x( )ˆOLSVar( , and 
1
x)x(
)ˆOLSβs.e.( , which is easily shown to be 
equivalent to 
N
1
s.e.( OLS )ˆ .   To test the null hypothesis that 0 , form the Z 
statistic, 
1
1
x)x(
yxx)x(





~
ˆ
ˆ
)s.e.(
Z
OLS
OLS


. This is easily shown to be equivalent to 
t
N
it
ii 1
ASAR t
AR
σ
Z N ASAR
N

 
 
 
  

. 
Thus, the Z statistic, 
t
N
it
ii 1
ASAR t
AR
σ
Z N ASAR
N

 
 
 
  

, corresponds to the null 
hypothesis, 0H : 0  . This contrast with the Z statistic, corresponding to the GLS estimate 
of  , 0H : 0  . Note that  and  are different.   is the mean of the distribution of 
abnormal returns, itAR .   is the mean of the distribution of standardized abnormal returns, 
it
i
AR

.    
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5.2.4. The Generalized Case Two: Multiple-markets and Multi-listings 
(Errors are heteroscedastic and cross-sectionally dependent) 
We move to multiple-markets and the multi-listing case, where the error structure is 
characterized by heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional dependence. The more integrated the 
markets, the more serious the cross-sectional correlation between pair returns. OLS is 
inefficient because it ignores these dependences and weights them as if they were completely 
independent observations. This gives too much weight to correlated observations. GLS solves 
this problem by ―efficiently‖ weighting the observations via the error variance-covariance 
matrix, Ω .   
We start off by considering a daily testing period (corresponding to daily abnormal 
returns), but then expand to allow for a multiple-day testing period (corresponding to 
cumulative abnormal returns).  Define 
ijtAR  as the abnormal returns from security i listed in 
market j at time t. Note that this allows the same security to be listed in more than one market 
at the same time.  
Let there be a total of N  observations of ijtAR for given t. We represent the associated 
DGP of abnormal returns, 
ijtAR , be given by 
(6)        t t tβ y x ε , 
where ty  is an 1N vector of abnormal returns; tx  is an 1N vector of ones, and β  is a 
scalar that equals the mean of the distribution of abnormal returns across multiple markets. tε  
is an N?  vector of error terms, ~ ,
2
1
2
2
t
2
N
σ 0 0
0 σ 0
N
0 0 σ
  
  
  
  
  
    
N
ε 0 Ω ,  where a 
N
0  is an 
1
~
N vector of zeroes and   is an NN
~~
 matrix, where the variances of the N  abnormal 
returns are given on the main diagonal. 
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We can better visualize the problem with an example. Let  
(7)         
11t
12t
13t
21t
23t
32t
43t
AR
AR
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AR
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
t
y  
In this example, the first security is multi-listed in three markets: markets 1,2, and 3. The 
second security is listed in two markets: markets 1 and 3. And the last two securities are 
single-listed. Security 3 is listed in market 2. Security 4 is listed in market 3. 
Define P  such that -1P'P = Ω . Pre-multiplying (6) by P  gives 
(8)         t t tPy = Px β + Pε  
Let us rewrite (8) as 
(9)  t t tβ y x ε  
where ty is an 1
~
N vector of standardized abnormal returns, t ty Py ,  
(10)         t
11t
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 
 
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 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
y ,  
t tx Px  and t tε Pε . 
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We now allow for correlated abnormal returns when the same security is listed in 
more than one market. Let ~ ( )t N N0 ,Ω , where Ω  is the N N  variance-covariance matrix 
corresponding to the standard abnormal returns ty . 
(11) 
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Ω , 
where 
,ij ik refers to correlations of standardized abnormal returns between multi-listing 
pairs, /ijt ijAR   and /ikt ikAR  . 
Similar to before, define P
~
 (where P
~
 is NN
~~
 ) such that 1ΩPP 
~~~
.  Assuming the 
ijtσ and ikij, i=1,2,…,N  are known, the GLS estimator of β  is  
(12)  yΩx)xΩx( 111 ~
~~~~~ˆ  GLSβ ,  
  11 )xΩx(  ~~~ˆGLSβVar , and   11 )xΩx(  ~~~ˆ.. GLSβs e . To test the null hypothesis that 0β  , 
we form the Z statistic,  
(13)        
ˆ
ˆ
GLS
t
GLS
β
Z
s.e.(β )
  
 
 
 

1 1 1
1 1
(x Ω x) x Ω y
(x Ω x)
. 
Given Ω, P  is easily calculated using a Cholesky decomposition. The only remaining 
twist is the determination of Ω , which involves estimating the individual elements ,ij ik . To 
achieve this, we follow a three-step process based on the studentized residual, which is the in-
sample, standardized residual from estimations of the market model.  
First, for each i and j, we estimate the market model during the estimation period, 
1,2,...,s s : 
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(14)       
ijs ij ij js ijsR Rm     . 
where 
ijsR is observed returns for security i in market j at time s; and jsRm is observed returns 
for the market portfolio corresponding to market j at time s.   
 We collect the explanatory variables in the matrix, 
ijX : 
j1
j2
jT'
1 Rm
Rm1
1 Rm
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
ij
X  
Define the ―hat‖ matrix 
' -1 '
ij ij ij ij ijH = X (X X ) X . 
The standard deviation of the sth residual associated with estimation of equation (14) can be 
estimated by 
(15)        sijijijs h 1ˆ   
where 
s
ijh  is the sth diagonal element of ijH  and ˆ ij is the standard error of the estimate from 
equation (14). Thus, for each j and k, the sample correlation of 
ˆ 1
ijs
s
ij ij
AR
h 
 and 
ˆ 1
iks
s
ik ik
AR
h 
 
can be used to estimate 
,ij ik . 
In the generalized multiple markets and multi-listing case with daily returns, the GLS 
estimator ˆGLS  (see equation 12) is used to estimate   in equation (6). Hypothesis testing 
proceeds by comparing tZ (see equation 13) with the appropriate critical t value.  
Now suppose there are multiple periods for the testing period, t=T1, T1+1, …,T2. 
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Define 
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 
 
  
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NN NN
NN NN
NN NN
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0 Ω 0
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 , where Y  and X  are 
each  11)T(TN 12 
~
, 
NN
0  is a zero matrix of size NN
~~
 , and   is 
1)T(TN1)T(TN 1212 
~~
. 
Then the corresponding GLS estimator of β  in equation (6) is  
YΣX)XΣX( 111
~~~~~~ˆ  GLSβ ,  
  11 )XΣX(  ~~~ˆGLSβVar , and   11 )XΣX(  ~~~ˆ.. GLSβs e . To test the null hypothesis that 0β  , 
form the Z statistic, 1, 2
ˆ
ˆ
GLS
T T
GLS
β
Z
s.e.(β )
  
 
 
 

1 1 1
1 1
(X Σ X) X Σ Y
(X Σ X)
 .   
Note that we can simplify the notation considerably. First note that 
1
1
1
1




 
 
 
 
 
  
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0 Ω 0
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. 
Thus,  
YΣX)XΣX( 111
~~~~~~ˆ  GLSβ = )
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
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Tt
T
Tt
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1
t
1
t
1
t yΩx)xΩx( ; 
  11 )XΣX(  ~~~ˆGLSβVar = 1t1t )xΩx( 

 
2
1
T
Tt
~~~ ; 
  1t1t )xΩx( 

 
2
1
T
Tt
GLSβs.e.
~~~ˆ .  
This leads to the following statistic for multi-period testing of abnormal returns, 
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(16)  1, 2
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 .  
The intuition underlying the above procedure is straightforward. Suppose a researcher 
had, for a given event type, access to data from firms listed in multiple markets and multi-
listings (where returns were both heteroscedastic and cross-sectionally correlated). The 
generalized approach outlined above adjusts their weights by the error variance covariance 
matrix, thus achieving an efficient weighting of individual observations. Note that ˆGLS , and 
the corresponding tZ and 1, 2T TZ  statistics, are designed to estimate and test hypotheses about 
 , the mean of the population of abnormal returns; and not  , the mean of the population of 
standardized abnormal returns, such as reported by Aybar & Ficici (2009), Doukas & Travlos 
(1988) and Mikkelson & Partch (1986). 
5.3. Application: Overseas Mergers and Acquisitions by Chinese Firms 
In this section, we apply the approach described above to a sample of overseas 
mergers and acquisitions (OMAs) by non-financial Chinese firms between 1 January 1994 
and 31 December 2009.
79
 There are two reasons why this should be a useful setting for 
assessing the potential contribution of our generalized methodology. First, the geographical 
dispersion of OMAs means that information relevant to a particular event is also likely to be 
dispersed. For example, while mainland investors might be expected to have informational 
advantages concerning Chinese acquiring firms, foreign investors may be better informed 
about the overseas targets. Estimation of the total wealth effects emanating from OMAs 
requires aggregation of these individual-country information sets. Second, such aggregation 
                                                 
 
79
 The data on OMAs were obtained from Thomson SDC Platinum M&A Database. 
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is unlikely to be revealed by the price reaction in a single market. Prior literature (Chen et al., 
2010; Gagnon & Karolyi, 2004) suggests that the Chinese mainland markets are not well 
integrated with other markets and that deviations from price parity are both common and 
substantial. 
5.3.1. Summary Information on Multi-listings 
To be included in the sample, the acquiring Chinese firm must have its shares listed in 
at least one of the following exchanges: Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges (China mainland), 
SEHK (Hong Kong, China), NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ (US); have stock price information 
available from DataStream; and provide at least 137 days of continuous return data before 
and 10 days return after announcement date, of which fewer than 50% are zero return days. 
157 OMA events initiated by a total of 96 Chinese acquirers satisfied these criteria.  
Over a third of these deals involved target firms located in Hong Kong, with the 
remainder spread widely across six continents. With Hong Kong excluded, the US is the most 
frequent location of target firms.
80
  
For our purposes, the most interesting aspect of this sample is the listing status, as 
summarized in Table 5.1, of the Chinese acquiring firms involved in the 157 OMA events. Of 
these, 111 events involve firms listed in a single market only – 50 in China, 30 in Hong Kong, 
China and 31 in US – while the remaining 46 are dual-listed (36) or triple-listed (10). In total, 
therefore, there are 213 return reactions in the sample once these multi-listings are taken into 
account. This compares with the 64 (157) observations available if only home (liquid) listings 
are used. However, this extended sample cannot simply be thought of as providing 
independent draws from a distribution – 102 of the 213 observations are related, in that they 
consist of double- or triple-listed shares of the same firm. 
                                                 
 
80
 We employ the same OMA event data as we used in Chapter Three. Please see Table 1-3 in Chapter Three for 
details. 
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5.3.2. Summary Information on the Abnormal Return Correlations 
Table 5.2 reports summary correlations between pair-listings. The abnormal return 
correlation drops with the decline of market integration.
81
 We employ ―lumped‖ instead of 
―trade to trade‖ returns to calculate daily return correlations because of different holiday 
distribution among nations or areas.  
Chinese mainland exchanges are believed to be partly segmented with the rest of the 
world. A security multi-listed in the mainland and overseas is not exchangeable. Chinese 
mainland citizens are not allowed legally to invest in HK or the US. Price of H shares are 
well-known to be discounted relative to A shares.
82
 The 20 Chinese mainland & US listing 
pairs, therefore, achieve a relatively low, average correlation of 0.1133. Although the Chinese 
mainland and Hong Kong markets are located in the same time zone, share the same language 
and similar culture, the 32 dual-listing pairs still demonstrate a low, average correlation of 
0.0858. On the other hand, the Hong Kong market is generally regarded as being highly 
integrated with US markets. H share ADRs in US and Pilot program securities in HK are 
exchangeable. There is no citizenship restriction for mutual investment. Therefore, Hong 
Kong & US dual-listing pairs achieve high correlation of 0.6088 (note time zone differences 
keep the correlation from being higher).  
                                                 
 
81
  Empirical studies show that correlation between different markets are pretty low:  0.0071-0.1232 for market 
return pairs (Yun et al., 2005); 0.107-0.403 for monthly returns in Cho et al. (1986); 0.24-0.71 for monthly 
excess return pairs in Longin & Solnik (1995) and -0.006-0.673 for daily residual returns pairs in Eun & Shim 
(1989). U.S. and Canada markets are found to get highest correlation, approximately 0.69, whereas U.S. and less 
developed markets are far less correlated; U.S. stock markets have significant return and volatility spillover 
effect to other international stock markets, whereas no other markets can significantly explain U.S. market 
movements (Eun & Shim, 1989; Hamao, Masulis, & Ng, 1990; Yun et al., 2005).  
82
 However, HK and U.S. citizens are allowed to purchase Chinese B shares in HK Dollar, US Dollar (T+3). 
Only Qualified Chinese Domestic Investment Institutions (QDII) can purchase foreign shares in foreign markets 
with a quota. Of course, there are ways for Chinese citizens to transfer money aboard and invest overseas with 
the help of financial institutions, or brokers, agencies in grey or black markets even under the capital control 
environment. 
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We find evidence of price convergence in Hong Kong and US dual-listing pairs. The 
mean, absolute percentage difference of Hong Kong-US dual-listing pairs was only 4.8% in 
2008 compared to 47.32% and 40.89% for the mainland-Hong Kong, mainland-US dual-
listings, respectively (see Table 5.3).
83
  Absolute percentage deviations for individual dual-
listed shares are reported in Table 5.3 for reference. 
5.3.3. The Comparison of OLS and GLS Estimators with Different Sample 
Sizes 
Table 5.4 reports daily results for the OLS and GLS estimators using the three data 
sets: (i) Mainland-listing, (ii) Liquid-listing, and, (iii) Multi-listing. We first look at the OLS 
and GLS-1 results from the sample of 64 mainland-listings. The results from the two 
procedures are very similar. The estimates of the daily mean values of itAR  are 
approximately the same. Further, both procedures find statistical significance for day (-1) and 
day (2).  
We next look at the sample of 157 liquid-listings. These include Chinese acquirers 
who list in all three markets: (i) Mainland, (ii) Hong Kong, and (iii) the U.S. The two 
procedures produce very different results for this sample. The major difference is that OLS 
finds significant day effects on day (-5), day (2), and day (3). The GLS-1 procedure finds no 
significant abnormal returns for any of the 21 days of the test period.  
For the sample of 213 multi-listings, the three procedures get diverse results too. We 
find significant abnormal returns on day (-5), day (0), day (1), day (2) and day (3) for the 
OLS procedure. However, only the day (1) returns are significant at the 5% level for GLS-1; 
and only the day(-1) returns are significant for the GLS-2 procedure. 
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 We employ US dollar prices and all the time series prices in year 2008 are from DataStream. The formula for 
mean absolute percentage deviation is:  
1 2
2
mapd
p p
P
p

 . 
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Table 5.5 reports the interval performance of Chinese OMAs. Once again, the results 
depend on the sample and the estimation periods. Interestingly, when it comes to statistical 
significance, the three procedures produce identical results within each sample, but results 
differ across samples. For the Mainland-listing sample, abnormal returns are significant on 
the (-5,-1) interval. In contrast, for the liquid-listing and Multi-listing samples, abnormal 
returns are significant on the (-1,1) interval. Across all three samples, the GLS-1 and GLS-2 
results estimate CARs that are close to each other. The OLS results tend to be substantially 
larger. 
Interval performance is generally considered to be more reliable than daily results, 
because aggregation tends to cancel out spurious findings. This is likely to be all the more 
true in the cross-listing case, when time zones and holidays affect the actual announcement 
dates and their stock price responses. Similar to aggregation across days is aggregation across 
markets. Including overseas markets allows ―votes‖ of foreign investors to be counted. 
So far, we report estimations of daily and interval performance on Chinese OMAs, for 
three different procedures and three different samples. But which set of estimates should we 
believe? 
First, more observations are better. More observations provide more information. 
Compared to the 64 mainland-listings, the 157 liquid-listings include Chinese acquirers who 
list on overseas markets (HK-listings and US-listings). This rarely happens for acquirers from 
developed nations or areas. However, for firms from emerging markets, foreign-listing is a 
signal of international operations experience, and offers greater transparency and better 
investor protection. In other words, Chinese foreign-listed acquirers are more likely to be 
recognized as firms with better performance. The OMA performance estimation will be 
biased if foreign-listing acquirers are not embodied in the sample. 
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Similarly, market responses from multi-listings can not be simply replaced by single-
listings. In our Chinese OMA case, many of the firms list on multiple markets. Multi-listings 
incorporate investors’ responses of HK and US investors to Chinese OMA events in HK and 
US. Because of language, cultural linkages and different geographic distributions, mainland 
investors are more knowledgeable on acquirers whilst HK and U.S. investors may be better 
informed about foreign targets. These new information sources will be blocked if only single-
listings are examined.  
The results in Table 5.4 provide evidence that foreign- and multi-listings add new 
information in Chinese OMA performance. The three sample groups report diverse abnormal 
returns and Z-values. Take the GLS-1 procedure for example. The results for the 64 
observations in the mainland-listings sample show significant positive abnormal returns on 
day (-1). In contrast, the GLS-1 procedure produces no significant abnormal returns for the 
157 observations of the liquid-listing sample. This is evidence that foreign investors differ 
from Chinese investors in their evaluations of Chinese OMAs. 
Having decided that the largest sample is best, the next question is which procedure 
produces the most reliable results. Our judgment is that the GLS-2 procedure is best because 
it weights observations on both heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional dependence. The use of 
multi-listed observations - which is desirable both because it increases sample size and allows 
a greater range of investor evaluations – argues for the GLS-2 procedures. The other two 
procedures treat multi-listed observations as though they are independent. Table 5.3 suggests 
that this assumption is not warranted. 
In this respect the contrast between the GLS-1 and GLS-2 results is enlightening. The 
GLS-1 results suggest information delay whilst GLS-2 suggests information leakage. We are 
more likely to believe information leakage rather than information lag in OMA events. 
Mainland-listings report significant abnormal returns on day (-1). As home markets or liquid 
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markets are regarded the key markets of information disclosure in finance literature, this is 
evidence of information leakage.
84
 The information lag result may be due to U.S.-listings, 
which are subject to a 12 hour time zone delay. GLS-1 weights US-listings equally with 
mainland- or HK- listings, which ―overweights‖ these observations if they are correlated with 
the other markets (especially HK).  
In all, we argue that results from the multi-listing sample/GLS-2 procedure provide 
the most reliable appraisal of Chinese OMA performance. We conclude that markets respond 
positively to Chinese OMA events with an overall 0.22% cumulative abnormal returns on the 
interval (-1,1). Information leakage happens on day (-1) with a significant 0.29% abnormal 
return before the OMA announcement.  
5.4. Conclusion 
This chapter extends event-study analysis to cases where firms list their stocks in multiple 
exchanges and with multi-listings. These additional listings offer extra information about 
investors that are not included in single, home market settings; and provide an opportunity to 
substantially increase sample size. We develop a generalized event-study methodology that 
explicitly incorporates the relationship of share price performance across multiple exchanges.  
The generalized methodology is likely to be important for performance evaluation in 
emerging markets, where home markets are partly segmented and with less investor 
protection, and where data for listed securities are relatively few. Using the information from 
multi-listings allows one to maximize the information available from a relatively small 
sample of firms. Our generalized approach incorporates heterocsedasticity and cross-sectional 
correlation in abnormal returns, and provides an efficient weighting of observations. 
                                                 
 
84
 Although foreign listing occupies 70% of the total sample (64 mainland listings, 76 Hong Kong listings and 
73 US listings), Chinese mainland listings achieve the most liquid ones among multi-listings in our sample 
according to trading volume and market depth criteria. 
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We compare our approach with the standardized event study approach used in Aybar 
& Ficici (2009), Doukas & Travlos (1988) and Mikkelson & Partch (1986). We note that the 
standardized event study approach estimates the mean of the distribution of standardized 
abnormal returns. In contrast, there is generally more interest in the mean of the distribution 
of (non-standardized) abnormal returns. Our generalized event study approach estimates the 
latter. Further, it produces consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates. 
We apply this new event study approach to estimate wealth effects of Chinese OMA 
acquirers. We include cross-listings in China mainland, Hong Kong and US markets, where 
markets are segmented or partially segmented. We compare outcomes from three 
methodologies (OLS, GLS-heterosedasticity and GLS-heteroscedasticity/cross-sectional 
correlation) and three sample sizes (64 mainland-listings, 157 single-listings in multiple 
markets and 213 multi-listings in multiple markets). The inclusion of multi-listed 
observations provides a more robust evaluation of OMA events. Our generalized 
methodology allows one to use these additional observations while providing consistent and 
asymptotically efficient estimates of mean abnormal returns. 
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Chapter Six  Concluding Remarks 
 
Chinese overseas merger and acquisition (OMA) activity is growing very fast. The starting 
point for this thesis is an investigation of their stock market performance and corresponding 
determinants using event study methodology. China is well known as a ―market economy 
model dominated by political capital‖. Political connections are considered to be supportive 
resources for Chinese OMA activities. Accordingly, we examine the Chinese Go Global 
policy and its impact on OMA performance. Moreover, we look at whether government 
strategy of industry restructuring has positional advantages on OMA performance in the long-
run.  
We employ event study methodology to investigate stock market performance of 
Chinese OMAs. The market model and the Fama and French Three-Factor Model are 
employed as benchmark models to evaluate abnormal returns in the short-and long-run 
respectively. 
M&A performance determinants are far more complicated in international settings. In 
this thesis, we test their effects on OMA performance by grouping them into bidder’s 
endowment, transaction details and target location variables. To be fully informed by more 
transparent and investor protection markets, we include multi-listing stocks of Chinese 
acquirers in three overseas markets (the Chinese mainland market, the Hong Kong market 
and the U.S. market). We find markets respond disparately on Chinese OMAs. Further, OLS 
tends to overestimate the wealth effect of Chinese OMAs when cross-listings are included in 
the sample. We then develop GLS procedures to ―weight‖ multi-listing observation according 
to the independent information they provide.   
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We find that markets respond positively to OMA announcement by Chinese acquirers. 
However, the short-run effect is small: the average daily rate of return over the (-1,1) window 
is 0.22%. The performance remains positive one and two years after OMAs, though not 
significant. It shrinks three years after OMAs, but remains non-negative. Using a Blinder-
Oaxaca Decomposition procedure, we find that markets responded less favourably to OMA 
announcements after the Chinese Go Global policy, though the difference is not significant. 
There is no evidence that Go Global destroyed shareholder’s value in the short-run. Nor that 
top managers were led into unprofitable decision-making because of the promotive policy of 
government.  
Performance determinants differ in explaining short- and long-run Chinese OMA 
performance. The multivariate regressions indicate mixed results for industry restructuring 
purpose of Chinese OMAs. Significantly negative OMA performance is found in the natural 
resources/high-technology sector in the short-run. In contrast, we find that in the long-run 
performance for this sector is positive. Government ownership is significantly negatively 
related to three-year long-run performance. No other variables are consistently related to 
Chinese OMAs performance.   
This thesis is one of the few studies on Chinese short- and long-run OMA 
performance. Furthermore, this thesis is the first to incorporate multi-listing stock 
performance in an event study.  We argue that Chinese multi-listings contribute additional 
information about OMA events. Therefore, we develop a new approach to avoid clustering 
and overestimation issues in multi-listings and achieve consistent performance results. We 
find the actual abnormal returns of Chinese OMAs are much smaller (CAR [-1,1] decreases 
from 1.2% to 0.22%) after Hong Kong and U.S. multi-listings are included in the estimation. 
We believe this approach can be applied to empirical studies in emerging market settings, 
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where markets are segmented with the world and weak investor protections exist in domestic 
markets. 
The findings of this study can be a reference for top managers of Chinese acquirers and 
foreign incumbents. Although there are diverse motives for cross-border OMAs, it is 
extremely important for top managers to be better informed about their performance. The 
hubris and herding behaviours are more likely to happen when Chinese top managers are not 
well informed, or lack world-class M&A capacity under the Go Global policy environment.  
Further, Chinese OMAs represent a potential threat- but also an opportunity - for western 
incumbents. A better understanding of their situation helps host countries and targets to figure 
out ways to profit from OMA deals and make them win-win for all parties.   
The results can also be a reference to individual investors. As we include three share 
markets’ responses (the Chinese mainland markets, the Hong Kong markets and the US 
markets) in this research, it provides comprehensive information about Chinese OMA events. 
The results about short-run performance and its determinants provide possible arbitrage 
opportunities for investors. Results about long-run performance and its determinants can 
assist investors to develop a sustainable investment strategy. 
Last but not the least, our findings can be a reference for policy makers. Chinese 
governments see overseas M&As as a means to lock-in strategy resources and drive industry 
restructuring. The long-run goal is to help Chinese MNEs to achieve positions of competitive 
global power, allowing them to keep more of the rewards from international trade. Empirical 
studies of OMA performance can help us understand whether such policies have been 
successful, at least for emerging economies. 
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Tables 
Table 3.1 Distribution of Deals Over Time 
 
 Deal number Deal value available 
Deal value 
($ mil) 
Average value 
($ mil) 
1994 1 1 98.5 98.5 
1995 1 1 1.3 1.3 
1996 2 2 482.1 241 
1997 4 3 360.6 120.2 
1998 7 6 262.5 43.7 
1999 4 3 45.9 15.3 
2000 6 4 75.5 18.9 
2001 6 4 50.5 12.6 
2002 11 10 2098.9 209.9 
2003 9 7 2048.6 292.7 
2004 16 9 2367.49 263.05 
2005 8 6 4243.59 707.27 
2006 12 9 10282.16 1142.46 
2007 21 15 2437.80 162.52 
2008 20 12 2346.35 195.53 
2009 29 21 5794.60 275.93 
Total 157 113 32996.3 292.00 
 
Source: SDC Platinum M&A database 
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Table 3.2 Target Location 
 
Nation or Area Number 
of deals 
Deal 
value 
available 
Total value of deals 
($mil) 
Average value of 
deals ($mil) 
Developed nations or Area 
Hong Kong
1 
58 45 5174.62 114.99 
United States 17 10 2476.79 247.68 
Australia 12 10 3690.42 369.04 
Canada 6 6 2553.19 425.53 
Japan 4 3 169.91 56.64 
United 
Kingdom
2 4 3 6886.50 2295.50 
Germany 3 0 0 0 
Italy 3 1 0.13 0.13 
Netherlands 2 1 148.50 148.50 
France 1 1 8.66 8.66 
New Zealand 1 1 26.18 26.18 
Sum 111 81 21134.89 260.9245 
Asia 
Singapore 6 4 1879.88 469.97 
Indonesia 5 4 1129.49 282.37 
South Korea 3 3 473.64 157.88 
Azerbaijan 2 2 70 35 
India 2 2 9.49 4.75 
Kazakhstan 2 1 200.00 200.00 
Pakistan 2 2 744 372 
Russian Fed 2 2 3600 1800 
Taiwan 2 1 2.17 2.17 
Malaysia 1 1 11.47 11.47 
Mongolia 1 0 0 0 
Philippines 1 1 70 70 
Thailand 1 1 0.58 0.58 
Vietnam 1 0 0 0 
Sum 31 24 8190.72 341.28 
Africa 
Nigeria 2 1 2692 2692 
Zambia 2 0 0 0 
Chad 1 1 202.5 202.5 
Tunisia 1 0 0 0 
Sum 6 2 2894.5 1447.25 
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Nation or Area Number 
of deals 
Deal 
value 
available 
Total value of deals 
($mil) 
Average value of 
deals ($mil) 
South America 
British Virgin 3 2 33.21 16.605 
Brazil 2 2 520 260 
Peru 2 1 200 200 
Cayman Islands 1 1 23 23 
Mexico 1 0 0 0 
Sum 9 6 776.21 129.3683 
Total 157 113 32996.3 292.00 
 
 
1
 We include Hong Kong targets in the overseas M&A group because most researchers argue that Hong Kong 
has obviously different economic system away from Chinese mainland. 
2
 Both of the target firms are PetroKazakhstan and with the nationality of United Kingdom in SDC database 
because they argue that the headquarter of PetroKazakhstan is in the United Kingdom. However, most Chinese 
consider it as a Canadian firm. In Zephyr M&A database, the nationality of PetroKazakhstan is Canada too. 
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Table 3.3 Industry Distribution 
 
Target industry 
sector 
Number 
of deals 
Deal 
value 
available 
Deal 
value 
$ million 
Average 
value 
$ million 
Deal 
number  
before 
2002
3 
Average 
Value 
Before 2002 
$ million 
Deal 
number  
after 2002 
Average Value 
after 2002 
$ million 
Telecommunication 
and electronics, 
Prepacked software
4 
45 32 4993 156 
11 
(35.5%) 
16 
34 
(27%) 
195.2 
Energy and natural 
resources
5
 
42 29 18557.5 639.9 
1 
(3.2%) 
0 
41 
(32.5%) 
639.9 
Miscellaneous 
business services
6
 
14 9 503 55.9 
2 
(6.5%) 
9.2 
12 
(9.5%) 
69.2 
Miscellaneous 
manufacturing 
Products
7
 
20 8 284.7 35.6 
5 
(16.1%) 
10.3 
15 
(11.9%) 
60.9 
Electric, gas and 
water distribution, 
construction 
9 5 469.4 93.9 
4 
(12.9%) 
13.3 
5 
(4%) 
214.8 
Wholesales, 
retail, trade
8
 
11 7 466.6 66.7 
4 
(12.9%) 
81.6 
7 
(5.6%) 
46.8 
Transportation
9
 11 11 2459.3 223.6 
3 
(9.7%) 
279.2 
8 
(6.3%) 
202.7 
Chemicals and 
Drugs
10
 
5 3 93.3 31.1 
1 
(3.2%) 
1.3 
4 
(3.2%) 
46 
Total 157 104 27826.8 267.6 31 57.4 126 330.6 
 
3 
   The percentage in the brackets shows the proportion in total deals in the period. 
4
 ―Telecommunication and Electronics, Prepackaged Software Industry‖ consists of the following SDC categories: ―Computer and Office Equipment;‖ 
―Telecommunications;‖  ―Electronic and Electrical Equipment;‖ ―Communications Equipment;‖ and ―Prepackaged Software.‖  
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5
 ―Energy and Natural Resources‖ consists of the following SDC categories: ―Oil and Gas;‖ ―Petroleum Refining;‖ ―Mining;‖ ―Metal and Metal Products;‖ and ―Agriculture, 
Forestry, and Fishing.‖  
6
 ―Wholesale, Retail, Trade‖ consists of the following SDC categories: ―Wholesale Trade-Nondurable Goods;‖ ―Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods;‖ and ―Miscellaneous 
Retail Trade.‖  
7
 ―Miscellaneous Manufacturing Products‖ consists of the following SDC categories: ―Measuring, Medical, Photo Eqipment;‖ ―Clocks;‖ ―Food and Kindred Products;‖ 
―Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products;‖ ―Textile and Apparel Products;‖ ―Wood Products, Furniture, and Fixtures;‖ ―Machinery;‖ ―Miscellaneous Manufacturing;‖ and 
―Transportation Equipment.‖  
8
 ―Transportation‖ consists of the following SDC categories: ―Transportation and Shipping (except Air);‖ and ―Air Transportation and Shipping.‖ 
9
 ―Miscellaneous Business Services‖ consists of the following SDC categories: ―Business Services;‖ ―Health Services;‖ ―Investment and Commodity Firms, Dealers, 
Exchanges;‖ and ―Radio and Television Broadcasting Stations.‖ 
10
 ―Chemicals and Drugs‖ consists of the following SDC categories: ―Drugs;‖ and ―Chemicals and Allied Products.‖ 
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Table 3.4  Daily Performance 
 
DAILY AAR ASAR
11
 ZDaily p-value 
-10 0.0026 0.0980 1.2283 0.2193 
-9 0.0025 0.1065 1.3340 0.1822 
-8 -0.0003 -0.0059 -0.0736 0.9413 
-7 -0.0031 -0.0734 -0.9198 0.3577 
-6 -0.0017 -0.0742 -0.9303 0.3522 
-5 0.0061 0.1323 1.6575 0.0974 
-4 -0.0023 0.0184 0.2306 0.8176 
-3 0.0000 0.0202 0.2529 0.8004 
-2 -0.0022 -0.0576 -0.7222 0.4702 
-1 0.0036 0.1513 1.8960 0.0580 
0 0.0044 0.0835 1.0459 0.2956 
1 0.0040 0.1203 1.5068 0.1319 
2 -0.0059 -0.1404 -1.7598 0.0784 
3 -0.0056 -0.1520 -1.9049 0.0568 
4 -0.0024 -0.0950 -1.1909 0.2337 
5 0.0014 0.0930 1.1655 0.2438 
6 -0.0017 -0.0783 -0.9811 0.3265 
7 0.0045 0.1019 1.2764 0.2018 
8 0.0005 0.0539 0.6749 0.4997 
9 -0.0006 -0.0645 -0.8087 0.4187 
10 -0.0031 -0.0952 -1.1926 0.2330 
 
Note: AAR, ASAR, and ZDaily are defined in the text (Section 3.3.2.). Days are identified relative to the 
announcement day (Day 0). The sample consists of 157 observations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 Please see Section 3.3.2. for details. 
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Table 3.5 Interval Performance 
 
INTERVAL ACAR ASCAR ZInterval p-value 
(-10,-5) 0.0061 0.0748 0.9374 0.3486 
(-10,-1) 0.0052 0.0998 1.2502 0.2112 
(-5,-1) 0.0051 0.1183 1.4824 0.1382 
(-1,1) 0.0120 0.2050 2.5684 0.0102 
(1,5) -0.0085 -0.0779 -0.9764 0.3288 
(5,10) 0.0009 0.0044 0.0548 0.9563 
(1,10) -0.0090 -0.0811 -1.0165 0.3094 
(-5,5) 0.0010 0.0524 0.6565 0.5115 
(-10,10) 0.0006 0.0311 0.3894 0.6970 
(-2,2) 0.0039 0.0702 0.8795 0.3791 
(-3,3) -0.0017 0.0095 0.1189 0.9054 
 
Note: ACAR, ASCAR, and ZInterval are defined in the text (Section 3.3.2.). Days are identified relative to the 
announcement day (Day 0). The sample consists of 157 observations. 
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Table 3.6  Three Markets, Daily Performance 
 
 MAINLAND HK US 
DAILY AAR ASAR ZDaily p-value AAR ASAR ZDaily p-value AAR ASAR ZDaily p-value 
-10 0.0011 0.0499 0.3993 0.6897 0.0012 0.0956 0.8334 0.4046 0.0055 0.1241 1.0599 0.2892 
-9 0.0037 0.1511 1.2087 0.2268 0.0032 0.1576 1.3742 0.1694 0.0008 0.0346 0.2954 0.7677 
-8 0.0018 0.1018 0.8141 0.4156 -0.0036 -0.1885 -1.6432 0.1003 0.0010 0.0491 0.4193 0.6750 
-7 0.0001 0.0043 0.0341 0.9728 0.0000 0.0101 0.0876 0.9302 -0.0096 -0.2721 -2.3252 0.0201 
-6 0.0005 -0.0126 -0.1011 0.9194 -0.0028 -0.1710 -1.4906 0.1361 -0.0010 -0.0344 -0.2940 0.7687 
-5 0.0040 0.1447 1.1576 0.2470 0.0037 0.0350 0.3049 0.7604 0.0074 0.1586 1.3554 0.1753 
-4 0.0009 0.0936 0.7488 0.4540 0.0064 0.1924 1.6775 0.0934 -0.0116 -0.2533 -2.1640 0.0305 
-3 -0.0003 -0.0159 -0.1269 0.8990 0.0008 0.0838 0.7308 0.4649 -0.0022 -0.0992 -0.8479 0.3965 
-2 0.0016 0.0764 0.6115 0.5409 -0.0025 -0.0928 -0.8087 0.4187 -0.0069 -0.1988 -1.6989 0.0893 
-1 0.0087 0.3845 3.0763 0.0021 0.0015 0.0564 0.4914 0.6231 0.0005 -0.0394 -0.3368 0.7363 
0 0.0003 0.0654 0.5234 0.6007 0.0071 0.1847 1.6103 0.1073 0.0052 -0.0173 -0.1479 0.8824 
1 -0.0010 -0.0797 -0.6379 0.5235 0.0032 0.1740 1.5168 0.1293 0.0133 0.4253 3.6342 0.0003 
2 -0.0060 -0.3058 -2.4462 0.0144 -0.0009 0.0462 0.4029 0.6870 -0.0089 -0.1758 -1.5024 0.1330 
3 0.0002 0.0118 0.0945 0.9247 -0.0093 -0.3142 -2.7388 0.0062 -0.0043 -0.0645 -0.5508 0.5817 
4 -0.0045 -0.1977 -1.5812 0.1138 0.0016 0.0791 0.6899 0.4903 -0.0007 -0.0254 -0.2167 0.8284 
5 0.0038 0.1593 1.2740 0.2027 0.0003 0.0389 0.3392 0.7344 0.0018 0.1274 1.0882 0.2765 
6 -0.0010 -0.0044 -0.0353 0.9718 -0.0009 -0.0728 -0.6348 0.5256 0.0017 0.0340 0.2902 0.7716 
7 0.0029 0.1451 1.1607 0.2458 0.0001 0.0201 0.1749 0.8612 0.0073 0.0527 0.4502 0.6525 
8 0.0010 0.1051 0.8412 0.4002 0.0004 -0.0632 -0.5510 0.5816 0.0015 0.1365 1.1662 0.2436 
9 -0.0023 -0.1657 -1.3253 0.1851 0.0035 0.1267 1.1044 0.2694 -0.0028 -0.1235 -1.0556 0.2911 
10 -0.0034 -0.1807 -1.4460 0.1482 -0.0014 -0.0150 -0.1309 0.8958 -0.0036 -0.0756 -0.6463 0.5181 
Obs. 64 76 73 
 
Note: AAR, ASAR, and ZDaily are defined in the text (Section 3.3.2.). Days are identified relative to the announcement day (Day 0). 
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Table 3.7  Three Markets, Interval Performance 
 
 Mainland HK US 
INTERVAL ACAR ASCAR ZInterval p-value ACAR ASCAR ZInterval p-value ACAR ASCAR ZInterval p-value 
(-10,-5) 0.0111 0.1793 1.4340 0.1516 0.0018 -0.0250 -0.2179 0.8275 0.0041 0.0244 0.2085 0.8348 
(-10,-1) 0.0220 0.3092 2.4736 0.0134 0.0080 0.0565 0.4925 0.6224 -0.0161 -0.1679 -1.4347 0.1514 
(-5,-1) 0.0149 0.3056 2.4450 0.0145 0.0099 0.1229 1.0715 0.2839 -0.0128 -0.1933 -1.6512 0.0987 
(-1,1) 0.0081 0.2138 1.7100 0.0873 0.0117 0.2396 2.0891 0.0367 0.0190 0.2128 1.8184 0.0690 
(1,5) -0.0076 -0.1843 -1.4744 0.1404 -0.0051 0.0108 0.0939 0.9252 0.0012 0.1284 1.0968 0.2727 
(5,10) 0.0010 0.0240 0.1916 0.8481 0.0019 0.0141 0.1232 0.9019 0.0059 0.0618 0.5278 0.5976 
(1,10) -0.0104 -0.1621 -1.2970 0.1946 -0.0035 0.0063 0.0546 0.9565 0.0053 0.0983 0.8403 0.4008 
(-5,5) 0.0076 0.1015 0.8122 0.4167 0.0118 0.1458 1.2713 0.2036 -0.0064 -0.0490 -0.4184 0.6757 
(-10,10) 0.0119 0.1158 0.9262 0.3544 0.0116 0.0836 0.7289 0.4661 -0.0056 -0.0518 -0.4425 0.6582 
(-2,2) 0.0037 0.0630 0.5040 0.6142 0.0083 0.1648 1.4368 0.1508 0.0032 -0.0027 -0.0232 0.9815 
(-3,3) 0.0036 0.0517 0.4137 0.6791 -0.0001 0.0522 0.4554 0.6489 -0.0033 -0.0642 -0.5483 0.5835 
Observation 64 76 73 
 
Note: ACAR, ASCAR, and ZInterval are defined in the text (Section 3.3.2.). Days are identified relative to the announcement day (Day 0).  
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Table 3.8  Performance Before and After “Go Global” 
 
 
BEFORE POLICY: 
1994-2001 
AFTER POLICY: 
2002-2009 
POLICY IMPACT: 
DIFFERENCE 
ACAR (-1,1) 0.0339 0.0066 -0.0273 
ASCAR (-1,1) 0.5298 0.3120 -0.2178 
ZInterval 1.7031 2.0222 -0.3529 
p-value 0.0885 0.0432 0.7241 
Observation 31 126  
 
Note: ACAR, ASCAR, and ZInterval are defined in the text (Section 3.3.2.). ―Policy‖ is defined as the onset of the 
―Go Global‖ policy, defined as beginning on or near 2002.  
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Table 3.9 Variable Description 
 
Dependent variable CAR(-1,1), cumulative abnormal return 
Independent 
variables 
Description   
Policy related variables 
POLICY Dummy 1 if in and after year 2002, 0 if not 
GOVTOWN Dummy 1 if Government owned enterprises, 0 if not
12
 
NATRES Dummy 1 if natural resources industry targets, 0 if not 
ITIN Dummy 1 if technology-intensive targets, 0 if not 
Control variables 
THK Dummy 1 if HK target, 0 if not 
INDREL Dummy 1 if related (SIC 2-digit code), 0 if unrelated 
ADVISOR Dummy 1 if acquirer employed institutional advisor, 0 if not 
FEX US dollar depreciation according to Chinese RMB
13
, daily data 
CASH Dummy 1 if cash payment, 0 if stock exchange 
Alternative variables in robustness check 
CULDIS Culture difference scores between China and the targets
14
 
DEVDC Dummy 1 if target is in developed country, 0 if not 
TRAVALUE Transaction value of the deal, in USD million 
LNTRAVALUE Log form of transaction value 
MV6b Market value 6 months before announcement 
LNMV6b Log form of market value 6 months before announcement 
BM
15
 Book to market ratio 
HKM Dummy 1 if list in Hong Kong market, 0 if not 
USM Dummy 1 if list in US market, 0 if not 
CRISIS Dummy 1 if in and after year 2007, 0 if not 
 
 
 
12
 Government owned enterprise is defined when the ultimate parent company is government owned in SDC 
Platinum. 
13
  FEX  is computed as following: 
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ke  indicates the daily exchange rate of USD (units of dollars per unit of RMB) in the year 1994-2007;  
ake  indicates daily foreign exchange rate of the USD in the year of the announcement,  
Positive 
kFEX
 values indicate a cheaper dollar for the Chinese acquirers, while negative values 
indicate that the USD will be more expensive.   
14
 Hofstede’s Cultural dimensions scores are from http://www.geert-hofstede.com. The culture distance index 
equation from Kogut and Sing (1998) is: 
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Where 
jCD
 indicates the culture distance index between country j and the home country; 
ijI indicates culture dimension score on ith item of country j; 
iNI indicates culture distance dimension score of home country while  
iV is the variance of culture distance dimension scores.  
15
 When book-to-market ratio is calculated, we employ book value 1 year before the OMA and market value on 
announcement date. 
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Table 3.10 Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable 
CAR(-1,1) 157 0.0120 0.0716 -0.1380 0.6316 
Policy related variables 
POLICY 157 0.8025 0.3994 0.0000 1.0000 
GOVTOWN 157 0.4713 0.5008 0.0000 1.0000 
NATRES 157 0.2675 0.4441 0.0000 1.0000 
ITIN 157 0.3376 0.4744 0.0000 1.0000 
Control variables 
THK 157 0.3694 0.4842 0.0000 1.0000 
INDREL 157 0.5223 0.5011 0.0000 1.0000 
ADVISOR 157 0.2994 0.4594 0.0000 1.0000 
FEX 157 0.0931 0.6841 -0.0348 0.1515 
CASH 157 0.5605 0.4979 0.0000 1.0000 
Alternative variables for robustness checks 
CULDIS 144 1.4383 1.3883 0.1400 4.5890 
DEVDC 157 0.7643 0.4258 0.0000 1.0000 
TRAVALUE 113 292.0028 710.7058 0.1270 4141.179 
LNTRAVALUE 113 3.6538 2.1808 -2.0636 8.3287 
MV6b
16
 157 11433.36 36217.11 5.6700 330278 
LNMV6b 157 7.3322 2.0992 1.7352 12.7077 
BM
17
 136 0.6113 1.2526 0.0172 12.5893 
HKM 157 0.3822 0.4875 0.0000 1.0000 
USM 157 0.1975 0.3994 0.0000 1.0000 
CRISIS 157 0.4459 0.4987 0.0000 1.0000 
 
16
 MV6b means market value of securities 6 month before the announcement. 
17
 When book-to-market ratio is calculated, I employ book value 1 year before the OMA and market value on 
announcement date. 
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Table 3.11 Correlation Coefficients 
 
 Car(-1,1) policy govtown natrel itin thk indrel advisor Fex cash Culdis devdc lntrav~e lnmv6b y1bm hkm usm crisis 
Car(-1,1) 1                  
policy -0.1522 1                 
govtown -0.0725 -0.0766 1                
natrel 0.0302 0.2636 0.3806 1               
itin -0.1535 -0.0519 -0.2963 -0.4314 1              
thk -0.0358 -0.3828 0.0175 -0.4328 0.2629 1             
indrel -0.1536 0.2944 0.0089 0.0594 0.1704 -0.1134 1            
advisor -0.0282 0.1495 0.1072 0.1077 -0.0255 -0.0105 0.0961 1           
fex -0.0463 0.4503 -0.3081 0.0881 -0.069 -0.3594 -0.0157 0.0129 1          
cash -0.054 0.1411 0.0134 0.1582 -0.1006 0.0396 0.0781 0.2426 0.0663 1         
culdis 0.0926 0.3009 -0.1186 0.2971 -0.1676 -0.7706 0.1032 0.0461 0.3583 -0.0409 1        
devdc 0.074 -0.1623 -0.2273 -0.3764 0.1108 0.425 -0.0503 0.1008 -0.0251 0.0223 0.1232 1       
lntravalue -0.0902 0.2515 0.3804 0.2655 -0.0984 -0.1421 0.1567 0.5619 -0.0504 0.0567 0.1051 -0.0845 1      
lnmv6b -0.1452 0.3546 0.4783 0.3277 -0.1394 -0.2334 0.2134 0.2074 0.105 0.1337 0.081 -0.2511 0.5711 1     
y1bm -0.1405 -0.0877 0.0003 -0.1121 0.033 0.2023 -0.1595 -0.0752 0.032 -0.0864 -0.1728 0.0262 -0.0747 -0.3502 1    
hkm -0.0095 -0.0709 0.4653 0.0873 -0.0902 0.1856 0.1224 0.1156 -0.304 -0.0167 -0.264 -0.1501 0.2181 0.2064 0.1018 1   
usm 0.0765 -0.1157 -0.4684 -0.2636 0.458 0.0513 -0.1022 -0.0447 0.1225 -0.0766 0.0384 0.0869 -0.1885 -0.3824 0.1365 -0.3901 1  
crisis -0.0474 0.4449 -0.2822 0.0658 -0.0713 -0.3414 -0.0144 -0.0267 0.9154 0.0456 0.3145 -0.0756 -0.0511 0.1505 -0.0076 -0.2044 0.0379 1 
 
Note: Variables are defined in Table 9. 
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Table 3.12 Multivariate Regressions 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
POLICY 
-0.0273 
(1.15) 
[0.253] 
-0.0343 
(1.4) 
[0.164] 
-0.0270 
(1.1) 
[0.273] 
GOVTOWN  
-0.0238 
(-1.61) 
[0.11] 
-0.0253 
(-1.63) 
[0.105] 
NATRES  
0.0103 
(0.89) 
[0.373] 
0.0093 
(0.7) 
[0.482] 
ITIN  
-0.0279 
(-2) 
[0.047] 
-0.0255 
(-1.86) 
[0.064] 
THK   
-0.0078 
(-0.43) 
[0.669] 
INDREL   
-0.0126 
(-1.33) 
[0.184] 
ADVISOR   
0.0036 
(0.36) 
[0.722] 
FEX   
-0.0629 
(-0.74) 
[0.461] 
CASH   
-0.0070 
(-0.72) 
[0.475] 
Constant 
0.0066 
(1.63) 
[0.106] 
0.0231 
(2.05) 
[0.042] 
0.0394 
(1.64) 
[0.104] 
Observation 157 157 157 
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Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
F 1.32 1.46 0.71 
Prob > F 0.2526 0.2166 0.6974 
R-squared 0.0232 0.0715 0.0838 
 
Note: The t-statistics are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets. We use White standard errors to calculate 
t-statistics. The dependent variable in the three models is CAR (-1,1). 
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Table 3.13 Comparison of Sample Means and Estimated Coefficients for Blinder-
Oaxaca Decomposition 
 
Panel A: Government Policy Variables 
 
Variable Sample  
 1994-2001 2002-2009 
A. Sample means   
CAR (-1,1)  0.0339 0.0066 
GOVTOWN 0.5484 0.4524 
NATRES 0.0323 0.3254 
ITIN 0.3871 0.3254 
B. Estimated coefficients   
GOVTOWN 
-0.1037 
(-1.65) 
[0.111] 
-0.0060 
(-0.63) 
[0.533] 
NATRES 
-0.0940 
(-4.03) 
[0] 
0.0158 
(1.36) 
[0.177] 
ITIN 
-0.1113 
(-1.94) 
[0.063] 
-0.0066 
(-0.69) 
[0.488] 
Constant 
0.1369 
(1.87) 
[0.072] 
0.0064 
(0.93) 
[0.352] 
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Variable Sample  
 1994-2001 2002-2009 
Observation 31 126 
R-squared 0.2371 0.0335 
 
146 
 
Panel B: All Variables  
 
Variables Sample  
 1994-2001 2002-2009 
A. Sample means   
CAR (-1,1) 0.0339 0.0066 
GOVTOWN 0.5484 0.4524 
NATRES 0.0323 0.3254 
ITIN 0.3871 0.3254 
THK 0.7419 0.2778 
INDREL 0.2258 0.5952 
ADVISOR 0.1613 0.3333 
FEX -0.0312 0.0553 
CASH 0.4194 0.5952 
B. Estimated Coefficients   
GOVTOWN 
-0.0577 
(-1.42) 
[0.17] 
-0.0061 
(-0.6) 
[0.546] 
147 
 
Variables Sample  
 1994-2001 2002-2009 
NATRES 
-0.2381 
(-2.25) 
[0.035] 
0.0167 
(1.39) 
[0.167] 
ITIN 
-0.1404 
(-2.07) 
[0.051] 
-0.0067 
(-0.61) 
[0.542] 
THK 
-0.0764 
(-0.95) 
[0.355] 
0.0048 
(0.4) 
[0.691] 
INDREL 
-0.1043 
(-2.47) 
[0.022] 
-0.0021 
(-0.24) 
[0.807] 
ADVISOR 
-0.0328 
(-1.03) 
[0.313] 
0.0081 
(0.8) 
[0.427] 
FEX 
2.5918 
(2.36) 
[0.028] 
0.0211 
(0.35) 
[0.726] 
CASH 
-0.0434 
(-1.18) 
[0.252] 
0.0013 
(0.17) 
[0.863] 
Constant 
0.3122 
(1.98) 
[0.06] 
0.0014 
(0.14) 
[0.887] 
Observation 31 126 
R-squared 0.4427 0.044 
 
Note: variables are defined in Table 9. Top part of each panel reports sample means. Bottom part reports results 
of regression when dependent variable is CAR(-1,1). T-statistics are listed in parentheses below estimated 
coefficients, and associated p-value are in brackets. White standard errors are used to calculate t-statistics. 
 
 
 
148 
 
Table 3.14 Decomposition of ACAR Gap 
 
Panel A: Government Policy Variables 
 
Policy Impact: 1994-2001/2002-2009 period 
Difference=-0.0273 
Variable  GOVTOWN NATRES ITIN Constant Decomposition 
Mean_Diff(A) -36.5 101.0 -25.2 0.0 39.3 
Coef_Diff(A) -161.9 -130.9 -124.9 478.3 60.7 
Mean_Diff(B) -2.1 -17.0 -1.5 0.0 -20.6 
Coef_Diff(B) -196.2 -13.0 -148.5 478.3 120.6 
 
Note: Table 3.14 reports the results of applying the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to the difference in ACAR 
values in the pre- and post-Go Global periods.  Changes in (i) mean sample characteristics,  12 XX  , and (ii) 
estimated coefficients,  12 ββ ˆˆ  , are identified by ―Means‖ and ―Coefficients‖ respectively.  The numbers in 
the table represent the percentage difference ―explained‖ by the respective change for each variable, including 
changes in the estimated value of the constant term.  A positive number suggests that the change contributed to 
the difference in ACAR values.  A negative number suggests the opposite; namely, that the observed gap is 
smaller as a result of the respective change.  We are looking for variables with large positive values for either 
―Means,‖ ―Coefficients,‖ or both to identify the contributors to negative ACAR gap. 
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Panel B: All Variables 
 
Policy Impact: 1994-2001/2002-2009 period 
Difference=-0.0273 
Variable GOVTOWN NATRES ITIN THK INDREL ADVISOR FEX CASH Constant Decomposition 
Mean_Diff 
(A) 
-20.3 255.7 -31.7 -129.9 141.2 20.7 -820.7 28.0 0.0 -557.0 
Coef_Diff 
(A) 
-85.5 -303.8 -159.3 -82.6 -222.9 -50.0 520.3 -97.5 1138.4 657.0 
Mean_Diff 
(B) 
-2.1 -18.0 -1.5 8.1 2.9 -5.1 -6.7 -0.8 0.0 -23.3 
Coef_Diff 
(B) 
-103.7 -30.1 -189.5 -220.6 -84.6 -24.2 -293.7 -68.7 1138.4 123.3 
 
Note: Table 3.14 reports the results of applying the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to the difference in ACAR values in the pre- and post-Go Global periods.  Changes in (i) 
mean sample characteristics,  12 XX  , and (ii) estimated coefficients,  12 ββ ˆˆ  , are identified by ―Means‖ and ―Coefficients‖ respectively.  The numbers in the table 
represent the percentage difference ―explained‖ by the respective change for each variable, including changes in the estimated value of the constant term.  A positive number 
suggests that the change contributed to the difference in ACAR values.  A negative number suggests the opposite; namely, that the observed gap is smaller as a result of the 
respective change.  We are looking for variables with large positive values for either ―Means,‖ ―Coefficients,‖ or both to identify the contributors to negative ACAR gap. 
150 
 
Table 4.1 Distribution of Chinese OMA Deals by Year 
 
Year 
No. of 
transactions 
Deal with 
transaction 
value 
Value of 
transaction 
(in mil USD) 
Average 
transaction 
value 
(in mil USD) 
1994 1 1 98.5 98.5 
1995 1 1 1.3 1.3 
1996 3 2 482.1 241 
1997 4 3 360.6 120.2 
1998 7 6 262.5 43.7 
1999 5 3 45.9 15.3 
2000 5 3 64 21.3 
2001 6 4 50.5 12.6 
2002 11 10 2098.9 209.9 
2003 9 8 2057 257.1 
2004 17 9 2267.9 252 
2005 8 6 4243.6 707.3 
2006 12 9 8511.9 945.8 
2007 18 11 1716 156 
2008 15 7 824.8 117.8 
Total 122 83 23085.4 278.1 
 
Note: Observations are those used for the three-year, long term performance.       
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Table 4.2 Distribution of Chinese OMA Deals by Region and Country 
 
Country 
Number 
of deals 
Deal value 
available 
Total value of deals 
($mil) 
Average Value 
 of Deals ($mil) 
Developed nations 
HK
18
 49 37 4507.8 121.8 
US 12 10 2553.6 255.4 
Australia 8 7 846.6 121 
Canada 4 2 772.3 386.2 
Germany 3 0 0 0 
France 2 2 62 31 
Japan 1 1 107 107 
Netherlands 2 1 148.5 148.5 
UK
19
 2 1 4141.2 4141.2 
Singapore 6 2 980.9 490.4 
South Korea 2 2 471.7 235.9 
Sum 91 65 14591.6 224.5 
Asia 
Indonesia 5 4 1129.5 282.4 
Kazakhstan 2 1 200 200 
India 2 1 1.1 1.1 
Azerbaijan 2 2 70 35 
Pakistan 1 1 284 284 
Russian Fed 2 2 3600 1800 
Malaysia 1 1 11.5 11.5 
Philippines 1 1 70 70 
Sum 16 13 5366.1 412.8 
Africa 
Nigeria 2 1 2692 2692 
Chad 1 1 202.5 202.5 
Sum 3 2 2894.5 1447.3 
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Country 
Number 
of deals 
Deal value 
available 
Total value of deals 
($mil) 
Average Value 
 of Deals ($mil) 
South America 
British 
Virgin 
3 2 33.2 16.6 
Peru 2 1 200 200 
Sum 5 3 233.2 77.7 
Others
20
 7 0 0 0 
Total 122 83 23085.4 278.1 
 
Note: Observations are those used for the three-year, long term performance.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18
 We include Hong Kong targets in the overseas M&A group because most researchers argue that Hong Kong 
has obviously different economic system away from Chinese mainland. 
19
 Both of the target firms are PetroKazakhstan and with the nationality of United Kingdom in SDC database 
because they argue that the headquarter of PetroKazakhstan is in the United Kingdom. However, most Chinese 
consider it as a Canadian firm. In Zephyr M&A database, the nationality of PetroKazakhstan is Canada too. 
20
 Others include Chinese OMAs in Mexico, Mongolia, Portugal, Tunisia, Vietnam, Zambia and Thailand. 
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Table 4.3 Industry Distribution of Chinese OMAs 
 
Target industry 
1994-2008 1994-2001 2002-2008 
Total Deals Average value Deals
21
  Average value Deals Average value  
Telecommunication and Electronics, 
Prepacked Software
22
 
32 191.4 
11 
(34%) 
16 
21 
(23%) 
263.6 
Energy and Natural Resources
23
 31 669.7 
2 
(6%) 
0 
29 
(32%) 
669.7 
Wholesales and Retail Trade
24
 10 67.2 
4 
(13%) 
81.6 
6 
(7%) 
48.1 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Products
25
 13 44 
4 
(13%) 
9.9 
9 
(10%) 
78.2 
Transportation
26
 9 245.1 
3 
(9%) 
279.2 
6 
(7%) 
228.1 
Miscellaneous Business Services
27
 14 163 
2 
(6%) 
8.7 
12 
(13%) 
201.4 
Chemicals and Drugs
28
 4 29.8 
2 
(6%) 
1.3 
2 
(2%) 
58.2 
Electric, Gas and Water Distribution, Construction 9 93.9 
4 
(13%) 
13.3 
5 
(6%) 
214.8 
Total 122 278.1 
32 
(100%) 
59.3 
90 
(100%) 
362 
 
Note: Observations are those used for the three-year, long term performance.       
21
 The percentage in the brackets shows the proportion in total deals in the period. 
22
  ―Telecommunication and Electronics, Prepackaged Software Industry‖ consists of the following SDC categories: ―Computer and Office Equipment;‖ 
―Telecommunications;‖  ―Electronic and Electrical Equipment;‖ ―Communications Equipment;‖ and ―Prepackaged Software.‖  
23
 ―Energy and Natural Resources‖ consists of the following SDC categories: ―Oil and Gas;‖ ―Petroleum Refining;‖ ―Mining;‖ ―Metal and Metal Products;‖ and ―Agriculture, 
Forestry, and Fishing.‖  
24
 ―Wholesale, Retail, Trade‖ consists of the following SDC categories: ―Wholesale Trade-Nondurable Goods;‖ ―Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods;‖ and ―Miscellaneous 
Retail Trade.‖  
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25
 ―Miscellaneous Manufacturing Products‖ consists of the following SDC categories: ―Measuring, Medical, Photo Eqipment;‖ ―Clocks;‖ ―Food and Kindred Products;‖ 
―Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products;‖ ―Textile and Apparel Products;‖ ―Wood Products, Furniture, and Fixtures;‖ ―Machinery;‖ ―Miscellaneous Manufacturing;‖ and 
―Transportation Equipment.‖  
26
 ―Transportation‖ consists of the following SDC categories: ―Transportation and Shipping (except Air);‖ and ―Air Transportation and Shipping.‖ 
27
 ―Miscellaneous Business Services‖ consists of the following SDC categories: ―Business Services;‖ ―Health Services;‖ ―Investment and Commodity Firms, Dealers, 
Exchanges;‖ and ―Radio and Television Broadcasting Stations.‖ 
28
 ―Chemicals and Drugs‖ consists of the following SDC categories: ―Drugs;‖ and ―Chemicals and Allied Products.‖ 
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Table 4.4 Long-Term Performance of Chinese OMAs, 1994-2008 
 
 6 month 12 month 18 month 24 month 30 month 
 
36 month 
 
CTAR 0.054 0.052 0.056 0.028 -0.012 -0.015 
t 0.596 0.406 0.362 0.146 -0.07 -0.1 
p-value 0.551 0.685 0.717 0.884 0.944 0.92 
Observation 
119 119 120 120 94 94 
 
       Note: 
 

N
i
T
t
itCTAR
N
CTAR
1 1
1
, where itCTAR  is defined in Equation 1. 
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Table 4.5A  Reproduction of Fama and French (1993) Results 
 
Dependent variable: Excess returns on 25 stock portfolios formed on size and book-to-market 
equity 
 Book-to-market equity (BE/ME) quintiles 
Size 
quintile 
Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High 
 a t(a) 
Small -0.34 -0.12 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -3.16 -1.47 -0.73 0.22 0.14 
2 -0.11 -0.01 0.08 0.03 0.02 -1.24 -0.20 1.04 0.51 0.34 
3 -0.11 0.04 -0.04 0.05 0.05 -1.42 0.47 -0.47 0.71 0.56 
4 0.09 -0.22 -0.08 0.03 0.13 1.07 -2.65 -0.99 0.33 1.24 
Big 0.21 -0.05 -0.13 -0.05 -0.16 3.27 -0.67 -1.46 -0.69 -1.41 
 b t(b) 
Small 1.04 1.02 0.95 0.91 0.96 39.37 51.80 60.44 59.73 57.89 
2 1.11 1.06 1.00 0.97 1.09 52.49 61.18 55.88 61.54 65.52 
3 1.12 1.02 0.98 0.97 1.09 56.88 53.17 50.78 54.38 52.52 
4 1.07 1.08 1.04 1.05 1.18 53.94 53.51 51.21 47.09 46.10 
Big 0.96 1.02 0.98 0.99 1.06 60.93 56.76 46.57 53.87 38.61 
 s t(s) 
Small 1.46 1.26 1.19 1.17 1.23 37.92 44.11 52.03 52.85 50.97 
2 1.00 0.98 0.88 0.73 0.89 32.73 38.79 34.03 31.66 36.78 
3 0.76 0.65 0.60 0.48 0.66 26.40 23.39 21.23 18.62 21.91 
4 0.37 0.33 0.29 0.24 0.41 12.73 11.11 9.81 7.38 11.01 
Big -0.17 -0.12 -0.23 -0.17 -0.05 -7.18 -4.51 -7.58 -6.27 -1.18 
 h t(h) 
Small -0.29 0.08 0.26 0.40 0.62 -6.47 2.35 9.66 15.53 22.24 
2 -0.52 0.01 0.26 0.46 0.70 -14.57 0.41 8.56 17.24 24.80 
3 -0.38 -0.00 0.32 0.51 0.68 -11.26 -0.05 9.75 16.88 19.39 
4 -0.42 0.04 0.30 0.56 0.74 -12.51 1.04 8.83 14.84 17.09 
Big -0.46 0.00 0.21 0.57 0.76 -17.03 0.09 5.80 18.34 16.24 
 R
2
 s(e) 
Small 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.96 1.94 1.44 1.16 1.12 1.22 
2 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 1.55 1.27 1.31 1.16 1.23 
3 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.93 1.45 1.41 1.43 1.32 1.52 
4 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.89 0.89 1.46 1.48 1.49 1.63 1.88 
Big 0.94 0.92 0.88 0.90 0.83 1.16 1.32 1.55 1.36 2.02 
 
Note: Taken from Tables 6 and 9a in Fama and French (1993). The estimates come from estimation of the 
following equation: ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( ) ( ) ( )R t RF t a b RM t RF t sSMB t hHML t e t        
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Table 4.5B FF3FM Results for 16 Portfolios 
 
Size quintile 
Book-to-market quintiles Book-to-market quintiles 
Low 2 3 High Low 2 3 High 
 Alpha Beta
29
 
Small 0.1035 0.1202 0.1190 0.3749 1.1058 1.0498 1.3393 1.2169 
2 0.0638 -0.0648 0.0942 0.3269 1.0906 0.9691 1.3795 1.1123 
3 0.3269 0.4193 0.2591 0.0926 1.4225 1.3977 1.1536 1.0154 
Big 0.1975 -0.0262 0.1765 -0.0149 1.1011 0.7921 1.0927 0.8784 
 t (Alpha) t (Beta) 
Small 1.7017 1.8671 6.7906 3.6563 1.1698 0.4193 1.6246 1.1877 
2 0.7365 -0.7434 1.7445 4.1418 0.3863 -0.1780 1.1718 1.1419 
3 4.0799 10.4529 4.6676 7.8730 1.8797 2.8456 2.7328 0.1929 
Big 6.0027 -0.5725 5.2713 -0.4929 0.6772 -1.5269 1.6324 -1.1632 
  p (Alpha) p (Beta) 
Small 0.0888 0.0619 0.0000 0.0003 0.2421 0.6750 0.1043 0.2349 
2 0.4614 0.4572 0.0811 0.0000 0.6993 0.8587 0.2413 0.2535 
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0601 0.0044 0.0063 0.8470 
Big 0.0000 0.5670 0.0000 0.6221 0.4983 0.1268 0.1026 0.2447 
 S H 
Small 0.8642 0.2375 -0.0632 0.2868 -0.7151 0.0215 -0.1132 0.8826 
2 0.0248 -0.1260 0.1412 0.0977 -0.1979 -0.0108 -0.0222 0.1274 
3 -0.4033 0.0483 0.3779 0.1020 0.2448 -0.0324 -0.0357 0.0422 
Big -0.1115 -0.8525 -0.0109 -0.3300 -0.0157 -0.1323 0.1216 -0.1584 
 t (s) t (h) 
Small 2.0009 1.7791 -0.1358 0.7260 -1.1927 0.1131 -0.4348 2.3515 
2 0.1819 -0.8436 0.2045 1.5811 -1.9624 -0.0978 -0.0892 0.6023 
3 -1.8652 0.3453 1.5507 0.3433 2.0119 -0.3027 -0.2184 0.4211 
Big -1.2606 -4.0619 -0.1167 -2.3033 -0.2026 -0.4222 2.3160 -1.2419 
 p (s) p (h) 
Small 0.0454 0.0752 0.8920 0.4679 0.2330 0.9100 0.6637 0.0187 
2 0.8557 0.3989 0.8380 0.1139 0.0497 0.9221 0.9289 0.5470 
3 0.0622 0.7299 0.1210 0.7314 0.0442 0.7621 0.8271 0.6737 
Big 0.2074 0.0000 0.9071 0.0213 0.8395 0.6729 0.0206 0.2143 
 R
2
 Portfolio N 
Small 0.3673 0.5305 0.5565 0.4162 7 3 3 7 
2 0.4305 0.5596 0.6611 0.6818 5 8 3 9 
3 0.7103 0.7120 0.7480 0.6118 5 11 6 4 
Big 0.6702 0.4673 0.6937 0.6240 8 3 12 4 
 
Note: Time series regressions with T=41 months. 
 
29
 The hypothesis test for beta (H10): Beta=1. We also tested the hypothesis for beta (H20): Beta=0 and got very 
large t values for all 16 portfolio Betas, suggesting to reject Beta=0 at 1% level. 
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Table 4.6 Performance Breakdown by Year 
 
Year      CAR (-1,1)  Year 1 CTAR Year 2 CTAR Year 3 CTAR 
1994 0.02 -0.36 -0.02 0.13 
1995 -0.01 0.26 0.07 -0.05 
1996 0.04 0.44 0.42 0.06 
1997 0.14 -0.26 -0.58 -0.16 
1998 0.03 -0.30 -0.28 -0.26 
1999 0.03 0.44 -0.01 -0.22 
2000 0.03 0.13 -0.01 0.10 
2001 -0.01 0.12 0.65 0.06 
2002 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.07 
2003 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.06 
2004 0.01 -0.10 -0.19 0.00 
2005 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.08 
2006 -0.01 0.14 0.06 -0.07 
2007 0.03 0.12 0.11 0.16 
2008 -0.01 0.22 0.17 n.a. 
1994-2001     
Mean 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.08 
Median 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.05 
Std. Dev  0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 
2002-2008     
  Mean 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.04 
Median 0.13 0.60 0.67 0.31 
Std. Dev 0.03 0.30 0.28 0.15 
1994-2008     
  Mean 0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.01 
Median 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.02 
Std. Dev 0.07 0.40 0.43 0.23 
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Table 4.7 Long-Term Performance in Different Markets 
 
Interval  
(In months) 
Chinese Mainland Hong Kong U.S. 
CTAR t p-value CTAR t p-value CTAR t p-value 
6 month 0.0223 0.3173 0.7511 -0.0415 -0.5651 0.5720 0.1905 1.2624 0.2068 
12 month 0.0682 0.5433 0.5869 -0.0433 -0.3468 0.7287 0.1046 0.4896 0.6244 
18 month 0.0843 0.4917 0.6230 -0.0232 -0.1664 0.8678 0.0751 0.3108 0.7560 
24 month 0.0082 0.0423 0.9662 -0.0105 -0.0617 0.9508 0.0455 0.1444 0.8852 
30 month -0.0322 -0.1208 0.9039 -0.0047 -0.0256 0.9796 0.0266 0.1038 0.9174 
36 month -0.0068 -0.0291 0.9768 0.0042 0.0229 0.9818 0.0087 0.0422 0.9664 
Observation 50 68 64 
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Table 4.8A Performance Breakdown by Sectors 
 
Target sector 
Deal  
Number 
CAR 
(-1,1) 
Year 1 
CTAR 
Year 2 
CTAR 
Year 3 
CTAR 
Telecommunication and Electronics, 
Prepacked Software 
32 0.00 0.18 0.14 0.03 
Energy and Natural Resources 31 0.00 0.12 0.02 0.08 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 10 0.10 1.80 -0.27 -0.24 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Products 13 0.03 0.54 0.10 0.05 
Transportation 9 0.00 0.29 0.07 0.01 
Miscellaneous Business Services 14 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.18 
Chemicals and Drugs 4 0.00 -0.12 0.15 -0.06 
Electric, Gas and Water Distribution, 
Construction 
9 0.00 0.24 0.01 -0.06 
Mean 0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.01 
Median 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.02 
Standard deviation 0.07 0.40 0.43 0.23 
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Table 4.8B Sector Performance 
 
Target Sector CAR(-1,1) Y1CTAR Y2CTAR Y3CTAR 
Telecommunication and Electronics, 
Prepacked Software 
-0.0117 
(-0.9500) 
[0.3420] 
0.1252 
(1.1100) 
[0.2700] 
-0.0006 
(-0.0100) 
[0.9960] 
-0.0062 
(-0.1000) 
[0.9200] 
Energy and Natural Resources 
-0.0139 
(-1.2800) 
[0.2040] 
-0.0416 
(-0.6600) 
[0.5130] 
0.0640 
(0.8800) 
[0.3830] 
0.0853 
(1.9800) 
[0.0510] 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 
0.0935 
(1.4600) 
[0.1470] 
-0.3530*** 
(-3.9700) 
[0.0000] 
-0.2894** 
(-2.1500) 
[0.0340] 
-0.0167 
(-0.2000) 
[0.8410] 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Products 
0.0215 
(0.8400) 
[0.4010] 
0.0592 
(0.5900) 
[0.5540] 
0.0200 
(0.2300) 
[0.8180] 
-0.0733 
(-0.5200) 
[0.6010] 
Transportation 
-0.0168 
(-0.7000) 
[0.4830] 
0.0154 
(0.1300) 
[0.8930] 
-0.0210 
(-0.1600) 
[0.8690] 
-0.0444 
(-1.0700) 
[0.2870] 
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Target Sector CAR(-1,1) Y1CTAR Y2CTAR Y3CTAR 
Miscellaneous Business Services 
-0.0153 
(-1.5300) 
[0.1300] 
0.0340 
(0.4600) 
[0.6480] 
0.1758 
(1.3200) 
[0.1890] 
-0.0426 
(-0.5200) 
[0.6050] 
Chemicals and Drugs 
-0.0177 
(-1.9700) 
[0.0520] 
0.1017 
(0.8300) 
[0.4070] 
-0.0901 
(-1.2700) 
[0.2050] 
-0.0390 
(-0.8900) 
[0.3730] 
Electric, Gas and Water Distribution, 
Construction 
-0.0101 
(-0.8700) 
[0.3880] 
-0.0394 
(-0.4500) 
[0.6570] 
-0.0926 
(-1.1300) 
[0.2620] 
0.0159 
(0.2900) 
[0.7730] 
Observation 114 119 120 94 
 
Note: the value in the parentheses is the t-statistic, and the value in brackets is the p-value. t-statistics are calculated from White robust standard errors. 
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Table 4.9 Performance of Top 15 Chinese Overseas M&As, 1994-2010 
 
Acquirer 
Name 
Year  
Target 
Name 
Target 
Nation 
Target  
Industry 
Shares 
Acq. 
(%) 
Transaction 
Value 
($mil) 
CAR 
(-1,1) 
Year 3 
CTAR 
Acquirer Advisors 
CNPC 2005 
PetroKaza 
-khstan 
UK Energy 100 4141.2 -0.025 0.124 Citigroup 
Sinopec 2006 
OAO 
Udmurtneft 
Russian Energy 96.9 3500 0.003 0.044 
Dresdner Kleinwort 
Wasserstein 
Yanzhou  
Coal Mining 
2009 
Felix 
Resources 
Australia Mining 100 2806.9 n.a.
30
 n.a.
31
 UBS Investment Bank 
CNOOC Ltd 2006 
NNPC-OML 
130 
Nigeria Energy 45 2692 0.005 0.333 Goldman Sachs & Co 
Lenovo 
Group 
2005 
IBM Corp 
Personal 
Computing 
US Hi-Tech 100 1750 0.027 0.255 
Goldman Sachs (Asia) 
Cazenove Asia Ltd 
BNP Paribas SA 
PetroChina 2010 
Athabasca 
Oil  
Sands-Assets 
Canada Energy 60 1737 n.a.
32
 n.a.
33
 TD Securities Inc 
China 
Unicom 
2003 
Unicom New 
World 
(BVI)Ltd 
HK Hi-Tech 100 1368.1 -0.018 -0.194 
Lehman Brothers Asia 
China International Capital 
Co 
Bank of 
China 
2006 
Singapore 
Aircraft 
 Leasing 
Singa- 
-pore 
Business  
Services 
100 965 n.a.
34
 -0.131 
Morgan Stanley 
UBS Investment Bank 
Bank of China International 
Aluminium 
Corp of 
China 
2007 
Peru Copper 
Inc 
Canada Mining 100 770.785 -0.0048 0.1959 BMO Capital Markets 
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Acquirer 
Name 
Year  
Target 
Name 
Target 
Nation 
Target  
Industry 
Shares 
Acq. 
(%) 
Transaction 
Value 
($mil) 
CAR 
(-1,1) 
Year 3 
CTAR 
Acquirer Advisors 
Air China 
Ltd 
2006 
Cathay 
Pacific 
Airways 
HK 
Transpor-
tation 
10.16 694.538 -0.0069 0.0041 
Merrill Lynch 
China International Capital 
Co 
BNP Paribas SA 
CNOOC Ltd 2002 
Repsol YPF 
SA 
Indo 
-nesia 
Energy 100 591.86 0.0498 0.0416 Merrill Lynch (Asia Pacific) 
CNOOC Ltd 2004 
North West  
Shelf Gas Pty 
Australia Energy 5.3 537.308 -0.0180 -0.1046 
Merrill Lynch 
Credit Suisse First Boston 
China 
Resources 
Entrp 
4/12/ 
1996 
Hong Kong  
Intl Terminal  
HK 
Transpor-
tation 
10 476.988 0.1197 0.0334 n.a 
Wuhan  
Iron & Steel 
2010 
MMX 
Sudeste  
Mineracao 
SA 
Brazil Mining 21.52 400 n.a.
35
 n.a.
36
 BNP Paribas SA 
BOE 2003 Hydis 
South 
Korea 
Hi-Tech 100 380 0.0213 0.1859 n.a 
 
30
 The CAR(-1,1) value is missing here because we delete observations with more than 50% zero return in investigation period.  
31
 The Year 3 CTAR value is missing here because the missing of time series returns data in the third year after OMA (2010). 
32
 The CAR(-1,1) value is missing here because we delete observations with more than 50% zero return in investigation period.  
33
 The Year 3 CTAR value is missing here because the missing of three years time series returns data after OMA. 
34
 The CAR(-1,1) value is missing here because we delete observations with more than 50% zero return in investigation period. 
35
 The CAR(-1,1) value is missing here because we delete observations with more than 50% zero return in investigation period. 
36
 The Year 3 CTAR value is missing here because the missing of three years time series returns data after OMA. 
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Table 4.10 Variable Descriptions 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Y3CTAR, cumulative three years calendar time abnormal return 
after effective date 
Independent 
variables 
Description 
CAR3 Cumulated abnormal return from day (-1) to day (1) in test period 
Y1CTAR Cumulated one years calendar time abnormal return after effective date 
Y2CTAR Cumulated two years calendar time abnormal return after effective date 
CULDIS Culture difference scores between China and the targets
37
 
FEX US dollar depreciation according to Chinese RMB
38
  
DEVDC Dummy 1 if target is in developed country, 0 if not 
THK Dummy 1 if HK target, 0 if not 
INDREL Dummy 1 if related (SIC 2-digit code), 0 if unrelated 
GOVTOWN Dummy 1 if Government owned enterprises, 0 if not
39
 
CASH Dummy 1 if cash payment, 0 if stock exchange 
NATRES Dummy 1 if natural resources industry targets, 0 if not 
ITIN Dummy 1 if technology-intensive targets, 0 if not 
TRAVALUE Transaction value of the deal, in USD million 
LNTRAVALUE Log form of transaction value 
MV24a Market value 24 months after effective 
LNMV24a Log form of market value 24 months after effective 
Y2BM Book to market ratio two years after effective 
ADVISOR Dummy 1 if acquirer employed institutional advisor, 0 if not 
HKM Dummy 1 if list in Hong Kong market, 0 if not 
USM Dummy 1 if list in US market, 0 if not 
POLICY Dummy 1 if year after China Go Global Policy, 0 if not 
SECTOR Control groups include 8 sectors reported in Table 3 and Table 8 
 
 
37
 Hofstede’s Cultural dimensions scores are from http://www.geert-hofstede.com. The culture distance index 
equation from Kogut and Sing (1998) is: 
  




4
1
2
4
/
i
iiNij
j
VII
CD
  
Where 
jCD
 indicates the culture distance index between country j and the home country; 
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ijI indicates culture dimension score on ith item of country j; 
iNI indicates culture distance dimension score of home country while  
iV is the variance of culture distance dimension scores.  
38
   FEX  is computed as following: 
1
1
1
1
n
k ak
i
n
k
i
e e
n
FEX
e
n






 
ke  indicates the daily exchange rate of USD (units of dollars per unit of RMB) in the year 1994-2007;  
ake  indicates daily foreign exchange rate of the USD in the year of the announcement,  
Positive 
kFEX
 values indicate a cheaper dollar for the Chinese acquirers, while negative values 
indicate that the USD will be more expensive.   
39
 Government owned enterprise is defined when the ultimate parent company is government owned in SDC 
Platinum. 
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Table 4.11 Summary Statistics for Performance Determinants 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CAR(-1,1) 114 0.0131 0.0749 -0.1380 0.6316 
Y1CTAR 
119 0.0517 0.4026 -0.8172 2.7705 
Y2CTAR 
120 0.0280 0.4276 -1.2233 2.4042 
Y3CTAR 94 -0.0146 0.2345 -1.2320 0.3954 
CULDIS 111 1.2873 1.3858 0.1400 4.5890 
FEX 122 0.0208 0.0575 -0.0242 0.1593 
DEVDC 122 0.7541 0.4324 0.0000 1.0000 
THK 122 0.4016 0.4923 0.0000 1.0000 
INDREL 122 0.5000 0.5021 0.0000 1.0000 
GOVTOWN 122 0.5000 0.5021 0.0000 1.0000 
POLICY 122 0.7377 0.442 0.0000 1.0000 
CASH 122 0.5410 0.5004 0.0000 1.0000 
NATRES 122 0.2541 0.4371 0.0000 1.0000 
ITIN 122 0.3361 0.4743 0.0000 1.0000 
TRAVALUE 83 278.1367 691.4977 0.6000 4141.179 
LNTRAVALUE 83 3.7895 2.0447 -0.5108 8.3287 
MV24a 116 20715.59 53576.4 2.1800 331338.4 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LNMV24a 116 7.5855 2.3998 0.7793 12.7109 
Y2BM 108 0.5549 0.9104 0.0004 8.1726 
ADVISOR 122 0.2951 0.4580 0.0000 1.0000 
HKM 122 0.4180 0.4953 0.0000 1.0000 
USM 122 0.1885 0.3927 0.0000 1.0000 
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Table 4.12 Correlation Coefficients 
 
 y3ctar market culdis fex devdc thk indrel govtown cash natrel itin travalue mv24a y2bm policy advisor 
y3ctar 1.0000                
market -0.0857 1.0000               
culdis 0.0195 -0.0223 1.0000              
fex 0.1061 -0.0375 0.2927 1.0000             
devdc -0.1663 0.0739 0.0955 -0.1178 1.0000            
thk -0.1557 0.1147 -0.7394 -0.3136 0.4678 1.0000           
indrel 0.2356 -0.0781 0.1027 -0.0365 -0.0761 -0.1505 1.0000          
govtown 0.0169 -0.2566 -0.2124 -0.2838 -0.2284 0.0502 0.1148 1.0000         
cash 0.0692 -0.1226 -0.0284 -0.0166 0.0088 0.0501 0.1645 0.0987 1.0000        
natrel 0.1594 -0.2472 0.2099 0.0161 -0.4537 -0.4398 0.2071 0.3954 0.1220 1.0000       
itin -0.0539 0.3873 -0.0445 0.0135 0.2048 0.2312 0.0868 -0.3297 -0.1107 -0.4152 1.0000      
travalue 0.1580 -0.0892 0.1647 -0.0148 -0.1483 -0.2040 0.1439 0.2441 0.0418 0.3210 -0.1081 1.0000     
mv24a 0.0182 -0.2030 0.0024 0.1565 -0.1459 -0.0669 0.0426 0.3352 0.0495 0.1371 -0.0856 0.2930 1.0000    
y2bm -0.1159 0.1911 0.0698 -0.0393 0.0257 -0.0312 -0.1930 -0.0350 -0.1549 -0.0630 -0.0544 -0.1111 -0.1025 1.0000   
policy 0.1867 -0.2424 0.2637 0.4198 -0.2107 -0.3477 0.2981 -0.0373 0.1986 0.2624 -0.0491 0.1971 0.2066 -0.0792 1.0000  
advisor -0.0370 0.0826 0.0934 -0.0383 0.1190 -0.0535 0.1797 0.1438 0.1992 0.0765 0.0343 0.4281 0.1869 -0.1178 0.1815 1.0000 
 
170 
 
Table 4.13 Univariate Regression of Determinants of Long-Term OMA 
Performance 
 
  Variables 
YEAR1 
CTAR 
YEAR2 
CTAR 
YEAR3 
CTAR 
CAR (-1,1) 
-0.3101 
(-0.5600) 
[0.5760] 
-1.2769 
(-2.2200) 
[0.0290] 
-0.7068 
(-1.2900) 
[0.1990] 
Y1CTAR --- --- --- 
Y2CTAR 
0.4799 
(3.4200) 
[0.0010] 
--- --- 
Y3CTAR --- 
0.1651 
(2.5500) 
[0.0130] 
--- 
CULDIS 
0.0394 
(1.4100) 
[0.1600] 
-0.0306 
(-0.9800) 
[0.3300] 
0.0034 
(0.2100) 
[0.8370] 
FEX 
1.2515 
(2.0300) 
[0.0450] 
1.3024 
(2.3500) 
[0.0210] 
1.0324 
(1.2500) 
[0.2140] 
DEVDC 
-0.0134 
(-0.2100) 
[0.8370] 
-0.1248 
(-1.9200) 
[0.0570] 
-0.0916 
(-1.9600) 
[0.0530] 
THK 
-0.0769 
(-0.9500) 
[0.3450] 
0.0165 
(0.2000) 
[0.8430] 
-0.0729 
(-1.4500) 
[0.1510] 
INDREL 
0.0120 
(0.1600) 
[0.8720] 
0.0094 
(0.1200) 
[0.9050] 
0.1100 
(2.2700) 
[0.0250] 
GOVTOWN 
-0.1143 
(-1.5700) 
[0.1200] 
-0.0688 
(-0.8700) 
[0.3850] 
0.0080 
(0.1500) 
[0.8830] 
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  Variables 
YEAR1 
CTAR 
YEAR2 
CTAR 
YEAR3 
CTAR 
POLICY 
0.0459 
(0.4100) 
[0.6820] 
0.0337 
(0.2700) 
[0.7860] 
0.0926 
(1.5400) 
[0.1280] 
CASH 
0.0004 
(0.0000) 
[0.9960] 
0.0072 
(0.0900) 
[0.9300] 
0.0325 
(0.6600) 
[0.5080] 
NATREL 
-0.0416 
(-0.6600) 
[0.5130] 
0.0640 
(0.8800) 
[0.3830] 
0.0853 
(1.9800) 
[0.0510] 
ITIN 
0.1460 
(1.5800) 
[0.1160] 
0.1202 
(1.2400) 
[0.2180] 
-0.0270 
(-0.4900) 
[0.6240] 
LNTRAVALUE 
0.0095 
(0.6100) 
[0.5420] 
0.0222 
(0.8100) 
[0.4220] 
0.0158 
(1.1200) 
[0.2650] 
LNMV 
-0.0098 
(-0.2900) 
[0.7710] 
0.0141 
(0.5100) 
[0.6100] 
0.0182 
(1.4900) 
[0.1400] 
BM 
-0.1159 
(-2.6700) 
[0.0090] 
-0.0732 
(-2.1900) 
[0.0300] 
-0.0223 
(-1.8000) 
[0.0760] 
ADVISOR 
-0.1413 
(-2.0700) 
[0.0410] 
-0.0876 
(-1.1600) 
[0.2470] 
-0.0184 
(-0.4100) 
[0.6860] 
HKM 
-0.2095 
(-3.0800) 
[0.0030] 
-0.0676 
(-0.9200) 
[0.3580] 
0.0158 
(0.3200) 
[0.7480] 
USM 
0.2896 
(1.9500) 
[0.0540] 
0.1728 
(0.9800) 
[0.3300] 
-0.0700 
(-0.8100) 
[0.4190] 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, numbers in brackets are p-values. t-statistics are calculated from 
White heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.     
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Table 4.14A Determinants of Chinese OMA Performance 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 
0.3625 
(2.33) 
[0.03] 
0.3623 
(2.39) 
[0.02] 
0.2790 
(4.84) 
[0.00] 
0.1215 
(1.90) 
[0.06] 
GOVTOWN 
-0.2185 
(-3.20) 
[0.00] 
-0.2168 
(-3.30) 
[0.00] 
-0.1284 
(-2.42) 
[0.02] 
-0.1058 
(-2.21) 
[0.03] 
Y2BM 
-0.0297 
(-1.71) 
[0.10] 
-0.0303 
(-1.89) 
[0.07] 
-0.0153 
(-1.19) 
[0.24] 
-0.0185 
(-1.24) 
[0.22] 
CULDIS 
-0.0651 
(-1.40) 
[0.17] 
-0.0653 
(-1.43) 
[0.16] 
-0.0491 
(-2.45) 
[0.02] 
 
FEX 
2.9877 
(2.49) 
[0.02] 
2.9892 
(2.53) 
[0.02] 
1.0579 
(1.62) 
[0.11] 
 
DEVDC 
0.0809 
(0.64) 
[0.53] 
0.0813 
(0.66) 
[0.52] 
-0.0278 
(-0.48) 
[0.64] 
 
THK 
-0.1001 
(-0.72) 
[0.48] 
-0.0999 
(-0.73) 
[0.47] 
-0.1153 
(-1.52) 
[0.13] 
 
INDREL 
0.1245 
(1.60) 
[0.12] 
0.1236 
(1.59) 
[0.12] 
  
CASH 
-0.1902 
(-1.67) 
[0.11] 
-0.1942 
(-2.08) 
[0.05] 
  
LNTRAVALUE 
0.0010 
(0.05) 
[0.96] 
0.0007 
(0.04) 
[0.97] 
  
173 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
ADVISOR 
-0.1284 
(-1.61) 
[0.12] 
-0.1286 
(-1.63) 
[0.11] 
  
LNMV24A 
0.0193 
(1.05) 
[0.30] 
0.0193 
(1.07) 
[0.29] 
  
HKM 
0.0890 
(2.10) 
[0.04] 
0.0891 
(2.16) 
[0.04] 
  
USM 
0.1736 
(1.82) 
[0.08] 
0.1757 
(1.85) 
[0.07] 
  
ITIN 
-0.0155 
(-0.18) 
[0.86] 
-0.0159 
(-0.19) 
[0.85] 
  
POLICY 
-0.0072 
(-0.11) 
[0.92] 
  
-0.0012 
(-0.02) 
[0.99] 
TRADE 
-0.3489 
(-2.87) 
[0.01] 
-0.3491 
(-2.93) 
[0.01] 
-0.0743 
(-0.89) 
[0.38] 
-0.0537 
(-0.57) 
[0.57] 
ENERGY 
-0.0432 
(-0.50) 
[0.62] 
-0.0451 
(-0.54) 
[0.59] 
0.0079 
(0.14) 
[0.89] 
0.0531 
(0.99) 
[0.33] 
TELECOM 
-0.2959 
(-2.25) 
[0.03] 
-0.2978 
(-2.38) 
[0.02] 
-0.0648 
(-0.95) 
[0.35] 
-0.0754 
(-1.09) 
[0.28] 
SERVICE 
-0.2738 
(-2.20) 
[0.04] 
-0.2759 
(-2.35) 
[0.03] 
-0.1048 
(-1.31) 
[0.20] 
-0.1300 
(-1.56) 
[0.12] 
UTILITIES 
-0.1015 
(-1.52) 
[0.14] 
-0.0988 
(-1.47) 
[0.15] 
-0.0168 
(-0.34) 
[0.73] 
-0.0128 
(-0.25) 
[0.81] 
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
TRANSPORTATION 
-0.1903 
(-2.45) 
[0.02] 
-0.1912 
(-2.65) 
[0.01] 
-0.0523 
(-0.98) 
[0.33] 
-0.0720 
(-1.55) 
[0.13] 
CHEMICAL 
-0.0625 
(-0.50) 
[0.62] 
-0.0656 
(-0.58) 
[0.57] 
-0.0732 
(-2.16) 
[0.03] 
-0.1087 
(-2.86) 
[0.01] 
Obs 55 55 75 82 
R-sq 0.5521 0.5519 0.1931 0.1194 
F   5.06 4.83 
Prob>F   0 0 
 
Note: The dependent variables in Models 1-4 are 3-year calendar-time abnormal returns (Y3CTARs). Models 1-
4 are fixed effects models with fixed group on sector variable. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Numbers 
in brackets are p-values. t-statistics are calculated from White heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.     
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Table 4.14B Determinants of Chinese OMA Performance 
 
Variable Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Constant 
0.2263 
(1.83) 
[0.07] 
-0.0407 
(-0.37) 
[0.71] 
0.0788 
(1.64) 
[0.11] 
0.1206 
(4.10) 
[0.00] 
GOVTOWN 
-0.1220 
(-2.75) 
[0.01] 
-0.1908 
(-3.34) 
[0.00] 
-0.1045 
(-2.34) 
[0.02] 
-0.1056 
(-2.49) 
[0.02] 
Y2BM 
-0.0201 
(-1.24) 
[0.22] 
0.0010 
(0.04) 
[0.97] 
-0.0222 
(-2.06) 
[0.04] 
-0.0185 
(-1.27) 
[0.21] 
CULDIS     
FEX     
DEVDC     
THK     
INDREL 
0.0994 
(1.40) 
[0.17] 
   
CASH 
-0.0861 
(-0.91) 
[0.37] 
   
LNTRAVALUE 
0.0088 
(0.58) 
[0.57] 
   
ADVISOR 
-0.0537 
(-0.78) 
[0.44] 
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Variable Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
LNMV24A  
0.0271 
(1.55) 
[0.13] 
  
HKM  
0.0489 
(1.20) 
[0.23] 
  
USM  
0.0018 
(0.01) 
[0.99] 
  
ITIN   
-0.0517 
(-0.94) 
[0.35] 
 
NATRES   
0.0948 
(2.36) 
[0.02] 
 
POLICY     
TRADE 
-0.2395 
(-2.10) 
[0.04] 
-0.0931 
(-0.92) 
[0.36] 
 
-0.0535 
(-0.57) 
[0.57] 
ENERGY 
-0.0399 
(-0.54) 
[0.59] 
-0.0027 
(-0.04) 
[0.97] 
 
0.0525 
(1.31) 
[0.20] 
TELECOM 
-0.1576 
(-1.30) 
[0.20] 
-0.1044 
(-1.40) 
[0.17] 
 
-0.0754 
(-1.09) 
[0.28] 
SERVICE 
-0.1659 
(-1.60) 
[0.12] 
-0.1828 
(-2.07) 
[0.04] 
 
-0.1301 
(-1.57) 
[0.12] 
UTILITIES 
-0.1090 
(-1.52) 
[0.14] 
-0.0191 
(-0.29) 
[0.77] 
 
-0.0126 
(-0.26) 
[0.80] 
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Variable Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
TRANSPORTATION 
-0.1423 
(-2.27) 
[0.03] 
-0.0909 
(-1.75) 
[0.08] 
 
-0.0721 
(-1.60) 
[0.11] 
CHEMICAL 
-0.1141 
(-1.76) 
[0.09] 
-0.1206 
(-2.76) 
[0.01] 
 
-0.1092 
(-4.26) 
[0.00] 
Obs 60 82 82 82 
R-sq 0.2464 0.1806 0.1006 0.1194 
F  3.99 4.73 5.4 
Prob>F  0.0001 0.0018 0 
 
Note: The dependent variables in Models 5-8 are 3-year calendar-time abnormal returns (Y3CTARs). Models 
5,6 and 8 are fixed effects models with fixed group on sector variable. Model 7 is simple OLS regression. 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Numbers in brackets are p-values. t-statistics are calculated from White 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
178 
 
Table 5.1 Summary Information on Multi-listings 
 
Listing 
Number of 
firms 
Number of events Number of observations 
China only 40 50 50 
Hong Kong only 22 30 30 
U.S. only 17 31 31 
China and Hong Kong 4 6 12 
China and U.S. 0 0 0 
Hong Kong and U.S. 9 30 60 
China, Hong Kong and U.S. 4 10 30 
Total 96 157 213 
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Table 5.2  Summary Information on the Correlations Used in  40 
 
Markets N Mean Max Min 
China-US 20 0.1133 0.4028 -0.1008 
China-Hong Kong 32 0.0858 0.3777 -0.1848 
Hong Kong-US 80 0.6088 0.8792 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________________ 
 
40
 We employ 126 days return in estimation period and calculate their dual-listing return correlations. We 
assume constant correlations across 147 days return for each dual-listing and apply estimation period 
correlations to adjust abnormal return correlations in test period. 
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Table 5.3 Stock Price Disparity Between Multi-listing Pairs 
(Mean Absolute Percentage Deviation)
41
 
 
A & H multi-listings H & US multi-listings A & US multi-listings 
Sinopec  0.4551 China Mobile  0.0206 China Ptl.& Chm. 0.4541 
Huaneng Power Intl. 0.3995 China Ptl.& Chm. 0.0228 Yanzhou Coal mining 0.4080 
Yanzhou Coal mining  0.4099 Lenovo GP. 0.0202 China Life Insurance 0.1239 
China Life Insurance 0.1232 PetroChina 0.0224 PetroChina 0.4711 
Aluminum Corp. of China  0.5081 China Netcom GP. 0.0222   
China Nonferrous Metals 0.9854 China Telecom SR. 0.0232   
Angang Steel 0.1931 CNOOC  0.0248   
PetroChina  0.4719 China Res.entrep. 0.0778   
  Yuexiu Property  0.9121   
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A & H multi-listings H & US multi-listings A & US multi-listings 
  China Unic. 0.0247   
  Yanzhou Coal mining  0.0264   
  China Life Insurance 0.0225   
Mean 0.4732 0.0480 0.4089 
Median 0.4551 0.0228 0.4541 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
 
41 
 We employ US dollar prices and all the time series prices in year 2008 are from DataStream. The formula for mean absolute percentage deviation is:  
1 2
2
mapd
p p
P
p

 . 
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Table 5.4  Daily Results Comparison 
 
DAY 
Mainland-listing (64) liquid-listing (157) Multi-listing (213) 
ˆ
OLS  1
ˆ
GLS   
ˆ
OLS  1
ˆ
GLS   
ˆ
OLS  1
ˆ
GLS   2
ˆ
GLS   
-10 
0.0011 0.0009 0.0026 0.0021 0.0026 0.0018 0.0022 
(0.39) (0.40) (0.95) (1.31) (1.19) (1.35) (1.53) 
-9 
0.0037 0.0022 0.0025 0.0018 0.0026 0.0021 0.0023 
(1.35) (0.99) (0.93) (1.16) (1.15) (1.54) (1.59) 
-8 
0.0018 0.0020 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0005 
(0.64) (0.91) (-0.10) (0.04) (-0.18) (-0.23) (-0.34) 
-7 
0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0031 -0.0012 -0.0033 -0.0015 -0.0001 
(0.02) (-0.11) (-1.15) (-0.76) (-1.47) (-1.07) (-0.08) 
-6 
0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0017 -0.0020 -0.0012 -0.0023 -0.0026 
(0.17) (-0.44) (-0.61) (-1.31) (-0.54) (-1.71) (-1.81) 
-5 
0.0040 0.0014 0.0061** 0.0007 0.0051** 0.0006 0.0009 
(1.45) (0.64) (2.22) (0.43) (2.28) (0.43) (0.66) 
-4 
0.0009 0.0030 -0.0023 0.0022 -0.0015 0.0013 0.0016 
(0.32) (1.37) (-0.85) (1.39) (-0.65) (0.95) (1.12) 
-3 
-0.0003 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0011 -0.0005 0.0004 0.0010 
(-0.11) (-0.07) (0.00) (0.68) (-0.24) (0.26) (0.66) 
-2 
0.0016 0.0014 -0.0022 -0.0006 -0.0028 -0.0011 -0.0012 
(0.59) (0.64) (-0.81) (-0.40) (-1.24) (-0.78) (-0.80) 
-1 
0.0087*** 0.0062*** 0.0036 0.0030 0.0033 0.0022 0.0029** 
(3.18) (2.83) (1.32) (1.90) (1.49) (1.61) (2.01) 
0 
0.0003 0.0019 0.0044 0.0017 0.0044** 0.0012 0.0011 
(0.11) (0.86) (1.61) (1.05) (1.99) (0.91) (0.77) 
1 
-0.0010 -0.0019 0.0040 0.0019 0.0054** 0.0031** 0.0025 
(-0.35) (-0.85) (1.48) (1.23) (2.43) (2.28) (1.72) 
2 
-0.0060** -0.0050** -0.0059** -0.0010 -0.0052** -0.0013 -0.0012 
(-2.20) (-2.29) (-2.17) (-0.64) (-2.35) (-0.96) (-0.83) 
3 
0.0002 0.0005 -0.0056** -0.0021 -0.0047** -0.0019 -0.0024 
(0.07) (0.22) (-2.05) (-1.35) (-2.13) (-1.42) (-1.65) 
4 
-0.0045 -0.0031 -0.0024 -0.0016 -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0011 
(-1.64) (-1.41) (-0.86) (-1.04) (-0.45) (-0.60) (-0.78) 
5 
0.0038 0.0020 0.0014 0.0014 0.0018 0.0018 0.0015 
(1.37) (0.94) (0.50) (0.91) (0.83) (1.33) (1.06) 
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DAY 
Mainland-listing (64) liquid-listing (157) Multi-listing (213) 
ˆ
OLS  1
ˆ
GLS   
ˆ
OLS  1
ˆ
GLS   
ˆ
OLS  1
ˆ
GLS   2
ˆ
GLS   
6 
-0.0010 0.0006 -0.0017 -0.0012 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0012 
(-0.36) (0.28 (-0.63) (-0.77) (-0.01) (-0.22) (-0.83) 
7 
0.0029 0.0019 0.0045 0.0008 0.0034 0.0005 0.0010 
(1.06) (0.86) (1.65) (0.48) (1.53) (0.36) (0.69) 
8 
0.0010 0.0026 0.0005 0.0013 0.0010 0.0012 0.0009 
(0.38) (1.21) (0.18) (0.86) (0.43) (0.87) (0.62) 
9 
-0.0023 -0.0034 -0.0006 -0.0015 -0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0011 
(-0.85) (1.56) (-0.23) (-0.98) (-0.19) (-0.91) (-0.80) 
10 
-0.0034 -0.0039 -0.0031 -0.0018 -0.0028 -0.0016 -0.0014 
(-1.24) (-1.77) (-1.13) (-1.15) (-1.25) (-1.19) (-0.99) 
 
Note: OLSˆ refers to estimations from the OLS procedure; 1
ˆ
GLS refers to estimations from the GLS procedure 
that only corrects for heteroscedasticity; 2
ˆ
GLS refers to estimations of the GLS procedure that corrects for 
both heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional dependence. Figures in brackets are Z statistics of point estimates. 
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Table 5.5 Interval Results Comparison 
 
Interval 
Mainland-listing (64) Single-listing (157) Multi-listing (213) 
ˆ
OLS  1
ˆ
GLS   
ˆ
OLS  1
ˆ
GLS   
ˆ
OLS  1
ˆ
GLS   2
ˆ
GLS   
(-10,-6) 
0.0071 0.0008 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 0.0003 
(1.15) (0.78) (0.00) (0.20) (0.06) (0.06) (0.40) 
(-5,-1) 
0.0149** 0.0024** 0.0051 0.0012 0.0036 0.0007 0.0011 
(2.43) (2.42) (0.84) (1.79) (0.73) (1.11) (1.64) 
(-1,1) 
0.0081 0.0021 0.0120** 0.0022** 0.0131*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 
(1.70) (1.64) (2.54) (2.41) (3.41) (2.77) (2.61) 
(1,5) 
-0.0076 -0.0015 -0.0085 -0.0003 -0.0037 0.0002 -0.0001 
(-1.24) (-1.52) (-1.39) (-0.40) (-0.75) (0.28) (-0.21) 
(6,10) 
-0.0028 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0012 -0.0003 -0.0004 
(-0.45) (-0.44) (-0.08) (-0.69) (-0.23) (-0.49) (-0.59) 
(-2,2) 
0.0037 0.0005 0.0039 0.001 0.0052 0.0008 0.0008 
(0.59) (0.53) (0.64) (1.40) (1.04) (1.36) (1.29) 
(-3,3) 
0.0035 0.0004 -0.0017 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 
(0.49) (0.50) (-0.24) (0.93) (-0.02) (0.71) (0.72) 
(-5,5) 
0.0076 0.0006 0.001 0.0006 0.0043 0.0005 0.0005 
(0.84) (0.87) (0.11) (1.25) (0.59) (1.21) (1.19) 
(-10,10) 
0.0119 0.0004 0.0006 0.0002 0.0058 0.0002 0.0002 
(0.95) (0.79) (0.05) (0.67) (0.57) (0.61) (0.77) 
 
Note: OLSˆ refers to estimations from the OLS procedure; 1
ˆ
GLS refers to estimations from the GLS procedure 
that only corrects for heteroscedasticity; 2
ˆ
GLS refers to estimations of the GLS procedure that corrects for 
both heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional dependence. Figures in brackets are Z statistics of point estimates. 
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Figures  
Figure 3.1 Acquiring Firm’s Demand and Supply of OMA Projects 
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Figure 3.2 Chinese OMAs: 1982-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SDC Platinum M&A database 
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Figure 3.3  Stock Market Performance of Chinese OMAs: 1994-2009 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
A.1.1. Proof of Z statistics in Equations (8) and (10)in Chapter Three 
In this section, we derive the formulae for the Z-statistics in Equations (8) and (10) in the text.  
Let ARit represent abnormal returns for security i at time t.  Assume abnormal returns are 
independent and normally distributed: ~ (0, )it itAR N  , where it is the standard deviation of 
abnormal returns during the test period. 
 If we knew it , then 
it
it
AR

 would be independent and standard normal distributed: 
~ (0,1)it
it
AR
N

.  We could then compare , 1,..., ; 1,..., ;it
it
AR
i N t T

  with the critical Z value 
to test whether it
it
AR

 is significantly different from 0. 
 In practise, we wouldn’t test the significance of each it
it
AR

 because there are too 
many of them and they are likely to give conflicting results. Therefore, we prefer to test the 
sum, or the mean, of these it
it
AR

s.  We first derive the variance for the sum of abnormal 
returns on a given test day t across firms, 
1
N
it
i it
AR

 .   
 Note that the 1 2
1 1 2
var( ) var( ... )
N
it t t Nt
i it t t Nt
AR AR AR AR
   
    .  If, as assumed, the it
it
AR

 
are distributed independently, then the variance of the sum equals the sum of the individual 
variances, 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 12
var( ... ) var( ) var( ) var( )t t Nt t t Nt
t t Nt t t Nt
AR AR AR AR AR AR
     
     
 
.  However, 
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since each of the ARs is standardized, the variances of the individual it
it
AR

 
terms are each 
equal to 1.  Thus, 
1
var( ) 1 1 1 .
N
it
i it
AR
N

    ; and the corresponding standard deviation is 
N
 
.  Note further that if the individual it
it
AR

terms are normally distributed, then the sum of 
these terms will also be normally distributed.   
If we divide the sum of the abnormal returns for a given test day by its standard 
deviation, call it  
(A.1)   
1
1 N it
t
i it
AR
Z
N 
   ,  
then Z will be normally distributed with variance equal to 1, 
1
1
~ (0,1)
N
i
i i
AR
Z N
N 
  .
 
The previous analysis is easily extended to the case when cumulative abnormal returns 
are summed over the interval (T1, T1+1,…,T2). 
In this case 
.)1()var( 12
1
2
1
NTT
ART
Tt
N
i it
it 
    
The compounding standard deviation is 
.112 NTT 
 
Now define that 
（A．2） 
.
1
1 2
1 112

 

T
Tt
N
i it
itAR
NTT
Z
  
It follows that 
).1,0(~
1
1 2
1 112
N
AR
NTT
Z
T
Tt
N
i it
it
 


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Many researchers find it convenient to work with the mean of the sum of it
it
AR

 
(ASAR). 
Consider first the single period are defined 
(A.3)  /it jt jtSAR AR   
Then 
(A.4)  
1
N
it
i
t
SAR
ASAR
N


 
.
11
)var(
1
)var(
1
22 


N
i
itt
N
N
N
SAR
N
ASAR
 
The associated standard deviation is N
1
.  
Define 
(A.5)  
t
t ASARN
N
ASAR
Z 
)/1(  
For reasons given earlier,  
).1,0(~ NASARNZ t
 
It is straightforward to show that the Z in (A.5) is identical to the Z in (A.1) 
Similarly, researchers sometimes prefer to work with the average of the standardized 
cumulative abnormal returns (ASCAR). 
(A.6)   

 

2
1
21
1
,
1 T
Tt
N
i
itTT SAR
N
ASCAR
 
).1(
1
)1(
1
)var(
1
)var( 12122
1
2,
2
1
21
 
 
TT
N
NTT
N
SAR
N
ASCAR
T
Tt
N
i
itTT
 
The associated standard deviation is 
.1
1
12 TT
N  
Define 
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(A.7)     
21
21
,
1212
,
11/1
TT
TT
ASCAR
TT
N
TTN
ASCAR
Z 




 
It follows that  
)1,0(~,
1
21 ,
12
NASCAR
TT
N
Z TT


 
Further, the Z in (A.7) is easily shown to be identical to the Z in (A.2). 
   Equations (A.1),(A.2),(A.5) and (A.7) appear frequently in the literature, albeit with 
different notation.  
For example, equation (9) in Mikkelson and Partch (1986) reports the Z test statistic as 
 
(A.8)     
1, 2( )T TZ N AISPE , 
where 
1, 2T TAISPE  stands for ―average interval standardized predicted error‖ in time period T1 
to T2 and is defined by 
(A.9)     .1/
1
1
12,
2
1
21 
 

N
i
T
Tt
itTT TTSPE
N
AISPE
i
i
 
However jt jtSPE SAR ; 
So  .
1
1
1 12
2
1
21 
  

N
i
T
Tt
it
TT
TT
SAR
N
AISPE  
From equation (A.6), 
(A.10)    .
1
1
2121 ,
12
, TTTT ASCAR
TT
AISPE 

  
Substituting (A.10) into (A.8) gives 
(A.11)    .
1
21 ,
12
TTASCAR
TT
N
Z 

  
which is identical to the Z in (A.7). 
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Because the sample is standard normally distributed, we use the Z-test to test the null 
hypothesis that the respective mean equal to 0. Testing proceeds by comparing the sample 
value of Z with the appropriate critical Z value. 
A.1.2. Estimating the Standard Deviation of Abnormal Returns for Firm i. 
In practise, we don’t know it . One approach is to assume it   for all i and t. 
To estimate  , we calculate abnormal returns for each security and time period.   is 
estimated by the sample standard deviation for all abnormal returns during the estimation 
period. 
   We define abnormal returns, ARit are 
(A. 12)  )].([ ititit RERAR 
 We estimate expected returns for security i at time t, E(Rit), using the market model. 
(A. 13)  .ˆˆ)(ˆ mtitit RRER    
   When iˆ  and iˆ  come from estimating the model 
(A.14)   ismsiiis RR    
Using observations from the estimation period. Suppose there are S observations for each of 
N securities, then 
(A.15)  .
22
]ˆ[
ˆ 1 1
2
1 1
2






  
NS
e
NS
RR
N
i
S
s
it
N
i
S
s
itit
  
When eit is the residual from the regression of (A.14). 
Substituting ARit and  ˆˆ it  into (A.1), (A.2), (A.5) and (A.7) produces the appropriate 
sample statistic. Strictly speaking, this sample statistic is distributed t. however, the standard 
normal distribution is a good approximation when (NS-2)>30. 
193 
 
    A less restrictive approach for estimating 
it
 allows ˆ
it
 to be different for i and t. Patell 
(1976) assumes, each security has a different variance. Let si
2
 be the variance of the residuals 
for security i during the estimation period, 
(A.16)  
2
2 1
ˆ
2
S
is
s
i
e
s
S



 (also see Beaver (1968)). 
    Patell shows that the standard deviation for the abnormal returns for security i at time t (in 
the test period) can be estimated by  
(A.17)  
it
ˆ
i its c    
where  
(A.18)  
2
2
1
( )1
1
( )
mt m
it S
ms m
s
R R
c
S
R R


  

 
(A.19)  
1
1 S
m ms
s
R R
S 
   
S equals number of days in estimation period, and itc  reflects the increase in variance 
due to prediction outside the estimation period. 
We next show how this formula is derived. Abnormal returns as an defined in (A.12) and 
(A.13) as 
.ˆ)( ititititit RRRERAR 
 where itRˆ  is the predicted value at time t in the test period based on the estimation of 
.ismsiiis RR     for the estimation period. 
Thus  
(A.20) ).|ˆcov(2)|ˆvar()|var()|var( mtititmtitmtitmt RRRRRRRRAR    
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We assume that itR and 
ˆ
itR are independent because the ˆi and 
ˆ
i  used to calculate 
ˆ
itR  
come from the estimation period, not the test period, therefore, 
(A.21)  .0)|ˆcov( mtitit RRR  
Further  
(A.22)  ,)var()|var()|var(
2
ititmtitmtiimtit RRRR    
and  
(A.23)  
).|ˆˆcov(2)|ˆvar()ˆvar(
)|ˆˆvar()|ˆvar(
mtmtiimtmtii
mtmtiimtit
RRRR
RRRR




 
It can be shown that ˆi and 
ˆ
i are independent, thus 
ˆˆcov( | ) 0;i i mt mtR R    
    It can also be shown that 
2
ˆvar( ) ii
S

     And 
2
2
2
1
( )ˆvar( | )
( )
mt m
i mt mt i S
ms m
s
R R
R R
R R
 


 

. 
Substituting the above into (A.23) yields 
(A.24) )ˆˆcov(2)|ˆvar()ˆvar()|ˆvar( mtiimtmtiimtit RRRRR    
2 2
2
2
1
( )
( ) 0
( )
i mt m
i S
ms m
s
R R
S
R R




  

 
where  
S is the number of observations in estimation period and 
1
1 S
m ms
s
R R
S 
   
Substituting (A.24), (A.22) and (A.21) into (A.20) yields 
(A.25)  
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2
1 1
( ) ( )1
var( | ) ( ) (1 )
( ) ( )
it mt m mt
it mt i i iS S
ms m ms m
s s
R R R R
AR R
S S
R R R R

  
 
 
     
  
 
Finally,  
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(A.26)  
2
2
1
( )1
ˆ( | ) 1
( )
mt m
it mt it i S
ms m
s
R R
Stddev AR R
S
R R
 


   

.
 
See (Brown, 1985; Doukas & Travlos, 1988; Dunne & Ndubizu, 1995; Mikkelson & Partch, 
1986; Patell, 1976) 
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Appendix 2. Matlab Coding in Chapter Three  
 
In this section, we report the Matlab code edited for calculating daily and interval abnormal 
returns of Chinese OMAs with event study methodology in Chapter Three.    
 
%% INPUT: RC1,RM1,testRC1,testRM1,LIST 
RC=RC1';  % return matrix for securities in estimation period; 
RM=RM1';  % return matrix for market indices in estimation period; 
testRC=testRC1';  % return matrix for securities in test period; 
testRM=testRM1';  % return matrix for market indices in test period; 
 
%% FOR DAILY Z VALUE AND P VALUE OF ABNORMAL RETURNS 
A=size(RC); 
L=A(1); % number of days in estimation period  
rbarm=sum(RM)/L; % average market return in estimation period 
for i=1:A(2); % i refers to columns of the matrix (number of securities)  
    B(:,i) =sum((RM(:,i)-rbarm(:,i)).^2); 
    C(:,i)=(testRM(:,i)-rbarm(:,i)).^2; 
    D(:,i)=1+1/L+C(:,i)/B(:,i);  
    [b(:,i),bint,r,rint,stats] = regress(RC(:,i),[ones(L,1),RM(:,i)]); % regression function with market model 
    s2(:,i)=stats(:,4);    % error variance for idividual security from market model 
    sjt(:,i)=sqrt(s2(:,i).*D(:,i)); % square root of firm j's estimated forecast variance 
    er=testRM.*b(2,i)+b(1,i);  % expected returns in test period 
    ar(:,i)=testRC(:,i)-er(:,i);  % abnormal return in test period 
    AAR=mean(ar')'; % average abnormal returns in test period 
    SAR=(ar./sjt)';   % standardized abnormal returns 
    SAR1=SAR';  %transpost standardized abnormal returns 
    ASAR=(1/A(2))*sum((ar./sjt)')';  % average standardized abnormal returns in test period 
    Z1=(A(2)^0.5)*ASAR;   % Z value of daily average standardized abnormal returns 
    p1=2*(1-normcdf(abs(Z1)));  % p value of daily average abnormal returns 
end 
 
%% FOR INTERVAL Z & p 
for i=1:A(2) 
car1(:,i)=sum(ar(1:6,i));  
%  vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-10,-5); 
car2(:,i)=sum(ar(1:10,i));  
%  vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-10,-1); 
car3(:,i)=sum(ar(6:10,i));  
%  vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-5,-1);      
car4(:,i)=sum(ar(10:12,i));  
%  vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-1,1); 
car5(:,i)=sum(ar(12:16,i));  
%  vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (1,5); 
car6(:,i)=sum(ar(16:21,i));  
%  vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (5,10); 
car7(:,i)=sum(ar(12:21,i)); 
%  vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (1,10); 
car8(:,i)=sum(ar(6:16,i));  
%  vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-5,5); 
car9(:,i)=sum(ar(1:21,i));  
%  vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-10,10); 
car10(:,i)=sum(ar(9:13,i));  
%  vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-2,2); 
car11(:,i)=sum(ar(8:14,i));  
%  vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-3,3); 
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ACAR=[mean(car1');mean(car2');mean(car3');mean(car4');mean(car5');mean(car6');mean(car7');mean(car8');me
an(car9');mean(car10');mean(car11')]; 
    % average cumulated abnormal return of intervals  
    
SCAR(:,i)=[sum(SAR(1:6,i));sum(SAR(1:10,i));sum(SAR(6:10,i));sum(SAR(10:12,i));sum(SAR(12:16,i));sum(
SAR(16:21,i));sum(SAR(12:21,i));sum(SAR(6:16,i));sum(SAR(1:21,i));sum(SAR(9:13,i));sum(SAR(8:14,i))]'; 
end 
%  FOR INTERVAL P MATRIX AND ADJUSTED Z VALUE AND P VALUE 
    C=[6,10,5,3,5,6,10,11,21,5,7];  
%  length (days) of 11 intervals defined above. 
    ASCAR=sum(SCAR')./(A(2).*sqrt(C)); 
% average standardized cumulative abnormal returns 
    Z2=sum(SCAR')./sqrt(A(2).*C); 
% Z value of interval standardized abnormal returns 
    p2=2*(1-normcdf(abs(Z2)));   
% p value of interval standardized abnormal returns 
 
%% performance 
DATRADAILY=[AAR,ASAR,Z1,p1]; % daily results 
INTRAINTERVAL=[ACAR,ASCAR’,Z2’,p2’]; % interval results 
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Appendix  3   Matlab Coding in Chapter Five 
A.3.1. Matlab Coding for OLS Estimator 
%% INPUT: RC1,RM1,testRC1,testRM1,LIST 
RC=RC1';  % return matrix for securities in estimation period; 
RM=RM1';  % return matrix for market indices in estimation period; 
testRC=testRC1'; % return matrix for securities in test period; 
testRM=testRM1';  % return matrix for market indices in test period; 
% LIST is  multilist vector. 
%% FOR DAILY Z VALUE AND P VALUE OF ABNORMAL RETURNS 
A=size(RC);   L=A(1);   % A(1) refers to number of days in estimation period, A(2) refers to number of 
securities.  
rbarm=sum(RM)/L; 
for i=1:A(2); % i refers to columns of the matrix (number of securities)  
    B(:,i) =sum((RM(:,i)-rbarm(:,i)).^2); 
    C(:,i)=(testRM(:,i)-rbarm(:,i)).^2; 
    D(:,i)=1+1/L+C(:,i)/B(:,i); 
    [b(:,i),bint,r,rint,stats] = regress(RC(:,i),[ones(L,1),RM(:,i)]); % regression function with market model 
    s2(:,i)=stats(:,4);    % error variance for idividual security from market model(squared one) 
    er=testRM.*b(2,i)+b(1,i); 
    ar(:,i)=testRC(:,i)-er(:,i);  % abnormal return matrix 
    AAR=mean(ar')';   %   mean abnorma returns on days 
    sjt=sqrt((sum(s2)/(A(2)-1))); % segma of idividual securities  
    SAR=(ar./sjt);   % standardized abnormal returns 21x213 
    SAR1=SAR';  % standardized abnormal returns 213x21 
    ASAR=(1/A(2))*sum((ar./sjt)')';  % standardized abnormal returns for each day in test period 
end 
%% FOR P MATRIX AND ADJUSTED Z VALUE AND P VALUE 
for i=1:21; 
    Z=sqrt(A(2))*ASAR; 
    p=2*(1-normcdf(abs(Z))); 
end 
% FOR CUMULATIVE Z AND p VALUE 
ASCAR=[sum(ASAR(1:5))/sqrt(5),sum(ASAR(6:10))/sqrt(5),sum(ASAR(10:12))/sqrt(3),sum(ASAR(12:16))/s
qrt(5),sum(ASAR(17:21))/sqrt(5),sum(ASAR(9:13))/sqrt(5),sum(ASAR(8:14))/sqrt(7),sum(ASAR(6:16))/sqrt(1
1),sum(ASAR(1:21))/sqrt(21)]'; 
for i=1:A(2),t=1:21; 
    car1(:,i)=sum(ar(1:5,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-10,-6); 
    car2(:,i)=sum(ar(6:10,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-5,-1); 
    car3(:,i)=sum(ar(10:12,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-1,1);      
    car4(:,i)=sum(ar(12:16,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (1,5); 
    car5(:,i)=sum(ar(17:21,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (6,10); 
    car6(:,i)=sum(ar(9:13,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-2,2); 
    car7(:,i)=sum(ar(8:14,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-3,3); 
    car8(:,i)=sum(ar(6:16,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-5,5); 
    car9(:,i)=sum(ar(1:21,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-10,10); 
    
ACAR=[mean(car1');mean(car2');mean(car3');mean(car4');mean(car5');mean(car6');mean(car7');mean(car8');me
an(car9')]; % mean cumulated abnormal returns 
end 
%% FOR INTERVAL P MATRIX AND ADJUSTED Z VALUE AND P VALUE 
for i=1:21 
    Z4=sqrt(A(2))*ASCAR; 
    p4=2*(1-normcdf(abs(Z4))); 
end 
%% performance 
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DAILY=[AAR';Z'];  
DAILY=DAILY(:);  %Adjusted results for daily ASAR, Z test and p value 
INTERVAL=[ACAR';Z4']; 
INTERVAL=INTERVAL(:);   %Adjusted results for interval ASCAR, Z test and p value
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A.3.2. Matlab Coding for GLS-1 Estimator 
%% INPUT: RC1,RM1,testRC1,testRM1,LIST 
RC=RC1';  % return matrix for securities in estimation period; 
RM=RM1';  % return matrix for market indices in estimation period; 
testRC=testRC1'; % return matrix for securities in test period; 
testRM=testRM1';  % return matrix for market indices in test period; 
% LIST is  multilist vector. 
%% For studentized STAR 
A=size(RC); % A(1) refers to number of days in estimation period, A(2) refers to number of securities. 
OMEGA=eye(A(2));  %% correlation matrix with only multi-listing coefficients. 
P= chol(inv(OMEGA));  % omega inverse matrix 213x213 
%% FOR DAILY Z VALUE AND P VALUE OF ABNORMAL RETURNS 
L=A(1);   
rbarm=sum(RM)/L; 
for i=1:A(2); % i refers to columns of the matrix (number of securities)  
    B(:,i) =sum((RM(:,i)-rbarm(:,i)).^2); 
    C(:,i)=(testRM(:,i)-rbarm(:,i)).^2; 
    D(:,i)=1+1/L+C(:,i)/B(:,i); 
    [b(:,i),bint,r,rint,stats] = regress(RC(:,i),[ones(L,1),RM(:,i)]); % regression function with market model 
    s2(:,i)=stats(:,4);    % error variance for idividual security from market model(squared one) 
    er=testRM.*b(2,i)+b(1,i); 
    ar(:,i)=testRC(:,i)-er(:,i);  % abnormal return matrix 
    AAR=mean(ar')';   %   mean abnorma returns on days 
    sjt(:,i)=(s2(:,i).*D(:,i)).^0.5; % segma of idividual securities  
    SAR=(ar./sjt);   % standardized abnormal returns 21x213 
    SAR1=SAR';  % standardized abnormal returns 213x21 
    ASAR=(1/A(2))*sum((ar./sjt)')';  % standardized abnormal returns for each day in test period 
end 
xtidea=ones(A(2),21)./sjt';  % standardized ones matrix 213x21 
E=xtidea';   % standardized ones matrix (21x213) 
%% FOR P MATRIX AND ADJUSTED Z VALUE AND P VALUE 
for i=1:21; 
   
ASCAR=[sum(ASAR(1:5))/sqrt(5),sum(ASAR(6:10))/sqrt(5),sum(ASAR(10:12))/sqrt(3),sum(ASAR(12:16))/s
qrt(5),sum(ASAR(17:21))/sqrt(5),sum(ASAR(9:13))/sqrt(5),sum(ASAR(8:14))/sqrt(7),sum(ASAR(6:16))/sqrt(1
1),sum(ASAR(1:21))/sqrt(21)]'; 
   NU1(:,i)=inv(E(i,:)*xtidea(:,i));   % first part of numerater 
   NU2(:,i)=E(i,:)*SAR1(:,i);    % second part of numerater 
   DE(:,i)=sqrt(inv(E(i,:)*xtidea(:,i)));     % denominator 
   SDE(:,i)=E(i,:)*xtidea(:,i); 
   betah(:,i)=(NU1(:,i)*NU2(:,i)); 
   Z(:,i)=(NU1(:,i)*NU2(:,i))/DE(:,i);   %Z value of daily betahat 
   p=2*(1-normcdf(abs(Z)));   %p value of daily AAR 
end 
% FOR CUMULATIVE Z AND p VALUE 
for i=1:A(2),t=1:21; 
    car1(:,i)=sum(ar(1:5,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-10,-6); 
    car2(:,i)=sum(ar(6:10,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-5,-1); 
    car3(:,i)=sum(ar(10:12,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-1,1);      
    car4(:,i)=sum(ar(12:16,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (1,5); 
    car5(:,i)=sum(ar(17:21,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (6,10); 
    car6(:,i)=sum(ar(9:13,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-2,2); 
    car7(:,i)=sum(ar(8:14,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-3,3); 
    car8(:,i)=sum(ar(6:16,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-5,5); 
    car9(:,i)=sum(ar(1:21,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-10,10); 
    
ACAR=[mean(car1');mean(car2');mean(car3');mean(car4');mean(car5');mean(car6');mean(car7');mean(car8');me
an(car9')]; % mean cumulated abnormal returns 
end 
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%% FOR INTERVAL P MATRIX AND ADJUSTED Z VALUE AND P VALUE 
for i=1:21  
    DE1=sqrt(inv(sum(SDE(:,1:5)))); 
    DE2=sqrt(inv(sum(SDE(:,6:10)))); 
    DE3=sqrt(inv(sum(SDE(:,10:12)))); 
    DE4=sqrt(inv(sum(SDE(:,12:16)))); 
    DE5=sqrt(inv(sum(SDE(:,17:21)))); 
    DE6=sqrt(inv(sum(SDE(:,9:13)))); 
    DE7=sqrt(inv(sum(SDE(:,8:14)))); 
    DE8=sqrt(inv(sum(SDE(:,6:16)))); 
    DE9=sqrt(inv(sum(SDE(:,1:21)))); 
    BETAH1=inv(sum(SDE(:,1:5)))*sum(NU2(:,1:5)); 
    BETAH2=inv(sum(SDE(:,6:10)))*sum(NU2(:,6:10)); 
    BETAH3=inv(sum(SDE(:,10:12)))*sum(NU2(:,10:12)); 
    BETAH4=inv(sum(SDE(:,12:16)))*sum(NU2(:,12:16)); 
    BETAH5=inv(sum(SDE(:,17:21)))*sum(NU2(:,17:21)); 
    BETAH6=inv(sum(SDE(:,9:13)))*sum(NU2(:,9:13)); 
    BETAH7=inv(sum(SDE(:,8:14)))*sum(NU2(:,8:14)); 
    BETAH8=inv(sum(SDE(:,6:16)))*sum(NU2(:,6:16)); 
    BETAH9=inv(sum(SDE(:,1:21)))*sum(NU2(:,1:21));  
    BETAH=[BETAH1,BETAH2,BETAH3,BETAH4,BETAH5,BETAH6,BETAH7,BETAH8,BETAH9]; 
    Z41=DE1*sum(NU2(:,1:5));    % Z value for interval (-10,-6); 
    Z42=DE2*sum(NU2(:,6:10));    % Z value for interval (-5,-1); 
    Z43=DE3*sum(NU2(:,10:12));   % Z vlaue for interval (-1,1); 
    Z44=DE4*sum(NU2(:,12:16));    % Z value for interval (1,5); 
    Z45=DE5*sum(NU2(:,17:21));    % Z value for interval (6,10); 
    Z46=DE6*sum(NU2(:,9:13));     % Z value for interval (-2,2); 
    Z47=DE7*sum(NU2(:,8:14));     % Z value for interval (-3,3); 
    Z48=DE8*sum(NU2(:,6:16));     % Z value for interval (-5,5); 
    Z49=DE9*sum(NU2(:,1:21));     % Z value for interval (-10,10); 
    Z4=[Z41,Z42,Z43,Z44,Z45,Z46,Z47,Z48,Z49]; 
    p4=2*(1-normcdf(abs(Z4))); 
end 
%% performance 
DAILY=[betah;Z];    
DAILY=DAILY(:);      %Adjusted results for daily ASAR, Z test and p value 
INTERVAL=[BETAH;Z4];    
INTERVAL=INTERVAL(:);  %Adjusted results for interval ASCAR, Z test and p value 
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A.3.3. Matlab Coding for GLS-2 Estimation 
%% INPUT: RC1,RM1,testRC1,testRM1,LIST 
RC=RC1';  % return matrix for securities in estimation period; 
RM=RM1';  % return matrix for market indices in estimation period; 
testRC=testRC1'; % return matrix for securities in test period; 
testRM=testRM1';  % return matrix for market indices in test period; 
% LIST is  multilist vector. 
%% For studentized STAR 
A=size(RC); % A(1) refers to number of days in estimation period, A(2) refers to number of securities. 
for i=1:A(2); % i refers to columns of the matrix (number of securities)  
    [b(:,i),bint,r,rint,stats] = regress(RC(:,i),[ones(A(1),1),RM(:,i)]); % regression function with market model 
    er=RM.*b(2,i)+b(1,i); 
    Ear(:,i)=RC(:,i)-er(:,i);  % residuals, abnormal return of estimation period 
    X1=[ones(A(1),1),RM(:,i)]; 
    H=X1*inv(X1'*X1)*X1'; 
    hi=diag(H); 
    segmahat2=sum(Ear'.^2)/(A(1)-2);  %the estimate of segmahat2 for internally studentized residuals 
    sjt2(:,i)=((segmahat2'.^0.5).*((1-hi)).^0.5); % denominator of studentized residuals  
    STAR=Ear./sjt2;   % studentized residuals 
end 
%% FOR OMEGA 
OMEGA=corrcoef(STAR);   %% correlation matrix of abnormal return. 
G=size(STAR);  % Size of the abnormal return matrix. 
Multi=eye(G(2));   %Identity matrix. 
%% 
for i=1:(G(2)-1); 
    if LIST(i+1,1)==LIST(i,1); 
        Multi(i+1,i)=1; 
    end 
end 
for i=1:(G(2)-2); 
     if LIST(i+2,1)==LIST(i,1); 
          Multi(i+2,i)=1; 
     end 
end 
for i=1:(G(2)-3); 
    if LIST(i+3,1)==LIST(i,1); 
          Multi(i+3,i)=1;    
    end 
end 
Multi=0.5*(Multi+transpose(Multi)); 
OMEGA(~Multi)=0;  %% correlation matrix with only multi-listing coefficients. 
P= chol(inv(OMEGA));  % omega inverse matrix 213x213 
%% FOR DAILY Z VALUE AND P VALUE OF ABNORMAL RETURNS 
L=A(1);   
rbarm=sum(RM)/L; 
for i=1:A(2); % i refers to columns of the matrix (number of securities)  
    B(:,i) =sum((RM(:,i)-rbarm(:,i)).^2); 
    C(:,i)=(testRM(:,i)-rbarm(:,i)).^2; 
    D(:,i)=1+1/L+C(:,i)/B(:,i); 
    [b(:,i),bint,r,rint,stats] = regress(RC(:,i),[ones(L,1),RM(:,i)]); % regression function with market model 
    s2(:,i)=stats(:,4);    % error variance for idividual security from market model(squared one) 
    er=testRM.*b(2,i)+b(1,i); 
    ar(:,i)=testRC(:,i)-er(:,i);  % abnormal return matrix 
    AAR=mean(ar')';   %   mean abnorma returns on days 
    sjt(:,i)=(s2(:,i).*D(:,i)).^0.5; % segma of idividual securities  
    SAR=(ar./sjt);   % standardized abnormal returns 21x213 
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    SAR1=SAR';  % standardized abnormal returns 213x21 
    ASAR=(1/A(2))*sum((ar./sjt)')';  % standardized abnormal returns for each day in test period 
end 
xtidea=ones(A(2),21)./sjt';  % standardized ones matrix 213x21 
E=xtidea';   % standardized ones matrix (21x213) 
%% FOR P MATRIX AND ADJUSTED Z VALUE AND P VALUE 
for i=1:21; 
   
ASCAR=[sum(ASAR(1:5))/sqrt(5),sum(ASAR(6:10))/sqrt(5),sum(ASAR(10:12))/sqrt(3),sum(ASAR(12:16))/s
qrt(5),sum(ASAR(17:21))/sqrt(5),sum(ASAR(9:13))/sqrt(5),sum(ASAR(8:14))/sqrt(7),sum(ASAR(6:16))/sqrt(1
1),sum(ASAR(1:21))/sqrt(21)]'; 
   NU1(:,i)=inv(E(i,:)*P*xtidea(:,i));   % first part of numerater 
   NU2(:,i)=E(i,:)*P*SAR1(:,i);    % second part of numerater 
   DE(:,i)=sqrt(inv(E(i,:)*P*xtidea(:,i)));     % denominator 
   SDE(:,i)=E(i,:)*P*xtidea(:,i); 
   betah(:,i)=(NU1(:,i)*NU2(:,i)); 
   Z(:,i)=(NU1(:,i)*NU2(:,i))/DE(:,i);   %Z value of daily AAR 
   p=2*(1-normcdf(abs(Z)));   %p value of daily AAR 
end 
% FOR CUMULATIVE Z AND p VALUE 
for i=1:A(2),t=1:21; 
    car1(:,i)=sum(ar(1:5,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-10,-6); 
    car2(:,i)=sum(ar(6:10,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-5,-1); 
    car3(:,i)=sum(ar(10:12,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-1,1);      
    car4(:,i)=sum(ar(12:16,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (1,5); 
    car5(:,i)=sum(ar(17:21,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (6,10); 
    car6(:,i)=sum(ar(9:13,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-2,2); 
    car7(:,i)=sum(ar(8:14,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-3,3); 
    car8(:,i)=sum(ar(6:16,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-5,5); 
    car9(:,i)=sum(ar(1:21,i)); %vector,cumulated abnormal return of interval (-10,10); 
    
ACAR=[mean(car1');mean(car2');mean(car3');mean(car4');mean(car5');mean(car6');mean(car7');mean(car8');me
an(car9')]; % mean cumulated abnormal returns 
end 
%% FOR INTERVAL P MATRIX AND ADJUSTED Z VALUE AND P VALUE 
for i=1:21 
    DE1=sqrt(inv(sum(SDE(:,1:5)))); 
    DE2=sqrt(inv(sum(SDE(:,6:10)))); 
    DE3=sqrt(inv(sum(SDE(:,10:12)))); 
    DE4=sqrt(inv(sum(SDE(:,12:16)))); 
    DE5=sqrt(inv(sum(SDE(:,17:21)))); 
    DE6=sqrt(inv(sum(SDE(:,9:13)))); 
    DE7=sqrt(inv(sum(SDE(:,8:14)))); 
    DE8=sqrt(inv(sum(SDE(:,6:16)))); 
    DE9=sqrt(inv(sum(SDE(:,1:21)))); 
    BETAH1=inv(sum(SDE(:,1:5)))*sum(NU2(:,1:5));  % Beta estimation of cumulative abnormal returns (-10,-
6). 
    BETAH2=inv(sum(SDE(:,6:10)))*sum(NU2(:,6:10)); % Beta estimation of cumulative abnormal returns (-5,-
1). 
    BETAH3=inv(sum(SDE(:,10:12)))*sum(NU2(:,10:12)); % Beta estimation of cumulative abnormal returns (-
1,1). 
    BETAH4=inv(sum(SDE(:,12:16)))*sum(NU2(:,12:16)); % Beta estimation of cumulative abnormal returns 
(1,5). 
    BETAH5=inv(sum(SDE(:,17:21)))*sum(NU2(:,17:21)); % Beta estimation of cumulative abnormal returns 
(6,10). 
    BETAH6=inv(sum(SDE(:,9:13)))*sum(NU2(:,9:13));  % Beta estimation of cumulative abnormal returns (-
2,2). 
    BETAH7=inv(sum(SDE(:,8:14)))*sum(NU2(:,8:14));  % Beta estimation of cumulative abnormal returns (-
3,3). 
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    BETAH8=inv(sum(SDE(:,6:16)))*sum(NU2(:,6:16));  % Beta estimation of cumulative abnormal returns (-
5,5). 
    BETAH9=inv(sum(SDE(:,1:21)))*sum(NU2(:,1:21));  % Beta estimation of cumulative abnormal returns (-
10,10). 
    
BETAH=[BETAH1,BETAH2,BETAH3,BETAH4,BETAH5,BETAH6,BETAH7,BETAH8,BETAH9]; %Beta 
matrix for cumulative abnromal returns. 
    Z41=DE1*sum(NU2(:,1:5));    % Z value for interval (-10,-6); 
    Z42=DE2*sum(NU2(:,6:10));    % Z value for interval (-5,-1); 
    Z43=DE3*sum(NU2(:,10:12));   % Z vlaue for interval (-1,1); 
    Z44=DE4*sum(NU2(:,12:16));    % Z value for interval (1,5); 
    Z45=DE5*sum(NU2(:,17:21));    % Z value for interval (6,10); 
    Z46=DE6*sum(NU2(:,9:13));     % Z value for interval (-2,2); 
    Z47=DE7*sum(NU2(:,8:14));     % Z value for interval (-3,3); 
    Z48=DE8*sum(NU2(:,6:16));     % Z value for interval (-5,5); 
    Z49=DE9*sum(NU2(:,1:21));     % Z value for interval (-10,10); 
    Z4=[Z41,Z42,Z43,Z44,Z45,Z46,Z47,Z48,Z49];  % Z value matrix for cumulative abnormal returns. 
    p4=2*(1-normcdf(abs(Z4)));   %p value of Z values 
end 
%% performance 
DAILY=[betah;Z];    
DAILY=DAILY(:);      %Adjusted results for daily abnormal returns and Z value. 
INTERVAL=[BETAH;Z4];    
INTERVAL=INTERVAL(:);     %Adjusted results for interval abnormal returns and Z value. 
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